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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
MIGRATION, YOUTH, AND NATIONHOOD: REPRODUCING THE RACIAL 
STATE IN BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA 
by 
María Victoria Barbero 
Florida International University, 2019 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Percy Hintzen, Major Professor 
This dissertation examines the nexus among migration, youth and the state in the 
south-south migratory context of Buenos Aires, Argentina. Drawing from 
documentary, ethnographic, interview, and archival data, it unpacks a series of 
contradicting realities that shape migrant youth’s experiences of protection, 
mobility, and belonging in Argentina despite progressive immigration policies. 
Specifically, it looks at 1) uneven state responses to the international movement 
of young people, 2) everyday exclusionary geographies that serve to criminalize 
young migrants, and 3) moral panics about youth migration that challenge the 
existence of progressive policies and make evident the historically-rooted racial 
structures of belonging that undergird contemporary immigration policy, discourse, 
and practice.  By unpacking deep contradictions between the official narratives and 
policies of the Argentine state, and its everyday practices and discourses, this 
dissertation intervenes in multiple scholarly debates pertinent both to the Latin 
American region and countries of the global north, arguing that securitized 
narratives about immigration function to sustain the racial state. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
In this dissertation, I explore issues of protection, mobility, and belonging as 
they pertain to migrant youth living in Buenos Aires, Argentina. In past decades, 
we have seen the framing of migration as a problem of security spread across the 
countries of the global north, and increasingly so, the global south.  Across the 
Americas, there has been rising popular opposition to the presence of immigrants, 
accompanied by growing animus and hateful rhetoric, encouraged and promoted 
most forcefully by powerful political figures like Donald Trump, president of the 
United States, and Jair Bolsonaro, president of Brazil. Youth—seen as 
personifying societies’ deepest hopes and anxieties—often become the 
battleground in immigration debates (Maira and Soep 2005). Indeed, they are at 
the center of securitizing narratives and efforts, constructed as threats to the state: 
as burdens to social welfare programs, deviant criminals, potential gang members, 
unruly and promiscuous teens, future terrorists, and so on. And while youth under 
the age of 29 make up around one-third of all global immigrants (United Nations 
2013), the topic of youth migration has not received significant attention in the 
scholarly literature, with researchers either focusing on migrants as 
undifferentiated adults or on children. This research focuses on youth, who—
straddling the elusive boundaries of childhood and adulthood, innocence and 
criminality, protection and control— are often at the center of what some scholars 
call the “securitization of migration,” or the framing of migration as a security threat.  
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Having led the way toward progressive South American immigration 
policies in the 21st century, Argentina becomes a key case for analysis in the 
current global context.  Despite a legal framework that stands in stark opposition 
to those forged in restrictive contexts and which provides access to legal status for 
most immigrants, the racial configuration of the Argentine nation-state continues 
to shape the experiences of global south migrants.  Through a focus on the 
disjuncture among policy, discourse and practice, this research places more 
attention on how contemporary migrant realities are shaped by the racial 
formations of nation-states.  
 
1. Securitization 
This dissertation contributes to debates regarding the nexus among 
nationhood, race, and migration (Bastia and Vom Hau 2014; Brubaker 1992; Cook-
Martín and Fitz- Gerald 2014). Such debates have documented the deep 
entanglements between the policing of “borders” (a country’s territorial limits) and 
the production of “boundaries” (constructions of national belonging) (Fassin 2011). 
Through engagement with critical security studies, this research project aims to 
provide further understanding of these entanglements. Critical security scholars 
have posited that—rather than a reflection on actual dangers—the framing of 
migration as a security threat constitutes “social and political techniques of 
governance” (Huysmans and Squire 2009, 11–12). As Bigo (2002) has argued, 
securitization becomes,  "a form of governmentality by diverse institutions to play 
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with the unease, or to encourage it if it does not yet exist, so as to affirm their role 
as providers of protection and security and to mask some of their failures.” (65) 
This literature on the “securitization” of migration—while robust in the European 
context (Baele and Sterck 2015)—has not attended sufficiently to the relevance of 
“securitization” in the global south (Domenech 2017; Magliano and Clavijo 2011). 
By exploring how migration becomes framed as an everyday security threat in 
Argentina, I posit that even in more progressive contexts, the framing of migration 
as an issue of security may be explained by a deep investment in maintaining 
“racial states,” or racially-configured states, implicated in the production of racial 
exclusion (Goldberg 2002).  
 
2. Objectives 
This research was conducted with two key objectives in mind. First, I wanted 
to document and examine the Argentine state’s efforts at managing contemporary 
migrations, with special attention to youth migration. And second, I proposed to 
explore the everyday experiences of contemporary non-European migrant youth 
in Argentina. Each objective included a set of research questions listed below: 
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Objective 1: To document and examine the various state policies—and 
related practices and discourses— employed to manage youth migration in 
Argentina. 
 
a. When, how, and to what extent are youth discussed in “state speech”— E.g. 
legal language, administrative categories, and everyday written and verbal 
speech— about immigration? 
b. How are the age-based categories and cut-offs used to classify young 
migrant populations constructed, defined, and justified, and how do they 
relate to efforts at migration control and border consolidation? 
c. How do agents of the state interpret and implement migration policies as they 
relate to youth?   
 
Objective 2: To observe and document how such policies—and related 
practices, and discourses—shape the experiences and opportunities of 
contemporary immigrant youth. 
 
a. How do youth engaged in various processes of the immigration bureaucracy 
remember and narrate these experiences? 
b. What strategies do youth deploy when they encounter challenges during their 
various encounters and exchanges with agents of the state immigration 
bureaucracy?  
c. To what extent do youth attribute specific opportunities or challenges that 
they encounter in Argentina to state policies, practices, or discourses?  
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These objectives both center the “governmentality” of youth migration, a topic 
underexplored in the migration studies literature, and allow for exploration of 
contemporary, non-European migrants’ experiences in Argentina under a relatively 
progressive policy context.1  
 
3. Research Framework 
 
Fieldwork for this project took place between November 2016 and October 
2017 using a multi-method qualitative research design, comprising six months of 
ethnographic fieldwork in the city of Buenos Aires, as well as interviews and 
primary and secondary data collection from archives and the media. These were 
compiled into ethnographic fieldnotes, hundreds of pages in transcripts from 
interviews, documents from multiple sources, including state documents, 
documents produced by civil society actors, and material collected from various 
media sources. These data were organized and coded thematically using NVivo 
software. The breakdown of methods used was as follows: 
i. Semi-Structured Interviews: I conducted semi-structured 
interviews with a dozen persons working in state agencies 
concerned with issues of immigration and/or youth.  They 
included varied differently ranked respondents at the national 
office of immigration, La Dirección Nacional de Migraciones 
 
1 I am referring here to policies that are informed by international human rights mechanisms and 
seek to guarantee migrant rights and protections.  
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(DNM); the National Refugee Commission, La Comisión Nacional 
para los Refugiados (CONARE); the Ministry of Public Defense, 
Ministerio Público de la Defensa (MPD); the National Secretariat 
of Childhood, Adolescence and Family, Secretaría Nacional de la 
Niñez, Adolescencia y Familia (SENAF), as well as local Buenos 
Aires state agencies dealing with migration and/or youth. I also 
conducted semi-structured interviews with ten Buenos Aires civil 
society leaders. Most organizations from which civil society 
leaders were selected were youth-based organizations and the 
interviewees were migrants under the age of 30.  Interviews took 
place either in public cafés or in the participants’ office space.  
ii. In-depth Interviews: I conducted in-depth interviews with 21 
migrant youth and young adults living in Buenos Aires who were 
from Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and the Middle East. 
All were between ages 17-32 at the time of the interview and had 
migrated to Argentina after the implementation of Argentina’s 
current immigration law in 2004, allowing for analysis that strictly 
centered in migrant experiences after the implementation of the 
current policy. The age of migration ranged from thirteen-years-
old to twenty-six years old. Nine were female, eleven were male, 
and one identified as non-binary. They all had either some form 
of permanent or temporary immigration status or were initiating 
the process when we met. When asked to identify ethno-racially, 
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the majority (9) identified as mestizo (including variations of this 
term such as trigueño). Two (2) identified as both mestizo and 
black or mestizo and indigenous, two (2) identified as Alawite 
Arab and four (4) as black. Two of the remaining four answered 
“I don’t know,” and two were not recorded.  Interviews took place 
at various locations including the participant’s homes, public 
spaces, offices, and cafés.   
iii. Participant Observation: Over a period of six months I 
conducted participant observation in the city of Buenos Aires. I 
lived in the neighborhood of Almagro, known for being the area 
of residence of many Peruvian migrants, and increasingly so, 
Venezuelans and Colombians. I attended events put together by 
migrant and migrant youth-based organizations such as cook-
outs, theater performances, get-togethers, street festivals, and 
marches. I also attended events organized by state actors, such 
as immigrant festivals and conferences on migration, human 
rights, and trafficking. In addition, I made several visits to the 
immigration office located in the neighborhood of Monte Castro 
and the National Museum of Immigration. 
iv. Documentary Research: I collected over one-hundred news 
articles, with the majority pertaining to a crime discussed in 
Chapter Six and others related to other themes discussed 
throughout this dissertation. They also included state documents 
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such as yearly reports put out by the DGN, agency institutional 
memories, newspapers, website and social media posts of the 
National office of Immigration (DNM) and the National Refugee 
Commission (CONARE), as well as pertinent statistical reports, 
laws, protocols, and resolutions. When relevant, I collected 
academic publications by professionals working for the state, 
including the Commission of Refugees and the Supreme Court’s 
Forensic Department. In addition, I collected documents 
published by civil society organizations, including the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the 
International Organization for Migration (OIM), and smaller 
organizations working on issues relating to migrant rights in 
Buenos Aires. These included announcements for marches, 
social-media posts, and self-published books and reports. Lastly, 
in an effort to explore the historical underpinnings of 
contemporary conversations about migration, I reviewed the 
institutional memories of the DNM (from 1892-1957) at the 
archives of the Center for Latin American Migration Studies in 
Buenos Aires (CEMLA) and varied ship arrival records and 
documents pertaining to the arrival of migrant minors from 1912-
1949 at the Argentine National Archives (Archivo General de la 
Nación). 
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v. Media Analysis: In Chapter Six, where I discuss a 2016 
notorious crime known in Argentina as “El Crimen de Brian” in 
relation to the major themes of this dissertation, I employ an in-
depth qualitative analysis of 69 Spanish-language media articles 
published between December 25, 2016 and February 23, 2017. 
The articles primarily come from Argentina’s most widely read 
news sources, including Clarín, La Nación, Infobae, Crónica, and 
Diario Popular. These sources were collected through a series of 
searches using key phrases (E.g. “Crimen en Flores,” “El Crimen 
de Brian,” “Brian Aguinaco”). The initial searches were done 
through internet news search engines, including Google, Yahoo! 
and Bing. The time frame selected was from December 24, 2016 
to June 24, 2017. The articles collected were then used to create 
a chronological chart identifying key events that led to broader 
media coverage of El Crimen de Brian on specific dates. I then 
used this chart to guide a round of targeted searches, which 
focused on specific events related to the crime (E.g. Brian’s 
mother’s residency is revoked). In this second phase I also 
resorted to the online archives of mainstream news sources such 
as Clarín and La Nación to collect a range of Argentine media 
coverage on the issue. By the end of the second phase of 
searches, dozens of additional articles were selected so that 
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each major event in the chronological list was populated with 
coverage from at least three different mainstream newspapers.  
 
These data were analyzed through two in-depth coding phases. 
The first phase was inductive and exploratory. During this phase 
I used varied qualitative coding techniques to make sense of and 
organize the documents. These techniques included the use of 
descriptive codes (E.g. “suspect in custody”), process codes (E.g. 
describing the victim), and affective codes (E.g. moral outrage) 
(Saldaña, 2016). The aim of this phase was to become grounded 
in the data in order to then go through a focused coding phase, 
which included organizing previous codes into the most salient 
categories, recoding the data and eventually identifying key 
themes. The statements discussed throughout Chapter Six 
reflect the most prevalent themes that emerged from this 
analysis.  Readership comments were not systematically coded 
and allusion to such comments is meant to be descriptive. 
vi. Pseudonyms and Translations: In order to protect the privacy 
of participants, all names provided throughout this text—unless 
part of widely available public discourse—are pseudonyms. I 
encouraged young migrants who participated to pick out a 
pseudonym and many of the names they chose were thought out 
with particular meanings in mind (E.g. an admired political leader, 
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the name of a beloved family member, etc.).  All translations of 
government documents, news articles, and interviews are my 
own.  
4. A Note on “The Field,” Researcher Positionality, and Objectivity 
Much of the research for this dissertation took place in the city of Buenos 
Aires. In barrios like Almagro where I lived, and in the city center, Once, and 
Constitución, where I attended events, marches, and conducted interviews at 
cafés and government offices. It is in the spaces of the city that I sought to explore 
how migrant youth might experience mobility, protection, and belonging, and what 
emerged as the binary opposites of these terms: stops, control, exclusion. It was 
also in these spaces that I realized the extent to which I navigated an 
insider/outsider positionality that inevitably influenced my research (Narayan 
1993). As an Argentine-born woman who migrated to the United States at a young 
age and conducts research on immigration in Argentina, I find Narayan’s (1993) 
challenge to the colonial dichotomy between the “native” and “foreign” 
anthropologist particularly helpful.  Moreover, I find it fruitful to explore my 
“multiplex identity” and “shifting identifications amid a field of interpenetrating 
communities and power relations” (1993, p. 671).  
As I conducted research in the city of Buenos Aires, I both had a certain 
level of know-how and benefited from unquestioned accommodation in the spaces 
I navigated, and an outsider’s vantage point from which to understand my 
experiences. My outsider’s perspective became particularly evident when it came 
to issues of racial inequity. While these issues take on similar shapes in the US 
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and Argentina, discussions of racial discrimination and inequity are a part of public 
discourse in the US in ways that often seem unimaginable in Argentina. As Elena 
and Alberto (2016) explain, “raising questions about the racial dimensions of 
inequality, identity and power in Argentina is itself controversial” (p.xv). For 
example, when a government office published a flyer picturing a white woman in 
blackface to advertise a photography competition on the city’s “mosaic of identities” 
on social media, I was dumbfounded when there was no backlash. However, my 
“outsider” identity and sensibilities as a Latina immigrant in the United States also 
made quite apparent the ways in which— as a Buenos Aires-born, light-skinned, 
middle-class, US-educated woman—I was widely seen in Buenos Aires as 
someone who unquestionably belonged. As I learned about the everyday stops 
that many migrant youth from Senegal, Peru, and Colombia experience as they 
navigate the city, I moved about fluidly and without interrogation. As I encountered 
state narratives of suspicion about black bodies, my body “sank” in the spaces of 
“White Argentina” with ease and my US researcher credentials granted me access 
to a “seat at the table” with state actors whom I interviewed.  As I sought to 
understand the strategies that many participants employed to access and remain 
unnoticed in certain spaces, I realized that I mostly navigated the city without 
second thought, sometimes even leaving my identity documents at home and, 
admittedly, at times mistakenly choosing interview spots that made some 
interviewees uncomfortable.  These profound differences in navigation of space 
come into sharp focus years later, back in the United States, where I now carry my 
passport ID with me in my wallet at all times. 
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Throughout this research, I experienced moments when I became–
sometimes uncomfortably—aware of my fluid insider/outsider positionality in 
“White Argentina.” On any given day, I could be perceived in a myriad of different 
and contradictory ways by participants as: “another anthropologist,” “a colleague,” 
“a peer,” “an activist,” “a fellow migrant,” an “imperialist US researcher,” “a white 
Argentinean,” “a fellow Latina,” “a clueless young woman.” The ways in which I 
both positioned myself and was positioned by others no doubt influenced the types 
of conversations that took place. As a feminist scholar, I worked under no pretense 
that my body, identity, and lived experiences didn’t influence the research process. 
Indeed, from what I choose to study and how I choose to do it, to what is revealed 
to me in this process, my research is fundamentally embodied meaning. As a 
result, rather than strive for detached, neutral, and value-free “results,” I have 
sought to provide “thick description” (Geertz 1994), and as suggested by Patti 
Lather (1993) describe a more embodied and reflexive research process. To this 
end, I wrote reflexive memos throughout the fieldwork and employed a technique 
that Gubrium and Holstein (1997) have called “active interviewing,” which refers to 
not simply “mining” for information during the interview process, but rather seeking 
to engage in meaning-making and analysis between interviewer and interviewee, 
allowing for new routes to open up through the interview process. This approach 
is cognizant of what Sayer (1992) called the “double hermeneutic” of social 
scientific research, whereby meaning is produced and shared by the researcher 
and participant alike. In practice, active interviewing required that I open up, 
sharing my own experiences and emergent analyses with participants. This greatly 
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enhanced the interviews, at times leading to long and stimulating conversations 
that exceeded the formal interview process and further complicated any simple 
insider/outsider dichotomy.  
5. Chapter Summaries 
This dissertation explores young migrants’ experiences of protection, 
mobility, and belonging in the Buenos Aires context, as a product of the racial state. 
In Chapter Two, I offer a theoretical framework that guides my analysis in the rest 
of the chapters, exploring how the “erosion-resistant sediments” (Pred 2004) of the 
racial and racist configurations of the Argentine nation-state emerge in 
contemporary migrant youths’ experiences and encounters with state actors. In 
doing so, I also unpack the relationship between “youth” and the state, arguing that 
focusing on youth experiences can offer significant insight for understanding the 
relationship among race, nation, and migration. This is not only because youth are 
often the object of a great deal of “societal anxiety” about the nation’s future, but 
also because they have historically been central targets of state intervention. 
Lastly, I outline the notion of “White Argentina,” highlighting the intersections 
among race, class, gender, and sexuality co-constitutive of this statist racial 
project. 
Chapter Three looks at the notion of protection. By analyzing the 
emergence and application of a multi-agency program for unaccompanied minors 
in the Argentine context, I argue that the conception of certain migrants as “threats” 
versus vulnerable victims in need of state protection is both constituted by and 
constitutive of “White Argentina.” I demonstrate this by exploring the emergence 
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of a government program for unaccompanied minors seeking asylum between 
2008-2011. Throughout the program’s development and in its subsequent 
implementation, I identify a series of surrounding discourses which divide young 
migrants into gendered and racialized notions of good vs. bad refugees, turning 
them into either victims in need of protection or deviants in need of control.  
Drawing from literature in the anthropology of childhood and youth, I point to the 
ways in which such dichotomies tap onto the racial configurations of the state, 
whereby a female Syrian teen represents a legible childhood marked by innocence 
and victimization, and a male Ghanaian teen represents an a priori suspect radical 
alterity.  
Chapter Four explores youth experiences more broadly by looking into 
questions of mobility. Drawing from Sara Ahmed’s Phenomenology of Whiteness, 
I inquire how young people navigate the capital city of Buenos Aires. While 
narratives of “free circulation” travel widely, with both state actors and migrant 
youth seeing Argentina as a positive context of immigrant reception, everyday 
mobility is not always fluid for non-white youth living in Buenos Aires. This chapter 
looks at Latin American and African migrant youths’ narratives about their 
presence and everyday mobility within the city. It elucidates the complex ways in 
which markers of race, class, and nationality shape their encounters with state and 
non-state actors alike, often curtailing their movement. Furthermore, this chapter 
shows how migrant youth come to understand these experiences as “normal,” 
developing strategies for more fluid movement and counter-narratives to challenge 
the discourses that serve to mark them as suspect. 
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Chapter Five analyzes the realities of migrants from Bolivia and Paraguay 
in Argentina, focusing specifically on the invisibility of bordering country youth for 
state actors attending to the issue of “unaccompanied minors.” In this chapter, I 
argue that contrary to “unruly” and “at risk” African minors targeted for state 
intervention through the 2011 protocol discussed in Chapter Four, bordering 
country youth are often willfully unseen, understood as docile bodies belonging to 
a productive, exploitable labor force. Indeed, while the migration projects of 
Bolivian, Paraguayan, Senegalese, and Ghanaian youth may overlap significantly, 
state workers understand these youth populations to be fundamentally different. 
Through De Genova’s (2011) theorization of “border spectacles,” I unpack the dual 
exclusion and segmented inclusion of Bolivian and Paraguayan migrants of all 
ages in Argentine society.  
Chapter Six looks at the notion of belonging. It explores a notorious 2016 
crime and subsequent moral panic which served to justify one of the most 
significant challenges to date to Argentina’s current immigration law. The crime 
involved a motorcycle theft, which ended in the tragic death of a minor on 
Christmas Eve. One of the accused—also a minor—was a teen whose parents 
were immigrants from Peru. Through in-depth analysis of the media and state 
narratives surrounding this crime, I demonstrate the ways in which the socio-
political consequences of the crime are deeply entangled with the ongoing racial 
project of “White Argentina,” revealing the precarious incorporation of non-white 
youth in Argentine society, regardless of birthright citizenship.  
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In Chapter Seven, I asses statist discourses on multiculturalism, particularly 
attending to the ways in which cultural programming “from below,” offered by 
migrant youth organizations challenges the state’s “ornamental multiculturalism.” I 
conclude in the following chapter by pointing to the ways in which a better 
understanding of the Argentine case—and perhaps other similar national 
contexts—can contribute to the migration studies literature, offering a critical 
assessment of the ways in which the racial state continues to mark young people’s 
experiences of mobility, protection, and belonging despite progressive immigration 
policies.  
 
6. Note on Terminology 
Throughout this dissertation, I use different terms to refer to young people 
who were either direct participants of this research project and/or subjects of state 
intervention or lack thereof. At different points, I employ terms like minor, child, 
adolescent, youth, and young adults.  I understand all of these concepts as deeply 
contextual, relational, elusive, and socially constructed. Nonetheless, they signal 
important distinctions of positionality in relation to the Argentine state and thus 
require clarification. I use the terms child/minor interchangeably to refer to persons 
under the age of 18, which—as of the passage of Ley 26.579 in 2009—is the age 
of legal majority in Argentina. Broadly speaking, those considered minors by the 
state are targeted by a plethora of specific laws, policies, and institutions both at 
the local, national and global scales. Importantly though, even in the strictly legal 
sense, childhood remains a social construction, situated within time and space. 
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When employing the term “adolescent,” I am echoing the usage of Argentine state 
actors and policies, where this term is specifically used to refer to persons who are 
between the ages of thirteen and eighteen. I use the term youth broadly to refer to 
young people who are roughly between the ages of fifteen and thirty, including 
legal minors and adults. I use the term “young adult” to signal that I am specifically 
speaking about youth who are over the age of eighteen, or in other words, 
considered adults legally. As numerous scholars discussed in the following chapter 
contend following Bourdieu (1978), “youth is just a word.” However, as this 
dissertation and other scholarship in youth studies have also demonstrated, this 
word can be tremendously powerful both as a category of state discipline and 
control, and as a form of social organization from which state power can be 
resisted, challenged, and recreated. 
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CHAPTER II: CENTERING YOUTH AND THE RACIAL STATE IN MIGRATION 
STUDIES 
 
The Argentine Republic receives the European, under the protection of the 
Constitution which orders the executive power ‘to promote European 
immigration,’ because with men of that origin, the country has been 
founded, with European civilization it has developed and formed with its 
science the institutions which govern it; because a nation has been created 
with the purpose to maintain and make prosper the Christian civilization, 
thus rejecting the entire human race that may introduce a contrary seed, or 
come in the disadvantageous conditions in which Asians have entered the 
United States of America. (Institutional Memories, Direccion Nacional de 
Migraciones (DNM) 1893, CEMLA Archives). 
 
From its very formation in the early 19th century, the Argentine state sought 
to become a beacon of white, Christian, European civilization, understanding 
migration to be a central means toward achieving this aspirational racial project.  
This objective was promoted by presidents like Bernardino Rivadavia in the early 
decades of the 19th century; is etched into the country’s first constitution of 1853; 
and shows up in the later institutional memories of the national immigration office, 
where state bureaucrats consistently reaffirmed their desire to welcome 
Europeans and reject “all human races that could introduce a different seed.” 
Scholars have argued that 21st century discourses (Ko 2014) and immigration 
policies (Bastia and Vom Hau 2014) in Argentina signal important disruptions—if 
not a paradigm shift—to the racial project of “Argentine whiteness,” this 
dissertation shows the ways in which immigrant experiences continue to be 
marked by this racial project.  
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1. Twenty-First Century Argentine Immigration Policy 
In the 21st century, the Argentine Congress passed one of the most 
progressive immigration policies in the Americas, if not the world: Ley 25.871.  This 
law was preceded by two laws that shaped immigrant reception in Argentina during 
the late 19th and 20th centuries: the 1981 “Ley Videla” (Ley General de Migraciones 
y de Fomento de la Inmigración N° 22.439), which was put in place by Argentina’s 
last military dictator Rafael Videla and violated migrants’ constitutional rights, and 
the previous 1876 “Ley Avellaneda” (Ley 817 de Inmigración y Colonización), 
which sought to “attract” and “retain” European migrants (Cook-Martín and 
Fitzgerald 2014; Courtis and Pacecca 2007). The passage of Ley 25.871 marks a 
stark shift away from “Ley Videla” and “Ley Avellaneda,” most notably due to the 
new law’s explicit commitment to upholding migrant rights and its focus on regional 
realities (Courtis and Pacecca 2007).2 
 
Ley 25.871 is infused with human rights discourse, proclaiming migration to 
be an “essential and inalienable” right, and seeking to guarantee equal access to 
social services, health care, education, work, and social security to all migrants 
regardless of their immigration status. Further, this law puts the onus of migrant 
regularization on the state and provides a special provision for regularization to 
 
2 See Novick (2008) for a detailed discussion of the differences and similarities between these 
three immigration laws.    
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migrants from the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) and associated states.3 
As scholars have noted, Ley 25.871 marked a significant change in official 21st-
century immigration narratives from an emphasis on “security” to one on “human 
rights” (Domenech, 2007). The nationality-based regularization criteria for those 
associated with Mercosur is also a notable shift for a country with a historical 
preference for European migration (Albarracín, 2004).  Legal scholars have 
described Argentina’s policy change as “a major step forward for the rights of 
immigrants, not only in Argentina, but throughout the world” (Hines 2010, 472). 
However, those who have studied the passage of Ley 25.871 have pointed out 
that despite multiple factors coming together to create broad congressional 
consensus over this legislation (E.g. a strong and well-organized civil society push, 
broad support for regional integration goals, and the need to finally replace Videla’s 
policy with one passed by a democratic government), the passage of the law itself 
did not necessarily signal a radical departure from dominant constructions of 
Argentine nationhood. In research on the Argentine Congress, Albarracín (2004) 
found that despite seeing Ley 25.871 favorably due to regional integration goals, 
legislators from across the political spectrum continued to understand European 
migration as the most “desirable” and beneficial for the country. Such work 
suggests that underlying sentiments about which immigrants can belong to the 
nation have not been dissolved by this policy but rather, coexist uncomfortably. 
 
3 As of May 2019, MERCOSUR member states include: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay as 
well as a suspended Venezuela and Bolivia in the process of accession. Associated states 
include Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru and Surinam.  
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For over a decade, Argentine social scientists have pointed to the limits of 
this law, including bureaucratic hurdles, lack of sufficient criteria for migrant 
workers or migrants from outside the Mercosur, as well as the fact that the law, 
while recognizing migrants as subjects with rights, fails to challenge the very notion 
of migrant illegality (Domenech 2007; Courtis and Paceca 2007; Kleidermacher 
2011). A central contention of this dissertation is that progressive immigration 
policies remain limited insofar as they coexist with exclusionary conceptions of 
national belonging. As a result, many of the challenges that migrants face in 
Argentina lie not only in the limits of the law’s language and state’s outreach, but 
also in the coexistence of this law with a continued commitment to the racial project 
of “White Argentina.” Each of the chapters of this dissertation contributes to this 
argument. They center on the experiences of young people, exploring how the 
themes of “protection,” “mobility,” and “belonging” are filtered through exclusionary 
politics that create challenges for non-white migrants and their descendants 
regardless of legal status, citizenship, and country of birth.   
 
2. Theoretical Standpoints: Youth Migration, the State, and a Racist World 
Order 
i. Studying the State, Centering Youth 
1. The State in the Social Sciences 
Scholars working across the social sciences have developed useful theories 
for understanding the state. For example, Aretxaga (2003), De Genova (2002), 
and Mitchell (2007) understand the state as a series of formal and informal 
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practices, processes, institutions, bureaucracies, agents, norms, and discourses. 
Contrary to other definitions of the state—such as Weber’s classic notion of the 
state as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical within a given territory” (2009, p.78)—this definition 
highlights internal fractions and contradictions. Following these scholars, the study 
of the state is then not the study of an external and isolated institution that exerts 
power over its citizenry from above, but the study of a set of sovereign, disciplinary, 
and regulatory processes that—while appearing “structural” or coherent and 
permanent (Mitchell 2007; Puri 2016)—are subject to internal differentiation based 
on localized geographies and power relations (Coleman 2012). 
Studying the state requires not only attention to the discourses of a centralized 
national authority, but also to local realities and the global processes under which 
such are enmeshed. While Weber’s definition draws our attention specifically to 
what Foucault has called the state’s “sovereign power”—power over life and 
death—the understanding of the state posited here creates room for a more 
“topological” analysis that also attends to the state’s power to “qualify, measure, 
appraise, and hierarchize” (Collier 2009; Foucault 1984, p.266). This approach can 
also shed light on the differential effects of the state on particular populations. 
Interdisciplinary scholarship in the social sciences has highlighted the ways in 
which the lived effects of the state are both driven by and filtered through 
categories of race, gender, sexuality, and class (Goldberg,2002; Luibheid, 2002; 
Omi and Winant, 2004; Puri, 2016; Yuval, 1997). As Fassin (2010) writes, “not 
everyone is equal before the law” (p. 218). Understudied in the literature on the 
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state, however, is the ways in which youth become the object of statist discourses, 
policies, and practices. 
 
2. Migrant Youth at the Center: National Anxieties and State Discipline and 
Control 
In 1978 French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu explained that “youth is just a word,” 
noting that like all other social categories, age-related categories are social 
constructions. As Bourdieu put it, subsuming persons with different life 
experiences and interests under one category due to biological age, is quite 
arbitrary, and frankly, an “abuse of language” (Bourdieu 1995, 95). Indeed, the 
meanings attributed to categories such as “youth” and “adult” have historically 
varied across time and place (Jiménez-Ramírez 2010; Reguillo 2003; Mizen 2002). 
Yet, to speak of youth as a social construction does not negate the relevance of 
“youth” as an important category for understanding lived experiences and power 
relations, specifically as they relate to the state.  As Bourdieu explained, 
“classification by age…always means imposing limits and producing an order to 
which each person must keep, keeping himself in his place” (1995, 94). This 
dissertation centers on this issue, asking questions such as: How does the 
Argentine state understand and seek to manage youth migration? Who counts as 
“youth”? Which youth or children are to be protected or deported? How do age-
based cut-offs and categorizations exclude or protect particular groups of 
immigrants?   
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This work thus builds on the scarce but critical scholarship that has pointed to 
the dual importance of immigrant youth for the state (Maira 2002; 2009; Heirbrink 
2014). As the very embodiment of national futures, youth become targeted by state 
discourse and practices of nationalist socialization. As specified by developmental 
psychology, late adolescence and early adulthood are often associated with a 
moment of limbo, instability, and even rebellion in the lifecycle of an individual 
(Arnett 2000; Maira 2002). For this reason, the state, looking to contain the 
seemingly fragile loyalties of youth, seeks to socialize them into officially 
sanctioned roles and identities. This perceived fragility becomes compounded in 
the case of “immigrant youth.” That is, as immigrants they are also perceived as 
unstable and threatening to the state due to their unreliable loyalties, thus 
becoming targets of socialization mechanisms (Behdad 2005; Maira 2009; 
Vertovec 2011). The compounded anxieties associated with this “doubly 
problematic” population are perhaps best evidenced by recent moral panics over 
ethnic studies K-12 education programs and bilingual education in the United 
States (see for example, Fonte & Nagai, 2013). As I have found in previous 
research, such programs, by making racial, ethnic, national and linguistic 
heterogeneities visible, are often seen as either dangerous to national coherence 
or unity, and/or sources of moral and cultural decline. It is perhaps not surprising 
then, that young immigrants have become central subjects of immigration policy, 
statist discourse, and national debates in the United States (Barbero 2019) and 
elsewhere. 
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In centering on migrant youth in the Argentine context, I draw from studies that 
have looked at the ways in which age-related categories such as of “youth” and 
“children” have been historically deployed by national authorities, both as nation-
making tropes, and as categories of social discipline and control (Bourdieu, 1993; 
Casavantes-Bradford 2014; Maira 2009; Mizen 2002). Across the Americas, from 
the United States to Argentina, youth and the family became the battleground for 
negotiating racial, sexual, and political anxiety after World War II (Manzano 2005; 
Passerini 1997). In Argentina, youth were often central in public anxieties about 
“modernization,” with their behaviors and sexualities often mapped onto national 
“first world” hopes and failures, and later, Cold War anxieties (Manzano 2005). In 
the U.S., the “weakness” of post-war youth was seen as an obstacle for American 
hegemony during the Cold War, with youth’s sexuality and racialized behaviors 
seen as dangerously constructing “a teenage society” (Passerini 1997). As a 
result, post-war youth often became the target of specialized knowledge, state 
institutions, discourses, and practices of control, all with the understanding that 
they held the nation’s “destiny” in their hands. Despite the extensive 
documentation on the historical centrality of youth for the state, migration studies 
havs been a largely adult-centered field, obscuring our ability to understand the 
contemporary relationship between migrant youth and the state (Glick Schiller and 
Levitt 2004; Reguillo 2003).4 
3. The Embodied and Subjective State 
 
4 A notable exception to this trend is found in the literature on second-generation immigrant 
experiences. See for example Rumbaut and Portes (2001), Alba (2005), and Levitt and Waters 
(2002). 
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Post-structural feminist theorists have contributed to understanding the ways 
in which the practices of the state are not only contradictory and incongruent but 
also subjective and embodied. These insights become particularly relevant for 
understanding youth experiences with the state. In Sexual States: Governance and 
the Struggle over the Antisodomy Law in India, Jyoti Puri studies the way in which 
the governance of sexuality functions as a legitimizing “state-effect” for states in 
flux and ridden with perceptions of “decline.” She argues that an understanding of 
the state’s “subjectivity” requires not only looking at the inconsistencies and biases 
of state agencies and institutions but also attending to “the passionate, the 
affective, and especially the sexual…” (Puri 2016, p. 5).   
Feminist geographers have also argued for the need to “embody” and “rescale” 
analyses of the state (Hyndman 2001; Mountz 2003; 2004). In her research on 
asylum in the Canadian context, Mountz has argued for the understanding of 
embodiment as a strategy that draws on standpoint theory (Harding,1986; 
Haraway, 1991) and institutional ethnography (Smith,1987) to understand 
the geography of the nation-state, and more specifically, the operation of 
power among institutional actors and migrants. Given that power moves 
through institutional practices at various scales, a shift in the scale of 
analysis of the nation-state, from the national and global scales to the finer 
scale of the body, reveals processes, relationships and experiences 
otherwise obscured” (Mountz 2004, p.325).  
Studying the experiences of young migrants with the state requires attention not 
only to the policies and discourses about migration in general and youth migration 
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in particular, but also embodied and subjective realities on the ground. In this 
dissertation, I explore relevant policies and discourses of immigration in Argentina. 
However, I also analyze the biases and affective dispositions of state workers, 
state workers’ perceptions of young migrants’ physical appearance, and the 
embodied lessons that young migrants—whether seen as “docile” or “unruly”—
learn from their everyday encounters with the state.  Studying the state at the 
subjective and embodied level reveals a different set of processes, discourses, 
and practices that exist between and beyond official messaging and policies. While 
laws, policies, and official reports can reveal important insights about the particular 
messages that governments seek to project, documenting the experiences of 
individual actors and norms of specific agencies reveals messy, relational, and 
uneven practices working in tandem, when not in tension, with those presented as 
official. 
3. The State and a Racist World Order 
In September 2016, Carlos, an immigration lawyer at a religious non-profit 
organization in Buenos Aires, confessed during an interview with me that he and 
other civil society leaders remained temerosos [fearful] in their advocacy for 
migrants, despite progressive immigration policies in Argentina. He explained that 
the “discriminatory, pejorative, and prejudiced” understanding of migrants 
commonplace in Argentine society posed a “heavier, stronger, more profound” 
problem that led him to fear pushing discourses of migrant rights too forcefully. 
This reality, he said, is perhaps the most “profound of all problems related to 
immigration in Argentina.” While a lot has changed since my conversation with 
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Carlos, including a significant challenge to Argentina’s progressive immigration law 
discussed in Chapter Six, his statements resonate with the findings of this 
dissertation, suggesting that a number of “more profound” exclusionary processes 
shape migrant experiences in Argentina despite their legal status in the country. 
Such processes can perhaps best be described through Gordillo’s (2016) concept 
of “White Argentina,” which I discuss below.   
Goldberg (2002) defines the modern state as a “racial state” because it was 
both constituted by a deeply racialized liberal political theory, and became 
constitutive of racial categories, differences, and configurations.5 All states, he 
argues, are racial states. Noting the difference and interconnectedness between 
Racial and Racist states, Goldberg (2002) explains,  
They are racial, in short, in virtue of their modes of population definition, 
determination, and structuration. And they are racist to the extent that such 
definition, determination, and structuration operate to exclude or privilege in or 
on racial terms and in so far as they circulate in and reproduce a world whose 
meanings and effects are racist. This is a world we might provocatively identify 
as a racist world order. (p. 104) 
Through such (re)production of racial terms, states have historically sought to 
render heterogeneity manageable, binding a “homogeneous” nation in relation to 
a racially configured external threat. While discussion of the nexus between race 
and state has been marginal—particularly in migration studies—theorists like 
 
5 The modern state here refers to the formation of post-medieval states. Goldberg (2002) argues 
that the transition toward modern states can be anticipated in the writings of Thomas Hobbes 
during the 17th century.  
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Goldberg (2002) and Omi and Winant (2008) have set the groundwork for a critical 
race theory that acknowledges the state a “preeminent site of racial struggle” 
(Kandaswamy 2012, p.23). Kandaswamy, however, notes the limits of analyzing 
the racial state without attention to how it’s co-constituted by and co-constitutive of 
other axes of power, including those of gender and class, intersections which this 
research explores in relation to the Argentine “racial state.”  
 
4. Migrations and the Argentine Racial State 
In Argentina, the constitution of the racial state is deeply intertwined with the 
country’s history of European immigration, especially during the second half of the 
19th century. Indeed, the desire to “civilize the population” by whitening it, 
cultivating the land, and colonizing the interior led Argentine elites to inscribe the 
promotion of European migration into the country’s first constitution of 1853 (Cook-
Martín and FitzGerald 2014; Bidegain Greising and Bidegain Greising 2016; 
Garguin 2007; 2014; Novick 2012). As a result, 6.5 million Europeans arrived in 
Argentina during the period of mass emigration between 1850-1930. Argentina 
was only second to the United States in the quantity of immigrants received during 
this period, but first in the world in proportion relative to the local population 
(Germani, 1966). These European migrants—encouraged from the onset as part 
of a racially motivated civilizational project—went on to consolidate the notion of 
Argentina as a “white nation” (Bastia and Matthias Vom Hau, 2014). By the mid-
20th century the racial project of blanqueamiento [whitening the population] was 
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deemed widely successful by Argentine elites and academics (Garguin 2007; 
Gordillo, 2016). 
The consolidation of Argentina as a “white nation” rendered non-white presences 
invisible. As Frigerio (2006) has argued, this invisibilization relies not only on 
dominant historical narratives that have disavowed and negated indigenous and 
African presences, but also on everyday discourses and racial categorizations in 
the Argentine territory. The result of these realities perpetuated both from “above” 
and from “below” (Hobsbawm 2012) is that in Argentina, racial categories like black 
and mestizo became understood as “foreign,” or strictly antithetical to national 
identity (Courtis et al. 2009, Lamborghini and Geler, 2016). This situation is unlike 
most other Latin American contexts, where mestizo, mulatto, and other multiracial 
identity constructs have been adopted as part of official state speech and 
narratives of nationhood (Briones, 2002; Segato 2010). Scholars have suggested 
similarities between dominant notions of “White Argentina” and “Mestizaje” or 
“Racial Democracy.” Although the latter acknowledge racial diversity and mixing, 
they can also be understood as hegemonic racial projects aimed at homogenizing 
and “whitening” a diverse population, masking over deep-seated racial hierarchies 
that structure local inequalities (Anderson 2018; Andrews 2016; Elena 2016). 
Viewed in this way, the “catch-all” notion of “whiteness” in Argentina, is not 
exceptional, as it homogenizes a diverse population and obscures ethno-racial 
inequities (Elena 2016; Andrews 2016). However, the significant difference is that 
this kind of “Mestizaje in Argentina does not result in Mestizos, but rather a 
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homogenous European or White Population” (Anderson 2019, p.217, citing Geler 
2016). 
Gordillo thus (2016) defines “White Argentina” as 
A geographical project and an affective disposition defined by the not 
always conscious desire to create, define, and feel through the bodily 
navigation of space that the national geography is largely European. But 
this is a haunted and ever-incomplete project, a whiteness that feels under 
siege, for it permanently confronts the evidence that millions of Argentine 
citizens bear in their bodies the traces of the non-European substratum of 
the nation…. (p. 243).  
Certainly, “Argentine whiteness” is always undermined by a much more diverse 
reality, and as a result, it must be constantly “manufactured, sustained, and 
reproduced” (Geler 2016, p.128). As Frigerio (2006) and Lamborghini and Geler 
(2016) explain, because of the impossibility of non-white presences in Argentine 
narratives of nationhood, ethno-racial diversity has historically been channeled 
through class distinctions.  
 
i. The Racialization of the Working Class  
Scholars trace a key moment in the construction of modern Argentine 
“whiteness” to the mid-20th century, when increased internal migration from the 
provinces to the capital acquired visibility during the rise to power (1945) and first 
term (1946-1952) of populist President Juan Domingo Perón (Courtis et al. 2009; 
Garguin, 2007; Grimson, 2016; Gordillo, 2016). Perón’s popularity with the 
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Argentine working class grew with his involvement in the Secretariat of Labor and 
Social Security during the military regime of Edelmiro Julián Farrell (1944-1946). 
As a result, when Perón was jailed in 1945 after being ousted by the military, 
masses of mestizo, working-class Argentines mobilized to the capital city to 
demand his release. As Gordillo (2016) writes, October 17th, 1945 was a 
particularly iconic date, when Argentina’s mestizo population was rendered visible, 
creating a sort of “trauma” for “White Argentina.” 
On October 17, 1945, this trauma was embodied in a ghostly apparition of 
sorts: the unexpected materialization of huge working-class, mestizo 
multitudes that converged on downtown Buenos Aires to demand the 
release of Colonel Juan Perón, briefly jailed by the military regime (1943-
1946) of which he had been part.  (Gordillo, 2016, p.249) 
 
As Gordillo (2016) explains, the ghost of a mestizo reality had come to haunt 
“Argentine whiteness” during Perón’s rise to power. Specifically, the multitudes that 
occupied the capital city’s public spaces challenged the very geographies of 
whiteness that Buenos Aires came to represent in large part due to the settlement 
of European migrants (Geler, 2016).  Out of this period came a “racialized 
classism” that is deeply embedded in Argentine society today (Grimson, 2016). In 
a context where the existence of Afro-Argentine presences was denied, derogatory 
terms such as los negros [the blacks] and cabecitas negras [blackheads]  
appeared as descriptors of the largely mestizo and provincial Perónist working 
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class (Courtis et al. 2009).6 Such terms encompassed a “very Argentine” form of 
racism which alluded to racial, class, regional, and political distinctions between 
the elites and the popular masses (Ratier 1971; Guber 2002). They served to 
construct an “other radically opposed to the respectable, white and civilized man… 
[and]… would come to include everyone who had been rejected from the spaces 
and benefits of urban, modern civilization” (Garguin, 2007). This racialization of the 
working class served to consolidate the Argentine middle class as white, and 
simultaneously solidified Argentine whiteness and nationhood as fundamentally 
middle class, especially in the capital city. 
Although it sometimes makes its way to online newspaper comments, the 
derogatory term cabecita negra is no longer part of the accepted everyday lexicon 
in Argentina (Segato, 2010).7 However, other derogatory terms such as negros de 
mierda [shitty blacks], negros villeros [blacks from the slums], and negros del alma 
[blacks in the soul] are used regularly to refer to those perceived as non-white, 
non-European, and poor, exhibiting these deep historical entanglements between 
racism and classism in Argentine society (Lamborghini and Geler, 2016). These 
terms are often not perceived as racist because they do not aim to describe 
“blackness,” a category which is exclusively reserved for those who possess a 
 
6 As explained by Grimson (2016) in an analysis of media coverage of October 17th, 1945, terms 
like “descamisados” and “cabecitas negras” emerged thereafter to describe the Perónist working 
class in ways that juxtaposed them to an image of Buenos Aires as white, European, civilized. 
“Descamisado” refers literally to being shirtless, but as Grimson explains, the term was broadly 
used to describe protesters who were seen as informally dressed (without suits, hats, ties) unable 
to blend in in cosmopolitan Buenos Aires and rather representing a foreign “barbarity” and 
indigence. The term “cabecita negra” [literally blackheads] was used to signal the dark hair and 
skin of Perón’s followers (Grimson 2016; Gordillo 2006).  
7 Comments in online news articles described in Chapters Three and Six do, however, show the 
continued use of similar derogatory terms in informal and anonymized spaces.     
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narrow set of phenotypical characteristics associated with “true blackness” 
(Lamborghini and Geler, 2016; Geler, 2016), and as a result sustains the negation 
of black presences, maintaining the myth of “White Argentina” (Frigerio, 2006). 
Rather, terms like “negros villeros” reference a “popular negritud” [popular 
blackness] which “is determined primarily by a “way of being associated with the 
lower classes, the popular world, and the grotesque…” “Popular negritud” is 
reserved for working class persons, particularly those of mestizo background— 
often immigrants from bordering countries and their descendants—who inhabit the 
poorest villas of Buenos Aires (Geler 2016, p. 219).  
 
 
ii. Gender, Sexuality, and the Argentine Racial State 
While the racialization of the working class has been studied at great length in 
the Argentine context, the ways in which such dynamics intersect with gendered 
and sexualizing narratives has received less attention in the academic literature. 
Such intersections, however, emerge as particularly clear in Argentina’s 20th 
century eugenics movement, as Latin American states—insecure in their national 
coherence—sought to deploy “the science of heredity” to “purify, unify and 
homogenize” their populations, each seeking to “produce a biologically 
consolidated nation” (Stepan 1992; p. 751). Although Latin American eugenics 
often rejected British and American “negative eugenics,” which included practices 
such as sterilization, they still focused on women’s reproduction and the family as 
central to the management of “the biological patrimony” of the nation (Stepan 
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1991). In Argentina—where the eugenics movement was among the most racist in 
the region—elites implemented programs which included issuing marriage 
certificates for “fit” couples, surveilling pregnant women, and prohibiting abortion 
(Stepan 1991; Taylor 1997; Miranda 2018). As a Catholic version of European 
eugenics, which drew heavily from the Italians and sought to maintain the “natural 
laws of motherhood,” the Argentine eugenics movement sought to homogenize a 
“Latin” European identity and protect it from racialized others.’’ As stated by Arturo 
Rossi, president of Argentina’s Association of Biotypology, Eugenics, and Social 
Medicine in the early 1940s, the aim was “defending white civilization . . . with 
energy and tenacity” against the “profound polymorphism of our people.” Working 
at the scale of the body and the family, the 20th century eugenics movement in 
Argentina “produced a set of racial and sexual ideals, prohibitions, and medical 
expectations that both reflected and created the gender and racial divisions within 
their society” (Stepan 1991, p.134). 
The desire to control women, their sexual habits, and reproductive practices for 
“civilizational” or “modernizing” purposes is a well-documented theme of 
colonialism (see for example Hintzen 2003; Chatterjee 1993; Colwill 1998). And 
this prevalence was no different in 19th and 20th century Argentina, where Taylor 
(1997) contends, “battles for land and national identity have been staged on, over 
and through the female body—literally and metaphorically” (p. 32).  From Juan 
Manuel Rosas, to Perón and critics of military dictators, Taylor finds performances 
of masculinity that resemble what Patil (2009) has described as the “contending 
masculinities” of decolonial struggles of the late 20th century, whereby both 
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colonialist and anti-colonialist discourses recreate colonial hierarchies of race and 
gender. As Taylor (1997) evidences, across time, the idealized Argentine woman 
is depicted as white, victimized, and disembodied, a symbol of national identity that 
differently positioned men struggled to protect from effeminate “savage” others. 
Focusing on the experiences of Jewish communities in Argentina, McGee 
Deutsch (2016) offers further insight into how concern over women’s sexuality is 
deeply embedded in constructions of Argentine whiteness. She argues that due to 
a deeply ambivalent reception, Jews in Argentina have historically navigated an 
“insecure whiteness.” Descriptions of Jews vacillated between notions of savagery 
and civilization during the late 19th and early to mid 20th centuries. They were both 
seen as animalistic, mob-like, barbaric; a race apart; and as laborious, orderly and 
honorable, “terms usually reserved for White Europeans” (p. 26). As a result of 
their “insecure whiteness,” Jews struggled “to perform whiteness through 
orderliness, strenuous labor, cultural achievements, manly virtue, and allegiance 
to Argentina” (p.46).   
The notion of “manly virtue” was central to the Jewish community’s struggle 
over “racial status” in the early 20th century, with the eradication of sexual 
commerce becoming a key concern for Argentine Jews. Unlike other Catholic and 
Latin migrant communities whose whiteness was more secure, Jews understood 
that “failing to safeguard women’s reputations undermined images of respectability 
and whiteness” (p. 27).  Prostitution added fuel to “depictions of Jewish men as 
corrupt, sexually dissolute, and unmanly” (p.43). Jewish men were seen as 
effeminate and unable to protect “their women,” who were described as “white 
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slaves” (Guy 1991) and depicted as agentless and victimized. In the 1890s the 
Sociedad Israelita de Protección a Niñas y Mujeres [Israeli Society for the 
Protection of Girls and Women] emerged as a patriarchal figure meant to protect 
Jewish women from the sex trade and to discipline their sexual habits (p. 44). As 
Taylor explains, the organization hoped to strengthen the reputation of Jewish men 
and communities as “honorable, civilized, and white” (p.44).  
Interestingly, concerns over commercial sex in Buenos Aires—where 
prostitution was municipally legalized and regulated between 1875 and 1936 (Guy 
1988)—extended beyond the country’s territory and local organizations. As more 
European migrant women became prostitutes, European reformists depicted 
Buenos Aires as the “sin city” of South America, where the “girlhood of Europe” 
was at risk (Guy 1991).  In the late 19th century the term “white slavery” gained 
traction to describe the sex trafficking of European women.  As Guy (1991) notes, 
however, the “anti-white slavery” movement was less fueled by verifiable stories 
of sex trafficking than by “racism, nationalism, and religious bigotry” (p.7). It relied 
on the presumption, for example, that  
all white women found in foreign bordellos had been forced there against 
their will by immoral men. The possibility that white women chose to engage 
in sexual commerce with men of different races, even if starvation were the 
only other “choice,” was inconceivable (p.25).  
Much like the Argentine Jewish community, navigating an “insecure whiteness,” 
Argentine authorities sought to dissuade European concerns by regulating the sex 
industry, working hand-in-hand with organizations such as Sociedad Israelita de 
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Protección a Niñas y Mujeres to control migrant women’s sexualities, seeking to 
monitor “unaccompanied or unauthorized female minors” (Guy 1991, p.27).  In 
1913, for example, the anti-trafficking Ley Palacios, expanded punishments for 
perpetrators of “white slavery” to include not only minors (those under the age of 
18) but also women under the age of 22 (Guy 1991). Further, ship records from 
the 1920s show that immigration authorities were adamant about policing the 
mobility of young women traveling alone.  In arrival ship records from 1927, for 
example, state actors suspended the disembarking of five Polish women traveling 
“alone” (without men)—all of whom were above the age of 18 (one was 28 years 
old)—at the request of the Sociedad Israelita.8 The understudied intersection 
among migration, gender, and race reveals the ways in which struggles to secure 
“whiteness” have historically centered around controlling women’s sexualities, with 
control over their bodies seen by both marginalized communities and state actors 
as a tool to prevent being racialized as non-white.  
 
5. “Youth” and “insecurity” in Latin America 
  
Youth like those who have nothing to lose, owning a moratorium and vital 
energy greater than that of adults, are considered privileged sectors for 
overflow, that is, feared for their ability to go beyond the established rules. 
Several then, have been the devices of that social control [of youth]: the 
school system, jurisprudence, the market, the family. In them, the control 
 
8 Records consulted at the National Archives Archivo General de la Nación in Buenos Aires. 
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over young people is exercised though ideas of support/containment or 
redirection of deviation. (Saintout 2002, p.100).  
In this project, I examine the social construction of “Argentine Whiteness”—with 
all of the historical precedent discussed above—as it intersects with the social 
construction of “youth.” As discussed above, youth have been historically feared 
as ungovernable, targeted through control mechanisms stemming from school 
systems, families, markets, and the state. As researchers have noted, “youth” 
became a powerful and visible concept after World War II (Hall and Jefferson 2001; 
Manzano 2005; Passerini 1997). As Rossana Reguillo (2000) has argued, this was 
the result of multiple factors, including a shifting organization of labor during post-
war economic restructuring, the emergence of juridical discourses targeting young 
people, and a new understanding of young people as a specific niche of 
consumers. In Latin America, youth first became visible as rebels in the 1950’s, 
unruly students in the 1960’s, and a subversive force in the 1970s (Reguillo 2000). 
In the last decades of the 20th century, however, as the region began to experience 
processes of urbanization and the contradictions of neoliberal policies, political 
concerns about youth gave way to broad understandings of young people as prone 
to violence and delinquency. Such became evident in media representations, in 
which—particularly racialized and poor youth from urban peripheries—are 
depicted as dangerous, drug-addicts and violent (Reguillo 2000). As Reguillo 
explains, Latin American youth emerged as a specific kind of “social problem.”  
While the “new” economic and political power that would be known as 
neoliberalism was configuring, the youth of the continent started to be 
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thought as those ‘responsible’ for violence in the cities. Demobilized by 
consumption and drugs, apparently the only “binding” factors of youth 
cultures, youth became visible as a social problem (2000, p. 20).  
Argentina was no exception, and youth studies scholars have noted the continued 
association of poor youth with delinquency and criminality (Chaves 2009; Saintout 
2002). In her analysis of depictions of youth in Argentine television after a massive 
economic crisis in 2001, Saintout finds a media discourse whereby violence, youth, 
and criminality are regularly associated. Further, youth, to the extent that they are 
seen as guilty, are also seen as rightless and disposable. The author concludes 
that “delinquent” youth become a key scapegoat in Argentina, with the association 
poverty/youth/delinquency becoming a central element of narratives of “security” 
during times of crisis (Saintout 2002).  As the chapters of this dissertation explore, 
the current “securitization” of migration, involves everyday practices that mark non-
white youth as “out of place” and suspect, at once disciplining migrant and native-
born youth into particular ways of being and belonging, and maintaining the 
narrative of “White Argentina.”  As Reguillo (2000) contends, however, youth 
studies must also attend to the “movements of response to the discourses and 
devices of control and exclusions” (p.79). Although a social construction, “youth” 
can become both a technology of governance and a productive category for 
mobilization through which young people challenge the order of things. This 
research thus also attends to those creative responses through which young 
people negotiate, challenge, and reshape their relationship to the state and its 
mechanisms of protection, discipline, and control. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 42 
 
 
 
6. Conclusion: Working at the “Epicenter” of “White Argentina” 
By taking up Gordillo’s (2016) analytical term of “White Argentina,” I am not 
simply referring to the black/white binary that sustains this racial project, but also 
a set of historically interconnected binaries that sit at its very foundation: that of 
civilization/savagery, modernity/backwardness, elite/popular, order/chaos, 
urban/rural, capital/province, rationality/emotion. The tensions between these 
categories are perhaps most clearly played out in the capital city of Buenos Aires, 
which—as scholars suggest—has always been at the center of struggles to 
construct and define national identity in Argentina; the space through which the 
racial configurations of the state are forged and maintained (Anderson 2019; 
Garguin 2007). Indeed “blackness,” in what Geler (2016) describes as the 
“popular” sense of the word, emerges as that which sits on the boundaries or 
constitutive outside of the capital city and the white, European, urban elite it 
purportedly represents; it is the shantytowns, the interior, the poor, the “lost” youth, 
the negated and invisibilized “racial other” that sustains the racial project of “White 
Argentina.”  
 While no doubt narratives of Argentine nationhood have shifted significantly 
since the late 20th century (Adamovsky 2016; Ko 2016), migrant experiences 
continue to be deeply shaped by the racial project of “White Argentina,” impacting 
how migrants can move about the city, interact with state actors, and even feel 
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secure in Argentina despite legal status or citizenship.   While the multidisciplinary 
field of migration studies is at the forefront of examining global patterns of racism 
and xenophobia, these realities are more often than not seen as transgressions in 
liberal democratic projects, particularly in countries construed as “nations of 
immigrants.” However, as this research suggests, negative experiences of migrant 
reception may have a lot to do with these very constructs, which are co-constitutive 
of racial and racist states.   
Having outlined the theoretical vantagepoints from which I explore issue of youth 
migration in this chapter, I dedicate the following chapters to attending to the “racial 
state” in its localized, contradictory, subjective, and embodied iterations. In the 
chapters that follow I look at the specific ways in which contradictory responses to 
youth migration are shaped by the racialized, gendered, and classed 
understandings of Argentine nationhood outlined above.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 44 
CHAPTER III: “AFRICA IN ARGENTINA:” MIGRANT YOUTH AND STATE 
MECHANISMS OF PROTECTION AND CONTROL 
 
The notion of “White Argentina” relies on centralization of European migrations 
to Argentina as well as the simultaneous negation of black and indigenous 
presences and disregard of long-standing migrations from bordering countries like 
Bolivia and Paraguay. This narrative, however, has come into tension with 
increasingly diverse migratory flows to Argentina. Since the last decades of the 
20th century, researchers have noted the emergence of new migrant communities 
from non-neighboring South American countries (E.g. Peru), Asia (E.g. China, 
South Korea), Eastern Europe (E.g. Ukraine), and Africa (E.g. Senegal, Nigeria) 
(Mármora et al. 2011; Mármora 2015). Most recently, researchers have particularly 
noted the growing presence of migrant communities from countries such as 
Senegal, Colombia, and Venezuela (see Zubrzycki & Alvarado 2016; Manzano & 
Velazquez 2016).  The 2010 Argentine census registered ongoing changes in the 
foreign-born population, showing that nearly 20% of Argentina’s migrant 
population is neither from Europe nor from bordering countries. Specifically, the 
census recorded 31,001 migrants from Asia, 2,738 from Africa, and 1,425 from 
Oceania. For these migrant populations, regularizing their status is more 
complicated than for migrants from Mercosur member and associated states who 
may do so on the basis of nationality. For migrants from outside Mercosur, options 
for regularizing their status are tied to economic and educational capital in ways 
that become limited for working-class migrants. 
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African migrants are predominantly from Sub-Saharan countries like Senegal, 
Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Mali, and Liberia 
(Kleidermacher 2011; Maffia 2010).  Most are young and male, between the ages 
of 20 and 40 years (Gattari 2016; Zubrzycki & Alvarado 2016; Zubrzycki 2016), 
and make a living through street vending (García 2014).9 Perhaps due to their 
“visibility” in a country that has historically concealed and negated black 
presences, African migrants have become the object of a great deal of academic, 
state, and media attention in recent years (Pacecca Canelo & Belcic 2017). As this 
chapter discusses, despite their relatively small numbers relative to other 
immigrant populations, African youth in Argentina became understood as “a 
problem” in need of state intervention during the first decade of the 21st century. 
Such interventions led to the implementation of a 2011 protocol for unaccompanied 
minors seeking asylum, which was lauded by international organizations as a 
progressive protection mechanism for migrant minors. While the protocol holds 
significant possibilities for promoting the rights of young migrants, its foundations, 
implementation, and surrounding discourses are emblematic of deeper 
contradictions in the Argentine state’s responses to international migration, in 
which progressive policies coexist uncomfortably with a deep-seated exclusionary 
logic. 
In this chapter, I argue that the protocol for unaccompanied minors functions 
as a “technology of governance” that serves to discipline and control a population 
 
9 The relatively young age of Sub-Saharan African migrants to Argentina is in keeping with global 
trends, as the UN reports that the average age of Sub-Saharan migrants was 30.7 years old in 
2017.   
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dually constructed as problematic. That is, both as black migrants and as 
perceptively ungovernable youth (whether minors or adults), African migrants are 
seen as a problem for the state. The discourses and practices surrounding the 
protocol reflect this reality, making this policy at once a product of and productive 
of the racial state.  In what follows, I first outline the ways in which African youth 
were seen a “doubly problematic” in the narratives of the media during 2009. I then 
go on to provide necessary background for understanding the implementation of 
the 2011 protocol, situating it within broader discourses about “good” vs. “bad” 
refugees circulating across state agencies. In order to analyze specific narratives 
surrounding the protocol, I provide a theoretical discussion of Western 
constructions of childhood and how they intersect with other axes of difference 
including gender and race, drawing from constructions of Argentine national 
identity discussed earlier. I go on to unpack the ways in which youth who straddle 
the boundaries between childhood and adulthood may or may not be associated 
with the normalized attributes of childhood: innocence and vulnerability. By looking 
at practices of “age determination” outlined in the protocol for unaccompanied 
minors, I then explore how age becomes a “technology of governance” productive 
for an Argentine state seeking to discipline and control a “problematic” population. 
Such practices, along with broader technologies of street policing, mark black 
migrant bodies as untrustworthy, threatening and “out of place” in Buenos Aires, 
sustaining notions of “White Argentina,” regardless of the actual incorporation of 
African youth into Argentine society.  
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1. African Youth: A Dual Problem 
i. Africa in Argentina: Media Narratives  
 
Headlines like "Africa Searches for Refuge in Argentina,” “Buenos Aires: 
Destination for Africans,” "The New Colors of Migration,” "The Ejected from the 
African Land" circulated in mainstream media in Argentina during 2008-2009. The 
arrival of African youth in Argentina, some of whom came as “stowaways” in ships, 
was described as a "new phenomenon” by the media, with many journalists delving 
into highly stylized and exoticizing descriptions of those migrants who were 
supposedly “altering the map” of the country. African migrants’ youthfulness and 
ungovernability were also a topic of attention.  
 
 
Table 1: African Youth in the Media 
“The immigrants come from Nigeria, Ivory Coast, and New 
Guinea. The majority are youth who travel alone, they 
have a painful past and an uncertain future.” 
(Página 12- 
Rosario, 
December 
2008) 
"Every year, hundreds of youth from the black 
continent arrive in Argentina, fleeing wars and misery. 
Where do they come from, what do they dream of and what 
do the jewelry vendors who have taken over downtown 
think of the country?" 
(La Nación, 
April 2009) 
 
“The Africans are a rarity in Argentina, they tend to be 
gregarious and generous among themselves (they 
share foods, movies, and overcrowded rooms), they are 
timid and polite, and the majority are of Islamic faith.” 
(El País, 
July 2009) 
“They often come from areas devastated by ethnic wars, 
political persecutions, misery and orphanhood. Most of 
the time it’s hard to understand what's going on with them, 
even for those who know them closely. As a general rule, 
they hate confinement and any type of control. But 
they are children, minors. The dilemma is inevitable. 
(La Capital, 
September, 
2009) 
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These news articles outlined in Table 1 collectively serve to essentialize and 
exoticize migrants from African countries, as well as exaggerate their demographic 
significance. Headlines like “Africa Searches for Refuge in Buenos Aires” would 
suggest that an entire continent has picked up and moved to the Southern Cone. 
"Africa" becomes represented through Orientalist imaginative geographies (Said 
1978). While the media provide little empirical evidence about the geopolitical 
conditions of the specific regions, countries, or cities that youth come from, they 
portray the entire African continent as a chaotic land of conflict, misery, penuries, 
wars, and orphanhood, tapping onto a racialized repertoire of colonial images, 
whereby the “Orient” represents barbarity and backwardness and the West 
civilization, progress, and modernity. 
Further, the articles suggest that hundreds of asylum seekers can “take over 
downtown” and “alter the map” of Latin America’s third most populated urban 
center, Buenos Aires.  Such hyperboles become particularly powerful in a country 
where “Africa” is regularly deployed as a point of reference for its (always 
impending) “decline” into the “Third World” during times of crisis.10  Such alarmist 
media representations of African migrant youth are accompanied by statistics 
provided by state authorities—E.g. a 150% increase in asylum seekers from 2006 
to 2008— suggesting that this is a new and concerning migratory “wave” that must 
be specifically addressed. One high-ranking Immigration (DNM) official explains 
that the office of immigration is actively seeking to address this: 
 
10 See Frigerio (2006) for discussion of phrases such as “If we don’t fight for a utopia, we will end 
up like a poor African country” during the 2001 economic crisis.  
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In past months, we increased efforts to reduce arrivals. We expressed our 
concern to consular authorities in Brazil and alerted them about the 
situation, mainly to avoid the trafficking of persons that is happening in 
countries of origin, where there are organizations that promote these types 
of trips and charge amounts that can be a fortune for a person from Senegal 
(La Nación, September 7, 2009). 
While the number of asylum seekers did indeed see an increase from 400 
applicants in 2006 to 859 in 2008, these numbers were by no means 
unprecedented for the Argentine context. In the year 2000, for example, CONARE 
reported 1,438 asylum applicants. Further, unlike the news coverage suggests, 
many 2008 applicants were from Asia as well as Latin American and Caribbean 
countries like Colombia and Haiti. 
 
ii. Ungovernable Youth 
Media coverage of African migrants to Argentina during this period also 
emphasizes the young age of these new migratory flows as a source of concern. 
These concerns are in keeping with scholarship that points to the ways in which 
“youth”—as a category between childhood and adulthood— can be a source of 
great societal anxiety. That is, young people are seen as potentially unstable and 
rebellious, particularly if detached from all institutional devices of social control 
(E.g. schools, family), with their loyalties and futures becoming a source of 
uncertainty (Arnett 2000; Maira 2002). Particularly youth seen as having “nothing 
to lose,” are feared for the potential to evade all established rules and as a result 
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“portrayed as the ‘Other’ which is unable to control or govern itself” (p.535). Such 
narratives have historically contributed to the uncritical association of poor youth 
with delinquency (Saintout 2002). In the media narratives outlined in Table 1, 
African youth are described in this way. They are alone and their futures are 
uncertain. As one journalist writes, “they hate confinement and any type of control.” 
Yet many of them are legal minors, under the age of 18, as a result, he suggests, 
“the dilemma is inevitable.”   
Although African migrants arrive in Argentina through multiple means including 
through airports and by crossing the border at various points, the image that 
became particularly visible in the media during 2009 was that of the polizón, or the 
migrant who travels as a “stowaway,” in a cargo ship. While these cases are few 
and far between, they garner great visibility and receive a great deal of attention 
from state and media actors, going on to shape conversations on the topic of 
migrant minors. The very word polizón shores up the dual problematization of 
African youth in Argentina. According to the Royal Spanish Academy, polizón can 
mean “a person who embarks in a clandestine manner” or “an idle individual 
without destiny…” In the original French, polisson can also be used to refer to “a 
turbulent or mischievous child.” The broad attention to young African migrants as 
polizones signals a dual concern for a migrant population seen as turbulent and 
problematic due to their exotic (chaotic, distant, incomprehensible) African origin, 
and their positionality as young people with uncertain and perhaps ungovernable 
futures. 
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2. Background: African Youth and a Protocol for Unaccompanied Minors 
Seeking Asylum 
As I researched the emergence of the 2011 protocol for unaccompanied minors 
and current state narratives about youth migration, I found that state actors also 
constructed African migrants in this way: problematic both as suspect black bodies 
in “White Argentina” and as “risky” young people. First, I want to provide some 
background necessary to understand the emergence of the 2011 protocol titled 
Protocolo para la Protección, Asistencia y Búsqueda de Soluciones Duraderas 
para los Niños no Acompañados o Separados de Sus Familias en Búsqueda de 
Asilo. (Protocol for the Protection, Assistance and Search for Durable Solutions for 
Unaccompanied or Separated Children Seeking Asylum). In this section, I discuss 
the agencies involved in the discussions over responses to unaccompanied minors 
between 2006-2011 as well as the ways in which African youth figured in these 
discussions.  
 
i. 2006-2008: “Diagnosing a Problem” 
Prior to 2006, agencies in charge of processing asylum claims and providing 
assistance to unaccompanied youth seeking asylum in Argentina were the 
Committee for Refugee Eligibility (CEPARE)11 and the United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), which worked with Argentine religious civil 
society organizations to provide support and assistance to minors arriving in the 
 
11 CEPARE becomes CONARE in 2006 with Ley N° 26.165.  
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country alone. These agencies also worked with others, including the National 
Office of Immigration (DNM). With the passage of Ley 25.871 in 2004 and the 2006 
Refugee Law, Ley 26.165, the Ministry of Public Defense (MPD), and particularly 
the National Public Defender’s office (DGN), joined CONARE, DNM, and UNHCR 
as key actors in the area of human mobility in Argentina (Mc Callum 2012). Such 
incorporation stemmed from a specific response to the “problem” of 
unaccompanied minors (under the age of 21, according to national legislation at 
that time).12 
In its 2006 annual report, the DGN reported “an increase of cases of minors 
who entered the country, from the African continent, as refugees.” The agency 
sought to provide a response to these minors, with their arrivals described as a 
problem with a “complexity” and “volume” that required state intervention. By 2007, 
the DGN noted a rise in migrants from the African continent seeking asylum and 
created a special commission to assist refugees and asylum seekers.13 While the 
objective of the commission was described broadly as identifying vulnerable 
populations of refugees and asylum seekers that might need special protections, 
unaccompanied minors were seen as key subjects for intervention and the DGN 
sought to create “directives for the follow-up of said minors and to provide them 
with assistance, accommodation, teaching of the Spanish language and 
everything related to their material and labor needs” (DGN 2006). 
 
 
13 Comisión para la Asistencia Integral y Protección del Refugiado y Peticionante de  
Refugio/ Commission for the Integral Assistance and Protection of the Refugee and Asylum 
Applicant.  DGN Nº 1071/07. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 53 
The narratives about these minors found in DGN documents at times mirror 
some of the essentialisms seen in media coverage. In fact, annual reports describe 
unaccompanied minors from African countries as arriving in "deplorable 
conditions,” being persons at "maximum risk" and requiring "delicate” and 
"exclusive” intervention. Their arrival is unquestionably seen as a "problem" in 
need of immediate “interventions” or "solutions."  To some extent, the program was 
meant to resolve the problem of “African youth,” as defined by Argentine media.  
According to one actor involved with the creation of the refugee commission, it 
coincided with a series of events in which youth had been in conflict with non-profit 
organizations providing initial assistance. As he explained, "the media would go 
and highlight it as a social problem, a problem of these African youth who come 
from war and almost come to reproduce the war here."  For him, this was “a 
program that supposedly was meant to resolve the situation of youth who were 
delinquent, who were violent."  In many ways, young African migrants are defined 
by the state as an “at risk” population which required state intervention.14 In her 
discussion of youth and governmentality, Besley (2010) argues that, 
In terms of governmentality, if youth cannot or will not control their conduct, 
they cease to be “docile bodies” and “useful” to the state (see Foucault, 
1977). If their behavior becomes unacceptable and criminal, the state will 
step in and attempt to control their conduct (at least for a while), 
 
14 Importantly, a number of state actors working within the DGN (particularly those who worked 
closely with migrant youth) were critical of these narratives. Rather, they located the “problem” on 
state responses. As discussed in the section to follow, this underscores the ways in which the 
state and its agencies are often polyvalent and contradictory.  
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administering its biopower in the form of the youth justice system – 
governmentality in action, which is probably the biggest risk of all for youth,  
especially in the disciplinary, punitive way it is formulated in much of the 
USA, where it totally ignores the theoretical findings of youth development 
that have been established in psychological discourses. (p. 529).  
The protocol for unaccompanied minors and surrounding programs that I describe 
below were developed as a form of protection for migrant youth. As Pécoud (2013) 
notes in the context of transnational immigration control, however, humanitarian 
protection and immigration control mechanisms are sometimes two sides of the 
same coin, or even mechanisms working toward the same goal in securitized 
contexts. As Besley (2010) further notes, the very labeling of young people as “at 
risk” or “risky,” 
tends to reinforce youth as being dangerous themselves and also as being 
a danger to others and experiencing danger from others; as relatively 
powerless yet with power, albeit in its negative form, as putting up 
resistance, and being rebellious, anti-social, even criminal and 
marginalized. (p. 535).  
Notions of youth “at risk” can both be interpreted as “being risky” or “undertaking 
behavior perceived as risky,” or in relation to “multiple discourses of youth ‘at risk’ 
and consequent sets of interventions that institutions put in place to deal with youth 
so labeled” (Besley 2010, p.535). As we shall see in other sections, while the 
second interpretation (youth as requiring intervention) applies here, African 
youth—both minors and adults—are also seen through the first interpretation, as 
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willing to undertake behavior that is risky (E.g. to deceive state actors) and, as a 
result, posing a threat to the state and the order of things.  
 
ii. 2008-2011: Developing a Program for Unaccompanied Minors  
 
In 2008, the DGN’s Commission for Refugees created a specific area for 
unaccompanied minors, and through resolution #489/08, the Ministry of Public 
Defense announced that an attorney working under this program would assume 
“the legal representation of unaccompanied children and adolescents,” “and assist 
and represent them both administratively and juridically” (Res. 488 2008). This 
measure was deemed as a necessary “alternative” to provide more adequate 
responses to the needs of youth who are “at maximum risk” (DGN 2008) and have 
“lost everything they know—house, family, friends, stability, customs” (Res. 488 
2008). In 2009, the Refugee Commission reported having the guardianship of 111 
youth, 70 of whom were from African countries, 37 from Latin America and the 
Caribbean, and 3 from Asia. (DGN 2009). At the time, the legal age of majority in 
Argentina was 21, and so 110 of the 111 youth under the guardianship of DGN 
were between the ages of 16 to 20 years old. 86.5% of youth were between the 
ages of 18-20. Table 2 shows the breakdown of minors under state guardianship 
between 2009-2016, also evidencing the new arrivals each year, as permitted by 
available data. The drastic decrease in the number of minors from 2009 to 2010 
can be accounted for by the change in the legal age of majority from 18 to 21 
through Ley 26.579.  
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Table 2: Unaccompanied Youth under State Guardianship 
 
Source: DGN Annual Reports 
Through Resolution #488, a DGN bureaucrat assumed the guardianship of these 
youth, becoming a “protagonist” in the administrative process of seeking asylum, 
with the objective "to ensure strict respect for human rights and guarantees of due 
process for children and adolescents in this situation, from the very beginning of 
the procedure, and in each and every one of its stages" (DGN 2008).  In these 
efforts, the guardian is joined by an "interdisciplinary team" composed of a social 
worker, a psychologist, and an anthropologist. The team works to “provide legal 
assistance and protection… as well as seek to respond to their demands in relation 
 
15 As reported, the total number is 56 but this seems to be an error in the DGN report. The 
presence of  ”?" in the table are meant to highlight discrepancies and inconsistencies in the 
agency’s reporting. 
CONTINENT 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
STATELESS 1 1 0 ? 0 ? 0 0 
AFRICAN 70 52 32 ? 37 ? 13 18 
ASIAN 3 0 0 ? 2 ? 3 1 
AMERICAN 37 4 2 ? 4 ? 6 7 
EUROPEAN 0 0 0 ? 0 ? 1 2 
TOTAL 111 5715 38 55 43 ? 23 28 
NEW 
ARRIVALS  
(36) ? (14) ? ? (23) (10) (21) 
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to their economic, labor, social and cultural integration” (Peruglia, Reiter & Laffitte 
2013, p.3). 
 
iii. 2011: Developing a Multi-Agency Protocol 
At this point, the DGN also reported the start of inter-agency talks to 
standardize a protocol for actions required upon the arrival of unaccompanied 
minors seeking asylum in Argentina. Such talks included actors like the UNHCR, 
CONARE, UNICEF, the National Office of Immigration (DNM), the Buenos Aires 
City Government's Council for the Rights of Children and Adolescents (CDNNYA), 
the National Secretariat of Childhood, Adolescence, and Family (SENAF) and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (CICR). After three years of discussions 
and reviews by each agency, the protocol, called Protocol for the Protection, 
Assistance and Search for Durable Solutions for Unaccompanied or Separated 
Children Seeking Asylum, was signed in 2011. Although one DGN actor described 
the process as "spicy” due to the different interests of each agency, he and others 
involved agreed that from the beginning there was a consensus that a protocol 
needed to be specified and that the result was at the very least an “interesting 
tool."  The result, in fact, was noteworthy. 
The 2011 protocol delineates how the Argentine state shall act in response to 
the arrival of unaccompanied minors seeking asylum. It outlines the role of each 
adhering agency, which include not only local and national state agencies in the 
areas of migration, refugee, and childhood but also civil society and international 
organizations. From guarantees of due process starting at the very first interaction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 58 
with a state agent, to legal aid in the asylum process and assistance with basic 
subsistence needs, the protocol is a comprehensive document that expands the 
DGN program for minors and implicates a handful of state agencies in providing 
adequate support to young migrants seeking asylum.  As such, the protocol breaks 
with an ongoing “double” absence of migrant children and youth in Argentina’s 
policies on childhood and migration (Pinto and Ceriani Cernadas 2013) and marks 
a stark contrast to the “law enforcement regime” reigning in this area in global north 
contexts like the United States (Heiddrink 2013)16. Further, it has been deemed a 
"best practice” by UNHCR, with the agency inviting Argentine actors to share their 
experiences in regional forums and lauding the document in regional reports (DGN 
2011).  
3. Data Gathered 
 
During research between 2016 and 2017, I sought to map out the state 
agencies involved in the response, intervention, and control of youth migration in 
Argentina. I focus here specifically on the topic of unaccompanied minor asylum 
seekers, an area in which I found state intervention to involve a complex and 
dizzying web of local, national, and international agencies. I found that such 
agencies had interconnected and at times conflicting interests and understandings 
of the topic. Contradictions were also evident within some agencies, and, at times, 
found in the narratives of individual actors. These contradictions served as 
 
16 The protocol, outlined specifically and purposefully as a procedure for asylum applicants, fails 
to provide any protection for unaccompanied children and youth who do not make claims of 
seeking asylum. As a result, it de facto excludes bordering country youth, whom I argue in 
Chapter Five, continue to go “willfully unseen” by the state. 
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reminders of the importance of studying the state at the subjective and embodied 
levels (Hyndman 2001; Mountz 2003; Puri 2016). The narratives analyzed here 
can thus be understood as a “snapshot” of ongoing tensions, contradictions, and 
messy dynamics, all of which have enormous consequences for the lives of 
migrant youth, who also emerged as key actors strategizing within and challenging 
state constructions. 
I draw here from interviews with state bureaucrats involved in key agencies 
dealing with unaccompanied youth to outline broader discourses and practices that 
circulated across agencies about African refugees more broadly (including minors 
and adults) and African minors seeking asylum who became eligible for the 
protection mechanism outlined in the 2011 protocol.  Many of those I interviewed 
were directly involved in the creation of the 2011 protocol, and all had been working 
in the area for at least two years. They included actors working at DNM, CONARE, 
SENAF, and DGN, and a key religious civil society organization. At some state 
agencies like CONARE, DGN, and DNM, I interviewed multiple persons working 
at different levels. I also draw here from a number of state documents and media 
sources, which helped me understand and analyze the consolidation of narratives 
about youth migration. Lastly, I draw here both explicitly and implicitly from 
interviews with youth who arrived in Argentina as unaccompanied minors and 
shared with me the experiences of navigating these state institutions as such. 
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4. “Good” vs. “Bad” Refugees and the Politics of Innocence and 
Vulnerability 
 
i. The Generic Syrian Girl 
 
  
  
The front page of the two latest CONARE statistical booklets show images 
of faired-skinned girls wearing colorful headscarves (See Figures 1 and 2). 
Readers are not told who they are or where they are from. All that the booklets 
state is that the images were provided by the United Nation’s High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR). Perhaps such images are meant to speak for themselves, 
Figure 1: 2016 CONARE Statistics Cover 
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suggesting this is what a refugee looks like. Noting similarities with other images 
widely circulated by the UNHCR on the Syrian refugee crisis, a reader might 
surmise that the girls are Syrian. Such an assumption might be supported by the 
fact that since 2013, Syrians make up the largest percentage of persons 
recognized as refugees in Argentina every year. Thus, at first glance, the images 
are representative of what current refugees to Argentina look like.  Closer analysis, 
however, reveals a different reality.  First, since 1985, the majority of those granted 
refugee status in Argentina—including minors and adults—were male. Further, 
between 2012-2016, 69% of refugees were between the ages of 18 and 69. During 
2012-2016, girls between the ages of 5 and 17 made up roughly 8 percent of all 
persons granted refugee status in Argentina. The numbers of Syrian girls between 
ages 5-17 are even more scarce in the unaccompanied refugee population, with 
Figure 2: 2014 CONARE Statistics Cover 
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the DGN program—predominantly receiving male youth from Africa, Latin 
America, and the Caribbean—only ever reporting two unaccompanied Syrians 
under state guardianship since 2009. Yet, in my research, I found the figure of the 
“Syrian refugee,” and particularly the “Syrian girl” to be central to narratives about 
young asylum seekers. 
In her work on the asylum procedures in Argentina, Stephanie McCallum 
(2012) argues that the process relies heavily on a particular image of the refugee. 
Drawing from scholars like Malkki (1992), she unpacks a series of transnational 
and hegemonic discourses that influence local agencies. Under these discourses, 
refugees are represented by UNHCR TV ads: as abandoned, vulnerable, and 
deferent to state authority. They are typically construed in opposition to “mere 
economic migrants” and typified by a woman or child who exhibits deep trauma 
and distress. This, McCallum (2012) writes, is the “hyperreal refugee,” a figure with 
which Argentine state agents determine the truth/falsehood of all asylum 
applications.  International reports, interviews, and forms become “technologies of 
governance” through which particular ways of being a refugee are sanctioned and 
(re) produced by the state. Understudied, however, is how the notion of the “good 
refugee” is not only gendered but also racialized.   
In my research, I found similar discourses to those outlined by McCallum about 
veracity/falsehood of asylum claims. In discussions about unaccompanied 
minors—-just as in the CONARE booklets—the faired-skinned Middle Eastern 
girl—came to represent the “real” refugee in need of protection, often directly 
juxtaposed to male African youth from countries like Senegal and Ghana. These 
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youth were marked as suspect: “mere economic migrants,” system abusers, and 
untrustworthy (or risky) ‘pseudo-minors’ putting real children and real refugees at 
risk.17  Paradoxically, as table 2 shows, while up to 70 African minors have been 
under state guardianship at once between 2009-2016, the total number of Middle 
Eastern (documented as Asian)  minors never surpassed three. 
 
ii. Youth, Race, Nation, and Innocence 
 
Understanding these narratives requires unpacking how the notion of the 
gendered “hyper-real refugee” is compounded when it intersects with Western 
constructions of childhood. Globalization and the expansion of universalized 
human-rights mechanisms such as the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child 
have consolidated a romanticized image of childhood as a period marked by play, 
innocence, and passivity (Heidbrink 2014; Shepler 2005). The child—understood 
as a person in the making—is stripped of any agency, becoming vulnerable and 
unable to fend for him or herself.  Hence the popularity of narratives about “saving 
the children,” particularly the children of the global south (Cheney 2009). As 
Cheney and others contend, these ideas about childhood circulate widely in 
humanitarian and development circles, where “African children are commonly 
made objects of the political motives behind aid agendas, local and global” 
(Cheney 2009, p.5). Following a “sedentary metaphysics” whereby displacement 
 
17 Clavijo (2018) documented similar dynamics in interviews with CONARE and civil society 
bureaucrats about the asylum application process in Argentina. While Syrians were understood 
as clearly evidencing need for protection, Senegalese migrants were associated with unfounded 
claims.   
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is associated with pathology, refugee children appear as in need of “repair” (Malki, 
1992; Epstein 2009). As Epstein elaborates, child refugees become “incomplete, 
uprooted, and traumatized victims in need of protection” (p. 23). 
The notion of the vulnerable African child in need of “repair” or “saving” appeared 
early on in the types of media narratives that pre-empted the program for 
unaccompanied minors in Argentina, where “Africa” is depicted as an 
undifferentiated space of extreme human suffering. Such notions are also 
exemplified by news stories that closely follow the adoption/attempted adoption of 
younger (E.g. 12-year-old) “polizones” by white Argentine families.18 And they 
appear in the 2008 DGN documents cited earlier, which at times describe 
unaccompanied minors as particularly “lacking,” as having “lost everything they 
know—house, family, friends, stability, customs” (Res. 488 2008). In 2012, actors 
within the DGN offered a critique of such narratives, arguing that—working under 
an assumption of refugee vulnerability— the program functioned with a “tendency 
toward victimization” (Peruglia Reiter & Laffitte 2012, p.9). While the “African 
child”—particularly the child whose body is marked by extreme hardship—is 
central to such understandings of passive, vulnerable, innocent childhoods in need 
of saving and protection, “African youth” (whether legally minors or adults)–
especially those without narratives and bodily evidence of extreme hardship—
become suspicious figures in need of control, rather than “saving” or “protecting.” 
 
18 See, for example, media following of Mohmed Baldé in Rosario in the early 2000s.  
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In constant flux between notions of childhood and adulthood, “youth” is a 
“slippery concept.” In her study of the politics of youth in Oakland, California, 
Jennifer Tilton (2010) points to the gendered and racialized aspects of discourses 
of childhood vs. adulthood, whereby some youth are understood as endangered 
while others are seen as dangerous. And “this distinction between endangered 
and dangerous maps complex racial, class, and gender divides in contemporary 
U.S. cities” (Tilton 2010, p.3). Understanding “the politics of youth” requires 
attending to these dynamics. I want to contend that in the Argentine context, 
innocence is filtered through narratives of “White Argentina” and, as a result, is a 
deeply gendered and racialized concept, becoming a near impossibility for youth 
racialized as black.  
As discussed in Chapter Two, exclusionary constructions of Argentine national 
identity add to the complexities of unpacking the “politics of youth” as they relate 
to asylum seekers and refugees. Syrian girls and African male youth arrive in a 
country that has historically been and continues to be (although with some 
fissures) imagined as a homogenous, white European nation. As discussed earlier, 
notions of “White Argentina” are sustained through a white/black binary (Geler 
2016). Under this binary, whiteness becomes a broad, all-encompassing, and 
deeply naturalized term. White is seen as “the normal,” un-named racial 
identification of all Argentines who are, relatedly, “not-black” (Geler 2016). 
Blackness functions through a dual construction, encompassing both a “racial” and 
“popular” understanding. While the racial construction of blackness is tied to a 
narrow set of phenotypes seen as signaling “true blackness,” in the “popular” 
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sense, blackness is ascribed to the working class. Although this is understudied, 
“popular blackness” has also emerged historically as a deeply masculinized 
discourse.19  Under the Argentine black/white binary we see both “social” and 
“physical” constructions of race functioning together to divide and hierarchize the 
population. The presumed attributes of childhood—innocence and vulnerability—
are filtered through this binary in ways that become evident in the following vignette 
from a research memo I wrote in 2017. 
 
19 Note historically that the figure of the “cabecita negra,” so central to Argentina’s “unique” 
racialized classism (Frigerio 2006), emerged as a descriptor of Perón’s working-class supporters 
who in 1945 became referred to as “los descamisados” (those without shirts). As Grimson (2006) 
explains, it’s not that they were shirtless, but that they did not wear suits that was so scandalous. 
Contemporary usage of “popular blackness” also appears quite gendered.    
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On June 14, 2017 a 13-year old boy was beaten by neighbors in downtown 
Córdoba. He had attempted to steal a woman’s phone and was caught by 
witnesses as he tried to flee. As reported, the boy was hit by those witnesses. In a 
partial recording of the scene posted on YouTube, we see two men forcefully 
holding on to the boy by his arms and t-shirt as he desperately tries to get away; 
crying, screaming, and pleading “let me go!” A large crowd gathers around the 
scene and we can hear voices yelling, both egging on and protesting what the 
men are doing. In the midst of all this commotion, a woman is heard pleading, 
“He’s a boy!” a male voice yells out in response, “He’s not a boy!” Similarly, in an 
online Clarín article about the incident, readers indignantly object the author’s use 
of the word “boy” to refer to the 13-year-old robber. Some examples from the 
comment section include: 
 
• “Boy? What boy? If this boy had a gun he would kill you.” 
• “Boys? They kill you. They are underage criminals.” 
• “These “boys” will shoot you with no problem.” 
• “You say boys, but they have learned to take what isn’t theirs.” 
 
Such objections to the use of the word “boy,” are intermingled with racial slurs that 
place the fair-skinned 13-year old at the center of Argentina’s stigmatized “popular 
blackness.” 
   
• “They are the SOBs that later kill you. Don’t be moved. A shot in the 
head and holy remedy, “Negros de mier”… they are cockroaches!” 
• “And they call him a child, that he cries unconsolably, honestly the 
[person] who wrote this piece deserves that these “Negritos” do 
something to someone they love.” 
• “Kid?... keep extending rights without responsibilities and we will end 
up dominated by the ‘Negro-cabeza’ virus.” 
 
 
 
Figure 3: "He's not a boy!" Research Memo  
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We see here in Figure 3 how childhood is not only associated with innocence (a 
13-year-old who steals cannot be called a child) but also with an inherent 
whiteness (a 13-year-old who steals is not a child, rather he is a “negro cabeza”). 
Blackness—in this case, “popular blackness”—becomes the justification for the 
child’s actions. The boy is represented as a “racial virus” that can spread and thus 
should be eliminated through actual violence. Relatedly, blackness and childhood 
become framed as mutually exclusive categories (either he is a child, or he is “un 
negro cabeza”). As discussed in Chapter Two, Latin American youth scholars have 
pointed to the emergence of an association between poor youth and criminality 
coinciding with the implementation of neoliberal policies across Latin America. 
What we see in this example, however, are the ways in which this association also 
taps onto Argentine constructions of blackness. In other words, if the association 
has historically been poor youth are delinquent, in this case, it goes something like 
this: Delinquent youth are poor, poor youth are black, and so delinquent youth are 
black.  We can begin to see how the normalized attributes of Western childhoods 
(innocence, vulnerability) are not seen as applicable for youth (even adolescents 
under the age 18) who are constructed as black.  
In this context, the Syrian girl exemplifies the “hyper-real refugee” in all the 
ways that a black male youth from Senegal or Ghana could not. That is, her gender 
and fair skin mark her as a priori vulnerable and innocent. As such, she can be 
seen as a “real refugee” posing no threat to the nation. Although often racialized 
as non-white in other contexts, new Syrian migrants to Argentina can be more or 
less “smoothly” incorporated into Argentina’s black/white binary due to the 
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presence of a strong Syrian and Lebanese community in the country. Such a 
presence stems from Arab migrations that date back to the 19th century (Civantos 
2006), which (like Muslims and Jews), although once deemed undesirable for the 
state’s racial project of “Argentine whiteness” have made claims to such whiteness 
and become understood as part of this broad construction, albeit somewhat 
uncomfortably (Hyland 2017; McGee Deutsch 2016) 
 
5. Youth Between Protection and Control 
 
In this section, I look at the avenues for regularization available for African 
migrants in Argentina, arguing that unlike those from Mercosur member and 
associate states, African youth have limited possibilities. I then go on to discuss 
how some youth may strategize to carve out a “legal space” for themselves within 
Argentine society. Rather than understanding these strategies as a demand for 
policies that account for their presence, state actors develop narratives of good vs. 
bad refugees and deploy age as a disciplinary “technology of governance.” Such 
narratives are undergirded by racialized notions of innocence that mark young 
black bodies as a priori suspect and sustain “White Argentina.” 
 
i. Carving Out a Space Within Limited Possibilities 
A few years after the implementation of the DGN commission for 
unaccompanied asylum-seeking minors (which eventually led to the 2011 
protocol), the DGN’s outreach was expanded into a broader commission, which 
also sought to account for the needs of migrants seeking asylum over the age of 
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18. As a result of this expansion, migrants seeking asylum in Argentina receive 
similar resources upon arrival, regardless of whether they are under or over the 
age of legal majority (E.g. legal representation, initial assistance with subsistence, 
etc.).20 This fluidity in the treatment of minors and adults is in stark contrast to other 
contexts, like the United States, where the difference between being a minor and 
an adult can be monumental (Heidbrink 2014). Further, in 2017, I was told that 
even those who are denied their asylum petitions receive assistance from the DGN 
in finding other avenues for regularizing their status within Argentina’s immigration 
law. 
Similar resources, however, are not available to migrants who do apply for asylum. 
In 2008, via Resolution #1858/08 the “Commission for Immigrants” was created to 
“promote activities oriented toward the defense and promotion of migrants’ rights.” 
As the resolution states, the commission would focus on deportation proceedings 
as well as on services for migrants within the penitentiary system. And, during 
interviews with different DGN actors, including one working for the Commission for 
Immigrants, I was told that the Commission was completely consumed with the 
legal representation of migrants in “conflict with the law” and with appealing 
deportation orders. As I encountered it, this commission—in stark contrast to the 
refugee commission—has no resources to assist migrants in the regularization 
 
20 There are some minor differences to be noted in the treatment of legal minors/adults seeking 
asylum. For example, underage migrants are assigned a state tutor and their asylum review 
process is expedited. More informally, in previous years, the Refugee Commission (CONARE) 
recommended some minors who were denied asylum status for consideration for a “humanitarian 
residency” offered by the National immigration Office (DNM). According to state actors 
interviewed in 2017, this was no longer the case. 
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process, orient them upon arrival, or disseminate resources on migrant rights. 
Such limits impact all immigrants who may have trouble regularizing their status, 
even those who are privileged in the Argentine Immigration Law as nationals of 
Mercosur member and associated states (as discussed in Chapter Five). However, 
these limits are perhaps particularly felt by non-Mercosur migrants who do not find 
clear-cut paths for regularization, especially African youth, many of whom are 
neither migrating to study at Buenos Aires’ public and private universities, nor able 
to secure a sponsoring employee and as a result cannot access these criteria for 
regularization either. For some, applying for refugee status becomes a strategic 
way to carve out a “legal” space for themselves in Argentine society. Take, for 
example, the experiences of Aliou. Aliou is 26 and from Senegal. He arrived in 
Argentina in September of 2008 at the age of seventeen. During an interview in a 
café near the city center in Buenos Aires, Aliou shared how he first made his way 
to the National Refugee Commission’s (CONARE) office upon arrival to Argentina. 
After arriving at the Retiro Bus Terminal in Buenos Aires, he met some fellow 
Senegalese youth who directed him to a residence where many Senegalese 
migrants live. 
When I arrived at the house where the guys lived, the first thing I asked was 
“and, what’s up? what do I have to do? Do you have to have a paper to 
show in order to work on the street? Or for the police not to stop you?’ And 
all that. And I, before traveling, I would always google, looking for 
information of the country, so that I wouldn’t get into something that I don’t 
know how it is. When arrived [sic], they tell me no, ‘you have to go to 
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CONARE and do refuge.’ And then they will give you the precaria 21 […] 
And I [said], ‘wait guys, how can I ask for asylum if I’m not a refuge’. But 
here, there’s no other option, it’s the only thing there is. And it’s still 
happening today. Because I didn’t have a regular entry, we don’t have an 
embassy, there is no other way. There is no criteria to get accredited. ‘What 
do you do when the police stop you on the street, to identify yourself? It’s 
the only path there is. You have to do it. […] Monday, it was the first thing I 
did.  
Aliou’s frank account of how he ended up applying for asylum just days after his 
arrival in Argentina provides several insights. First, Aliou identifies the lack of 
options within Argentine immigration policy for working-class non-Mercosur 
migrants like himself to regularize their status. He also pointed out other obstacles 
like the lack of a Senegalese embassy in Argentina, or the limits posed by crossing 
the border at an unauthorized point.22 And second, Aliou provides a glimpse into 
the incredibly robust transnational networks of support that “unaccompanied” 
migrant youth tap onto as they cross borders in search of safety and work 
opportunities. Aliou arrived in Argentina only knowing a friend of a friend. But at 
the Retiro bus terminal in Buenos Aires, he met other Senegalese youth who sent 
him to a family hotel where many of them lived. It was there that he learned that 
 
21 The “precaria” is a temporary identity document provided by the immigration office, which 
allows migrants to work. It must be regularly renewed and, as the name suggests, is not always 
an entirely helpful ID since some state actors don’t recognize it as valid. 
 
22 Being unable to show a receipt of crossing an authorized port of entry is one of the most 
significant obstacles faced by immigrants seeking to regularize their status in Argentina. 
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he could strategically apply for asylum to get a “paper” and be able to work as a 
street vendor while his case was resolved. It is there that he learned how to carve 
out a space for himself in a country that fails to contemplate his very presence in 
its policies. Within 2-3 years, Aliou’s asylum application was denied. By then, 
however, CONARE had recommended that the immigration office provide him a 
residency for “humanitarian reasons” since he had arrived as a minor, and he was 
able to regularize his status in that way.23 By the time we met in 2017, Aliou was 
an Argentine citizen.   
A state tutor who had worked with Aliou and other unaccompanied minors 
seeking asylum between 2007-2013 reflected that, for some youth, saying that 
they were refugees or minors was a “survival strategy.” After years of building trust, 
for example, he met the parents of youth who had originally claimed that both of 
their parents had been murdered or learned that some had claimed to be a few 
years younger to secure a status as a “protected minor” for as long as possible. 
He understood these acts as survival strategies as well as a way for youth to make 
a demand on the state. “[They are telling us], hey! you have a system that is very 
narrow, focused on a collective, and there is another [collective] with just as many 
needs that you are leaving out.”  In response to this demand, he explained, the 
state has two choices, “Either you criminalize that strategy, or you universalize and 
 
23  Aliou’s case provides an example of the ways in which CONARE and DNM informally applied 
more flexibility to the cases of minors seeking asylum by recommending a “humanitarian” 
residency. As mentioned earlier, I was repeatedly told that this is no longer taking place and 
would only apply in extremely rare occasions.  
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open [the system].” Some state actors such as he always sought to pursue the 
latter, hence the expansion of the refugee commission for minors to include adults. 
Nonetheless, as the next section shows, other state actors are deeply invested in 
criminalizing these strategies and reinforcing notions of African youth as a priori 
problematic. 
 
ii. Separating the Wheat from the Chaff: Good vs. Bad Refugees 
Within this context, some state actors were invested in what one worker called 
“separating the wheat from the chaff’ [separar la paja del trigo]. The presence of 
“fake refugees” and “fake minors” emerged as a key concern that circulated across 
state institutions. Some actors felt like they were “working for” the “wrong people,” 
and made generalized statements that divided refugees between “good” and “bad” 
along national lines.  
 
1. African Migrants as “Bad” Refugees 
One high-ranking CONARE bureaucrat explained,  
 
Again, you are not working for refugees, you are not working for a guy that 
comes from Syria, who comes from Afghanistan, who comes from Ukraine, 
or for the one that comes from Congo, or for guys that have protection. On 
the contrary, you are protec…you have so much abuse of the system, that 
you are assigning the majority of your resources to resolve more quickly 
those unfounded cases, to demonstrate to this system and to those people 
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that it’s not good that they abuse the system. And those that really need 
protection, you leave them more relegated, because they require more 
research.  
Here, the state actor’s concern over certain people “abusing the system” is linked 
to a notion that resolving what are seen as “unfounded cases” diminishes the 
state’s ability to respond to “real refugees.” Such reasoning relies on a dichotomy 
between “real” or “good” refugees versus “fake” or “bad” refugees. Potentially “real” 
refugees are those who come from countries like Ukraine, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, and Syria. The state actor lists these as examples of nation-states he 
expects “real” refugees might come from, and in fact, UNHCR data shows that 
these were among the top 20 countries of origin of global refugees in recent years. 
However, just like in the CONARE statistical booklets, Syria emerged as the 
nationality of the “hyperreal refugee” in interviews across agencies.  The Syrian 
child is typically juxtaposed to other “bad,” or less “real” asylum applicants, mainly 
those from African countries, often perceived as “abusing the system.”  
In May 2017, a mid-rank CONARE employee reflected on her work with asylum 
seekers and refugees: 
We always, I don’t know, we always have a touching case, right? Recently 
we had a case of a Syrian family. They had a 5-year old little girl. And since 
she saw that they interviewed her mother, they interviewed her father, she 
witnessed that, that they had been interviewed separately… She said that 
she also wanted to tell her story. And well, since the parents agreed, we 
took her statement “so to speak” and the truth is that it was terrible, terrible, 
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the story of the Syrian girl and the things she would share from her 
perspective. Well those things happen, and they are touching. But in part 
it’s also good in order to motivate us about why we are here. Because 
sometimes there are so many unfounded requests, right? So you say “I’m 
working for people that don’t require protection.” When the objective of this 
office is another one. And so every once in a while, those extraordinary--
let’s say touching cases— they are motivating.  
Similarly to the high ranking official, this CONARE employee feels like she is 
“working for” the wrong people, for those who don’t “require protection.” However, 
certain clear-cut cases, those of “hyperreal refugees”—in this case, a Syrian girl 
willing to share her trauma with officials—becomes a source of “motivation” to keep 
doing the work that otherwise feels pointless. 
Syrians and Syrian children were not just central to CONARE’s documents and 
discussions, but the Syrian girl also emerged as the prototype of the person that 
the DGN’s program for unaccompanied minors “worked for.” During interviews with 
involved actors, I often heard about two Syrian sisters, Carol and Sara. They were 
clearly some of the DGN workers’ “favorites,” having arrived in Argentina at the 
ages of 13 and 14 when they were described as “tiny” and from a country at war. 
Their stories were not the subject of suspicion and their need for protection was 
quickly certified. Although adolescents upon arrival, as fair-skinned middle-class 
girls who were quickly enrolled in private schools, they were not seen as posing 
any problem for the state. Rather, they were described as “charming” 
[compradoras], with one state actor of Syrian background described by others as 
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being “crazy about them.” In no way did the girls pose a challenge to “White 
Argentina,” and so the normalized attributes of childhood, innocence and 
vulnerability, were granted without concern. 24 
One state actor referred me to the Syrian sisters as a “good case,” “where 
everything went perfectly.” He directly juxtaposed them to a group of Congolese 
brothers seen as problematic. These brothers, in contrast, were seen as “lazy,” 
and entitled.  
These Congolese brothers, they are four, and well, they are kind of lazy, 
you offer them things for work and they don’t want to do anything 
[laughs].  There are some that come and say I want a house. You know? 
Yes, I have the right to get a house, I am a refugee, give me a house. Well, 
ok stop, what resources does the state have? (Tutor, Ministry of Public 
Defense) 
As this state workers’ comments suggest, the Congolese minors are seen as 
entitled and “taking advantage” of the state. In previous research on the Argentine 
asylum process, researchers like Clavijo (2018) and McCallum (2012) have 
documented similar discourses about Senegalese youth, who are also seen as 
“taking advantage” of state resources, “posing as refugees” when they were “mere 
economic migrants.” Similarly, I found that—if the “hyperreal” child refugee 
became embodied by a Syrian girl with traumatic stories of war—the bad, suspect 
 
24 Although outside of the scope of this chapter, these normalized notions of childhood also failed 
to account for the needs of these sisters, who at times experienced state “protection” as an 
obstacle to their desires.  
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refugee was represented by an African male youth (both minors and adults) who 
certainly did not “appear” or “behave” like children.  
To some state agents, many African youth, predominantly arriving in 
Argentina from nations like Senegal, Ghana, and Sierra Leone do not appear 
innocent or in need of protection. They become generally suspect of constructing 
fraudulent identities and abusing a system built for “real” children and “real” 
refugees. They represent something like what Squire (2009) calls the figure of the 
"abusive asylum seeker” in the securitized European and UK context. The abusive 
asylum seeker is “assumed to be an economic migrant who enters without 
authorization in order to reap the benefits of living in a wealthy state, this figure is 
largely perceived a 'bogus’ one that 'poses’ as a refugee in need of protection” 
(p.3).  Rather than a "wealthy society” that migrants seek to reap the benefits of, 
the real victim emerged in some narratives as the “emasculated state” (see Mountz 
2003), an Argentine state that gets taken advantage of due to its expansive human 
rights protection mechanisms and is, as a result of such abuse, at the brink of 
collapse.25 
As McCallum (2012) writes about Senegalese asylum seekers, they become— 
 in this familiar way— understood by the state as “mere economic migrants” posing 
as refugees to gain access to state resources. The fears and uncertainties that 
drove their migrations and mark their journeys to Argentina are not recognized as 
 
25 Such notions of “collapse” circulate in state and media narratives about migration and become 
particularly conducive for the maintenance of “White Argentina.” The decline of social services 
and the state’s ability to provide safety and security for all residents, is pinned on migrants who 
are (often “fraudulently”) overwhelming state resources and thus to blame for these deficiencies. 
This narrative is visible in Buenos Aires, construed as the epicenter of “White Argentina.”  
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meriting refugee status. Further, their frank desire to work is seen as mutually 
exclusive from a credible asylum application (Clavijo, 2018). As a result, I heard 
blanket statements such as “we all know that they are not refugees,” or “we 
continue to have many applications from people who in reality are not refugees, 
nor do they have much argument to request asylum, such as the Senegalese.” 
Such observations suggest that Senegalese youth are likely not being considered 
fairly for asylum at an individual level. An official at CONARE assented when I 
asked if Senegalese asylum seekers are treated as a priori “suspect” due to their 
nationality. This is confirmed by Clavijo (2018), who found that CONARE applies 
a “summary” process to applicants who are either “evidently” in need of protection, 
or—conversely—evidently “unfounded.” Nationality—particularly Syrian and 
Senegalese—becomes a central element used by state actors to classify whether 
or not applicants require a full or summary review.  Official CONARE statistics offer 
further evidence of concern, since between 2010 and 2014, only 10 out of 1,035 
Senegalese asylum applicants were recognized as refugees. Given these dismal 
numbers, Senegalese applicants stand in direct numerical opposition to Syrian 
applicants, who are the most likely to be granted refugee status with 233 refugees 
recognized between 2010 and 2014, out of 263 applicants. 
In this context, it was not the asylum applicant who emerged as the subject in 
need of protection, but rather, the “system of protection” that needed to be secured 
from continued (ab)use by suspect figures most embodied by Senegalese youth. 
Similarly, in discussions about the system of protection for minors, Ghanaian and 
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other African asylum seekers emerged as the key figures from which "real children” 
needed to be protected from by the state. 
 
iii. Age Determination as “Technology of Governance” 
 
1. Age Determination Practices  
 
Just like in similar documents drafted in other immigrant-receiving countries, 
the 2011 Argentine protocol for unaccompanied minors includes a set of 
procedures for “age determination.” The United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) recommends such practices, for instances when young 
migrants do not have identity documents, or their documents are not “credible.” As 
the agency then funding assistance programs for unaccompanied minors, some 
state workers recalled that it was UNHCR which promoted the addition of age 
determination procedures to the language of the protocol, with the belief that "youth 
were coming to abuse a system for children” (DGN tutor). As stated in the 
protocol—and recommended elsewhere by UNHCR—in such instances where 
doubts about age emerge, states can recur to dental and skeletal x-rays, along 
with psychosocial evaluations in order to “specify, to the greatest possible extent, 
the age of that person” (Protocol 2011, p.18). Also stated in the protocol is that if 
state actors fail to submit young migrants to age determination test within 
reasonable time, UNHCR “could consider the possibility of discontinuing the care 
support under its program (lodging and subsistence), in those case in which, for 
example, there are reasonable doubts about the reported age” (Protocol 2011, 
p.19).    
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Age determination exams are the source of great international contention, as—
to date—the medical and scientific communities have not identified a single 
accurate way to verify a person’s exact chronological age. As a result, the UN 
warns that such tests should be used as a last resort and with extreme caution, 
always applying the principle of the benefit of the doubt. I found that state actors 
across agencies involved with migrant youth— DNM, CONARE, DGN, SENAF—
understood the uncertainty of these practices. They referred to them in ways that 
suggest deep ambivalence, calling them “flimsy” (DGN1), "a lottery” (SENAF 
employee), and “kind of homemade” (DGN tutor). They admitted that such 
practices do not represent an “exact science” by any means (DGN2) and 
understood that it was “impossible to determine the true age.” Such procedures 
were seen as a “sort of objective” analysis (DNM) with “enormous margins of error” 
(CONARE). One actor was aware of the limited tools of these practices, which are 
modeled after research with white American populations from the 1930s, failing to 
account for geographic, ethnic, and socioeconomic variations (Heidbrink 2014). 
Further, state actors regularly explained that the results of the tests were hardly 
consequential, as young people had to be given the benefit of the doubt and even 
if “determined” to be adults, youth would receive most of the same resources as 
adult asylum seekers with the DGN’s program.   
And yet, these practices persist and continue to be done in Argentina. At one 
point—contrary to protocol directives stating that age determination procedures 
shall avoid “all risk of violating the physical integrity” and “respect” human dignity—
young migrants were regularly submitted to age determination tests that involved 
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the examination of their “genital development” and “appearance of pubic hair.” 
Such assessments have been deemed “ethically questionable” (Defensor del 
Pueblo 2011), when not “highly unlikely to be anything other than abusive” 
(Crawley 2007). Further, they are one of the least accurate ways to determine a 
person’s age beyond puberty (Wenke 2017). Oddly, the Argentine Supreme 
Court’s Medical Forensic Department conducted these tests. While DGN actors 
had reservations about youth having to “undress” during the age determination 
process and stated that this was a source of strong debates, they saw the forensic 
department as performing more  “serious” and “complete” analyses by “excellent 
professionals,” as opposed to those done at other public hospitals, where there 
was little understanding of how such practices were to be done or reported. 
2. A “Technology of Governance” Associated with “Problematic Youth” 
Despite 1) contention over age determination practices, 2) knowledge of the 
unreliability of results, 3) flexibility in terms of resources for both minors and adults 
seeking asylum, and 4) confusion about how these tests are done, the Argentine 
state has applied and continues to apply age determination practices, sometimes 
even taking these practices to abusive extremes. I’d like to argue that for the 
Argentine state, age determination practices function as a “technology of 
governance” targeting and reinforcing African youth as a problematic population. 
As Barbara Cruikshank (1999) defines it, following Foucault, governance refers to  
forms of action and relations of power that aim to guide and shape (rather 
than force, control, or dominate) the actions of others. In this broad sense, 
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governance includes any program, discourse or strategy that attempts to 
alter the actions of others or one self.  (p.4) 
To refer to certain state practices, discourses, or policies as “technologies” or 
“instruments” of governance is to attend to the tools through which “governments, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), public agencies and international bodies 
classify and regulate the spaces and subjects they seek to govern” (Shore and 
Wright 2011, p.3). Similarly, it refers to the ways in which the state uses interviews, 
international reports, and forms to reinforce particular ways of being a refugee, as 
described by McCallum (2012) and supported in this research: age determination 
practices mark certain migrant populations as particularly problematic, out of place, 
and “risky.” In her research with unaccompanied minors in the US, Heidbrink 
(2014) similarly found that age determination practices were ordered by social 
service agencies for youth deemed “untrustworthy” or “problematic.”    
Reflecting on why these tests are applied in Argentina, those who had 
previously worked with youth at the DGN explained that they felt that these tests 
were all about “uncovering” or “dissuading” untrustworthy, suspect youth.   
It’s that suspicion, right? About the fine line between the economic migrant, 
refugee, or minor who is a refugee, with all that implies—or a disguised 
adult. You know? It’s that thing... I don’t know, the age determination test 
will tell me that.  (Interdisciplinary team 1, DGN) 
 
Since the money came from UNCHR, and UNCHR thought at one point that 
there were youth who were coming to abuse a system developed for 
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children, they thought that to dissuade this strategy, there had to be age 
determination practices. (Ex-Tutor DGN).26 
As the above discussion suggests, the construction of some youth as particularly 
suspect, delinquent or problematic is deeply racialized. Although drawing from 
UNHCR recommendations long used in other contexts, these practices began to 
be delineated and applied in Argentina at a time when (as seen in Table 2) the 
majority of youth seeking asylum as minors were from African countries. The 
experiences of state actors in charge of accompanying youth to do age 
determination tests, as well as narratives about these tests suggest, that rather 
than evidence of systematic “system abuse,” affective and appearance-based 
suspicion of African youth by state and non-state actors served as a justification 
of these practices. 
Although DGN reports mention age determination practices dating back to 
2008, state and non-state actors regularly referred to 2014 as the year when such 
practices started to be most heavily applied. This year coincided with suspicions 
over what some state and civil society actors called a “wave” of “pseudo minors” 
from Ghana who came after the 2014 World Cup in Brazil.   
Brazil had given like seven thousand visas to Ghanaians to come see their 
team, and many Ghanaians started to come here. And they claimed to be 
children, but the truth is that one would look at them and get the sense 
that they weren't. (mid-rank bureaucrat CONARE) 
 
26 During fieldwork, I repeatedly sought to gather the perspective UNHCR actors who had been 
heavily involved in the development of the 2011 protocol. However, I was unable to secure any 
interviews, despite reaching out to a number of persons suggested by state actors.  
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I believe that 2-3 years ago, we had a flow of citizens from Cameroon, I 
think, no from Ghana, from Ghana! And they would come and say that they 
were minors. Of course, they didn’t have any documents and they would 
apply for asylum. And they…let’s say it wasn’t very credible. So much so 
that when they were directed to mechanisms for housing, the people in 
charge of the housing didn’t want to put those people who were evidently 
not minors, in the same installations where there were minors.  So they 
would reject them. (Attorney, religious civil society organization). 
Such affective and appearance-based suspicions were repeated by other actors, 
who shared a narrative of dozens of wrinkled and gray-bearded middle-aged men 
who arrived within the span of a few weeks claiming to be 16 years-old and seeking 
asylum.  
Later issues began to arise… well, in fact at first minors were coming, 
especially as “polizones,” and then some started coming that had more 
gray hair than me and wrinkles greater than mine and presented 
themselves as minors… but in the face they were at least 45 years old 
and so we had to generate some ... We had to adapt the protocol for 
unfounded claims because it was not just a matter of determining if they 
were minor or not. But that person was going to put in a place where there 
were minors. And that person was 45, 50 years old ... and you were 
putting at risk the population of minors. So... (High-ranking Bureaucrat, 
CONARE) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 86 
  
A 50-year old gentleman, with a gray beard would come, saying, I am a 
refugee, I am a minor, I am sixteen years old. I was not here during that 
time ... but I know of anecdotes of guys that came, to this day, I see those 
old, filed papers, during the beginnings of CONARE, you have the photo 
of the person, and in these cases, you see the photo and you say, 
obviously this guy is not sixteen, he is fifty…they all said, I am a minor, I 
am a minor, and it was because of this it [age determination practices] 
started.  (Tutor, MPD) 
In these statements made by persons working for different sectors of the state, we 
see how tightly woven this narrative about the “wave of Ghanaian pseudo minors” 
became. Even the tutor, who had only recently joined the program for 
unaccompanied minors, shared the same story about an overwhelming wave of 
middle-aged men posing as children, a fraudulent flow of Ghanaian migrants 
"coming to abuse a system for children" that needed to be stopped. Age 
determination was seen as a tool to discipline this “ungovernable” population. 
When pressed about these narratives, however, state agents’ answers revealed— 
rather than the “overwhelming wave” of pseudo children—a suspicion of black 
bodies.  When I asked the CONARE bureaucrat how many of these persons he 
thought turned out to be over 30 years old, he stated,   
Actually… sometimes it’s hard. But clearly, they were adults. Later they 
turned out to be in fact adults. Yes, there were some gray cases, because 
there are physiological issues that generate confusion, especially with 
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people of color, or because their physical appearance they look like they 
are 30 years old, and the guy is 18 or 17. There are not that many cases, 
it’s rare, but it has happened. 
According to official CONARE statistics, the total number of Ghanaian asylum 
applicants during 2014 was 41. Specifically, as outlined by the 2014 Annual DGN 
report, only 16 of those persons manifested being unaccompanied minors. One 
DGN actor, who worked closely with these youth, critiqued the narratives of other 
state agencies. She explained, 
I think the thing here… there is an issue of, let’s say—horribly—but this 
difference, this exoticism of the African. Everything raises suspicions. 
Everything is unknown. So legalize it. Put it all in papers. How old is he. 
[…]  they say things like, “Africans don’t age.” You know? As if it were 
common sense. [They say] “You can’t know their age, and I don’t know 
[what else].” And then you start thinking, and I mean, if I see a guy walking 
on the street, a 17-year-old Argentinean, I don’t know if he’s 17 or 21.  
(Interdisciplinary team, DGN) 
In this state actor’s view, the strong push for implementation of age determination 
practices in 2014 "was to stop a flow of youth migration." "But youth migration," 
she emphasized. "Because not all of those [persons] ended up being adults” (as 
suggested by age determination tests). She continued, "So, these are strategies 
that institutions have to stop the flow when it becomes visibly notable.” Perhaps 
offering further evidence to the DGN actor's theory, the approval of Ghanaian 
asylum applications was extremely low after 2014.  According to the 2014 and 
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2016 CONARE statistics booklets, the ratio of applicants to approvals went from 
17 to 17 in 2013, to 1 to 41 in 2014. While official CONARE statistics don’t provide 
the numbers of applicants in 2015 and 2016,  0 Ghanaian persons were 
recognized as refugees in 2015, and only 2 in 2016.27 While submitting migrant 
youth seeking asylum to age determination procedures may not stop them from 
migrating to Argentina, these practices, wielding state power over their bodies and 
intimacies, can go a long way in reinforcing them—and their bodies—as suspect,  
problematic, and risky. 
 
iv. Suspect Bodies Navigating the State 
One DGN actor who has worked for years as part of the interdisciplinary team 
in charge of accompanying youth, described this accompaniment as exhausting 
“on the street,” given that she and others in the team had to struggle to get things 
done, because of, in her words, “the exoticization of the African.”   For example, 
she and others struggled to secure spots for these youth in city government-run 
group homes [hogares]. The DGN actor, explained, “above all, the issue of age 
determination tests was due to admittance in group homes, and until a test 
wasn’t done, they wouldn’t do the interview in CONARE, they would stop the 
process." She would hear things like:  
 
27 After this research concluded, CONARE removed the 2014 and 2016 statistics booklets from 
its website, replacing them with a new booklet including statistics from 2013-2017. There are 
significant discrepancies and a noteworthy invisivilization of African migrants seeking asylum in 
the progression of statistical reporting from 2014, to 2016 and to 2017 that requires further 
analysis. 
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“no, no, I know that they are all adults, I know that it’s all a lie, go, take him 
to the hospital, do the test, but I won’t place him in any housing.”  In many 
ways, age determination tests became a way to uncover the “truth” of 
suspect bodies.   
As a result, as this state actor explained, when the results of age determination 
practices came back “positive” (stating an age under 18) this was a cause for 
celebration, as they now had a tool to use against the denial of services for 
African youth in certain institutions that saw them as a priori suspect.   
 
v. Suspect Bodies Navigating the Streets of Buenos Aires  
Regardless of whether they make claims to being refugees or minors, African 
migrant youth navigate a broader minefield of “technologies of governance” that 
mark them as suspect in “White Argentina.” Part of this is a constant harassment 
by “professionals of security” (Bigo 2002) as they work vending on the city’s 
streets. While I discuss this issue further in the next chapter, it also deserves 
mention here as “technology of governance” that regularly marks African youth as 
“out of place” in the street of Buenos Aires, regardless of their age.  
This includes constant harassment at the hands of police officers and 
municipality agents in charge of the everyday policing of street vending.28 In recent 
years, such policing has often turned into spectacular large-scale operations aimed 
 
28 Kleidermacher (2011) explains, while selling items in the public space for the purposes of 
“subsistence” is allowed in the Buenos Aires Code of Contraventions, migrant youth often have to 
enter into “negotiations” with police officers or forfeit their merchandise to avoid the opening of an 
“acta” against them on the basis of the code of contraventions. 
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at “dismantling a “problem of manteros” and “cleansing the streets” of Buenos 
Aires.  The word mantero is used to describe street vendors in Argentina, 
stemming from the fact that some use tablecloths (mantel in Spanish) to organize 
their merchandise along sidewalks. The online Oxford Dictionary’s translation of 
“mantero” to English is “illegal street vendor,” perhaps evidencing a global 
naturalization of the criminalization of street workers. Also signaling an a priori 
illegality, Paceca, Canelo and Belcic (2017) write that Argentine state actors 
understand the  “mantero problem” as one of mafia-like organizations and a form 
of  “complex crime.”29 As the authors analyze it, the state’s strategic response is 
then threefold: 1) constant harassment to displace vendors, 2) confiscation of 
merchandise to tire vendors, and 3) construction of street vendors in ways that 
foment public disapproval.    
 
For African youth, navigating a socio-legal context that provides police officers 
arbitrary and unchecked discretionary power over all street workers (Paceca, 
Canelo and Belcic 2017) intersects with a racial and xenophobic animus toward 
black migrant workers and heightened vulnerabilities tied to not speaking Spanish 
to create situations of extreme police abuse.  Such situations have been 
documented by researchers who have looked at 2009 and 2014 cases where 
African migrants took legal action against police officers and the Ministerio Público 
Fiscal (García 2014; Paceca, Canelo and Belcic 2017; Pita 2017). In this context, 
 
29 As described in Chapter Six, “complex crime” is often deployed to refer to crimes tied to drug-
trafficking. 
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some youth may strategically apply for asylum, seeking to navigate this dilemma 
with some form of legal document while their cases are resolved. Their persecution 
as “manteros” intersects with suspicions over their legitimate presence as migrants 
and refugees in Argentina.  Operations to search and evict street vendors have 
followed migrants to their places of residence, evidencing a material impossibility 
of “belonging” in the Argentine context for African youth.30 Such operations include 
large-scale, middle-of-the-night raids at long-term hotels where Senegalese 
migrants live. In these operations, state actors cited in media coverage claim to be 
simultaneously performing controles de permanencia (immigration controls aimed 
at detecting irregular migrants) and searching for “deposits” of products associated 
with the “improper use of public space for profit.” These raids become news 
spectacles, with media cameras following police into the building and 
photographing countless white bags filled with confiscated products such as 
shoes, hats, and sunglasses. During interviews, workers at both the National and 
local Buenos Aires Public Defender’s offices noted the immigration office’s 
increased concern with policing hotels where migrants live. This can also be 
corroborated in the 2016 and 2017 reports published by the National Immigration 
Office (DNM), showing a significant increase in immigration controls, particularly 
listing “private residences” and “hotels,” and “accommodation establishments” as 
part of the top 10 places where it performs such controls.31 
 
30 Such experiences of exclusion tie in with the distinction made by Paul Gilroy (1999) between 
“location of residence” and the “location of belonging.” 
31 Importantly, Article 55 of the Argentine Immigration Law sanctions the paid accommodation of 
migrants “residing in the country irregularly” through significant fines to those who provide such 
accommodations, supporting the precarization of migrant housing. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, by centering of the 2011 protocol for unaccompanied minors, 
as well as broader discourses about refugees and asylum applicants circulating 
in the media and across Argentine state agencies, I’ve explored the ways in 
which some youth are seen as innocent and vulnerable subjects in need of state 
protection (legitimate refugees typified by the Syrian girl)—and others become 
construed as problematic subjects who must be disciplined due to the threat that 
their “ungovernability” poses to the state  (usually male African youth with 
suspect bodies and behaviors). Age, I’ve argued, functions as one of many 
technologies of governance that mark black migrants as suspect and “out of 
place.” While the 2011 protocol for unaccompanied minors can serve as a tool for 
protecting the rights of underage migrants, I’ve sought here to also explore the 
ways in which it becomes embedded within and filtered through racialized and 
gendered understandings of innocence and vulnerability which serve to sustain 
exclusionary narratives of Argentine national belonging. In the following chapter, I 
explore the experiences of Latin American and African migrants as they navigate 
the streets of Buenos Aires and encounter the everyday state in this context. 
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CHAPTER IV: ETIQUETADOS: SUSPECT BODIES AND EVERYDAY 
MOBILITY IN BUENOS AIRES 
At a 2017 event hosted by the Casa Rosada in Buenos Aires, Federico 
Agusti—then president of Argentina’s National Refugee Commission—
characterized migration as an essential element of Argentina’s “DNA.” He recalled 
the country’s history of European immigration, pointing out that we were just a few 
thousand meters away from the historic building where thousands of 20th-century 
European immigrants were once housed. In doing so, he placed emphasis on the 
ways in which migration is an undeniable fact of Argentina, a literal engravement 
on the landscape of the capital city. Other high-ranking government officials made 
similar statements throughout this event. These officials linked this history of 
immigration to an imperative of maintaining Argentina as “open” and “welcoming” 
to immigrants and refugees despite restrictive global trends.  Argentina’s current 
immigration law, with its emphasis on migrant rights and regional mobility, gives 
further credence to these discourses. And so in this context, state agents and 
government officials often characterize Argentine borders as permeable with 
“extremely” easy entry into the country, and migrant mobility as the order of things.  
In this chapter, I try to explain the ways in which the racial project of “White 
Argentina” comes into tension with migrant youth’s everyday mobility,  providing 
empirical evidence for how the mobility of those who are etiquetados, or labeled 
and placed on the constitutive outside of “White Argentina” due to markers of race, 
class, and nationality, become suspect and policed by the everyday racial state.  
In doing so, I argue that how countries are constructed as nations of immigrants 
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may be a more significant factor to consider for research on immigration rather 
than that they are constructed in this manner.  
 
1. Data and Methods 
 
Data for this chapter was collected fieldwork in Buenos Aires between 2016 
and 2017 as well as In-depth interviews conducted with two dozen global south 
migrant youth between the ages of 15 and 32 who were living in Buenos Aires at 
the time and had migrated to the city after the current immigration law was 
implemented in 2004.  I completed a thematic analysis of these data, which was 
complemented with analysis of state documents and media articles related to the 
key themes described here. While drawing from a broad range of youth 
experiences to provide more general dynamics, I focus here on the experience of 
male and male-passing youth from Latin American and African countries who 
identified ethno-racially as either black, mestizo, or indigenous. 32 For these youth, 
everyday mobility often became a problem that required a great deal of strategy, 
negotiation, and resistance.   
 
2. Racialized Bodies and a “Phenomenology of Being Stopped” 
 
The objective of this chapter is not so much to understand how the Argentine 
state defines race and other interrelated categorizations like class and nation, but 
 
32 While the overall interviews were divided roughly equally between male and female 
participants, the themes analyzed here emerged in the interviews with male participants. This 
may be because more of the male youth worked in street vending and, as a result, had more 
frequent encounters with everyday state agents. Nonetheless, I do draw here from experiences of 
mobility and belonging of female youth as I develop broader connections.  
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rather to analyze the work that categories of race, nation, and class do during 
interactions between youth and agents of the state (Brubaker 2009). What does 
being “labeled” [etiquetados] as poor, nonwhite, and foreigner mean for migrant 
youth in their daily interactions as they navigate the city?   
In a “Phenomenology of Whiteness,” Sara Ahmed (2007) grounds colonial 
legacies by examining how the “ongoing and unfinished history” of whiteness 
shapes the ways bodies experience the world, “affecting how they ‘take up’ space” 
(p. 151). These histories, she states, “surface on the body, or even shape how 
bodies surface.” As a result, they orient spaces toward whiteness, insofar as 
whiteness “trails behind” the actions of certain bodies as they move through the 
world, rarely posing a “problem” or turning into an “obstacle” to the completion of 
an action. Nonwhite bodies, however, cannot “trail behind” actions.  As Ahmed 
explains, “you learn to fade into the background, but sometimes you can’t, or you 
don’t. The moments when the body appears “out of place” are moments of political 
and personal trouble” (p.159). In contrast to white motility in a world “organized 
around whiteness,” nonwhite bodies regularly become “stuck,” often feeling 
“uncomfortable, exposed, visible, different, when they take up this space” (p. 157). 
 
Such experiences can perhaps be most aptly described by what Ahmed calls “a 
phenomenology of being stopped.”  
For bodies that are not extended by the skin of the social, bodily movement 
is not so easy. Such bodies are stopped, where the stopping is an action 
that creates its own impressions. Who are you? Why are you here? What 
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are you doing? Each question, when asked, is a kind of stopping device: 
you are stopped by being asked the question, just as asking the question 
requires that you be stopped. A phenomenology of ‘being stopped’ might 
take us in a different direction than one that begins with motility, with a body 
that ‘can do’ by flowing into space (p. 161). 
In what follows, I draw from Ahmed’s theorizations, as well as those of other 
scholars of race, the state, and nationhood to understand the experiences of young 
migrants when they encounter state and non-state actors as they navigate the city 
of Buenos Aires. In doing so, I look at “when, where, and how” race, ethnicity, 
nationhood, and class become salient in the lives of young migrants living in 
Argentina (Brubaker, Feischmidt, Fox, and Grancea 2009). 
 
3. Suspect Mobilities: Learning, Living, and Resisting Everyday Labels 
 
Nonwhite migrant youth often seem hyper-aware of how their bodies “take up 
space.” They recognize prevalent forms of racism that bind all nationals into 
essentialized images and stereotypes, come to expect being labeled and stopped 
on the basis of their appearance, and strategize to move about more freely. These 
narratives reveal just how concretely notions of “White Argentina” come to shape 
the politics of mobility and belonging in Buenos Aires. 
 
i. Suspect Nationalities: Pedagogies of Criminalization 
 
Unfortunately, I have ... I believe that all my compatriots, we have a 
complex. And it is the fact of being Colombian. You will always be the figure, 
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the important figure with a customs agent, or with an immigration agent. 
You will always be the character to be seen. Why? Because we have an 
ugly past, a drug trafficking past, a past full of girls, uh, prostitutes. Then 
you will always be marked by one of those characteristics and you will not 
be able to travel freely as a tourist or as a citizen, or a business person. You 
will always be labeled. 
        Arlanda, Colombia, 26 
 
Arlanda is a gender-fluid 26-year-old Colombian. They,33 like other Latin American 
and African youth, have learned to expect that their mobility will be curtailed as a 
result of a series of assumptions about their country of origin. Arlanda partly 
learned this lesson at Argentina’s international airport, two years before our 
interview in 2017, after arriving to pursue a degree at a private university in Buenos 
Aires. There, they experienced unexplained repeated questioning by the customs 
agent about their plans, despite having thoroughly prepared all the necessary 
paperwork and information. This was—while only temporary—a stop, and Arlanda 
experienced it as such.  For a few minutes, Arlanda became “stuck,” and they 
described this experience as a form of “violence,” a way for state agents to get 
them to say the “wrong thing.” 
While Arlanda was only momentarily “slowed down,” Steven, a 23-year-old 
male Colombian, recalled a stop that lasted more than 24 hours.   
 
33 Arlanda identified as genderqueer or non-binary, hence the use of the pronouns 
“them/their/them.” Arlanda picked this particular name to signal their gender fluidity.  
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A year and a half ago, when I was entering Argentina they stopped me ... 
arriving to Salta. […] There was a gendarmerie control. They stopped me 
there because ... For being Colombian,  [they said] that I had drugs ... but 
they checked my suitcase and I had absolutely nothing ... They arrested me 
and took me to a clinic to have an X-ray exam,  [they said] that I had cocaine 
in my body ...So then they did the exams and I didn’t have anything. And 
they let me go ... I think it was because I’m Colombian. And they didn’t see 
... they didn’t see anything in my suitcase. Only because he searched me 
and touched my belly, he kept saying that I had cocaine capsules. So I think 
it was more than anything for being Colombian, and I don’t know. They were 
convinced that I had cocaine and that I had cocaine! I don’t know, they saw 
me as suspicious. And in the end, they did the exams and all that. And in 
the results, I had nothing, only hunger in my belly. 
       Steven, Colombia, 23 
 
Like Arlanda, Steven understands this stop as a direct consequence of his 
nationality, and, indeed, this is what the gendarmerie agents told him; he was being 
stopped because he was Colombian. He, like Arlanda, had his requirements for 
entry in order. This was a checkpoint in the interior, and he had already crossed 
other border checkpoints. Steven and Arlanda’s stops resonate with Sara Ahmed’s 
(2007) experience of having the “wrong name.” Ahmed explains that despite 
having the “right passport”—a British passport—her Muslim last name, Ahmed, 
slows her down and makes her subject to scrutiny. In this case, despite being from 
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South America, and subject to 1) agreements that should theoretically facilitate 
their movement in the region and 2) an Argentine law that provides them access 
to long-term legal residence in the country on the basis of their nationality, Arlanda 
and Steven’s Colombianess marks them as suspect and slows them down. 
As a result of the strong foothold that discourses of criminality, drug trafficking, 
and violence centered on Colombia have taken in Argentina, as well as the broader 
South American context (Abiuso, 2016; Stang and Stefoni 2016), Colombian youth 
often experience getting “stuck” before they can move on. Moving on, however, 
may be structured by other forms of classification which approximate or distance 
bodies to “White Argentina” and therefore extend or further curtail their mobility. In 
their case, Arlanda, perhaps due to the middle-class status signaled by their 
inscription in a private Buenos Aires University, quickly becomes “unstuck..” 
Steven, however, is subject to prolonged scrutiny. His belongings are searched, 
and when nothing turns up, his body becomes the object of inspection. Almost 
literally, the growling of his empty belly—signaling the exact opposite of a private 
university inscription—makes Steven’s body doubly suspect. 
For Colombian youth like Arlanda and Steven, an assumed association among 
Colombians, drugs, and criminality marks their experiences with immigration 
agents as they enter Argentina. The criminalization of migrants on the basis of 
nationality, however, was an issue that came up during many interviews, with youth 
understanding that although most nationalities are subject to essentializing 
narratives about their labor and customs, Colombian, Bolivian, Peruvian, and 
Senegalese migrants are specifically subject to criminalization.  Such 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 100 
criminalization affected youths’ everyday lives and mobility beyond their initial entry 
into the country. 
I don’t know, [they say] that Peruvians and Bolivians steal a lot. Or that 
Bolivians can only have vegetable stands and nothing else. So if there is a 
Bolivian in a classroom, you are not Bolivian, how could you be from 
Bolivia? 
   Paola, Colombia, 32 
 
 
Argentineans think that Peruvians come here to steal, to sell drugs, and to 
keep stealing.  Very few think that there are Peruvians working legally or 
honest Peruvians, very few. Because Peruvians and Bolivians are always 
in the villas. If you go to a villa and you don’t find a Peruvian or Bolivian, it’s 
not a villa. The truth is that these are their expectations of Peruvians here. 
This is the reason you may notice that I don’t want people to know that I’m 
Peruvian. 
Ian, Peru, 26 
 
 
White Argentineans, let’s say, when you hear them speak of the majority of 
people, they always refer to nationalities by generalizing, referring 
pejoratively to those nationalities, probably because they had some bad 
encounter with some person from that nationality, and they always tend to 
generalize and say, those shitty Peruvians or Bolivians, they come to 
steal…I see that a lot…   
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Andrés, Guatemala, 24 
 
 
There are some Peruvians who do make other Peruvians look bad. 
Because some Peruvians steal here or are drug traffickers. And other 
Peruvians just work and study. And like, they make them look bad. And then 
there are some Argentineans who say, all Peruvians are like this. Not all of 
them, obviously. 
         Fernanda, Peru, 17 
 
I remember that when I was selling on the street, they would treat us like 
drug traffickers. Because they thought that we had drugs underneath our 
mat or table.  They often thought that. I’m speaking of my own experience 
on the streets. Sometimes they would come and check. The civil police, for 
example, they did that to me. They would pretend they were not looking to 
see what was in the box, what was underneath. They would always do it. I 
would tell them, “are you looking for drugs?” Fortunately, I don’t even 
consume.            
        Aliou, Senegal, 26 
 
In their statements, youth explain the ways in which certain behaviors (E.g. 
stealing, selling drugs and working illicitly) are associated with nationals of specific 
countries, who are then seen as belonging in particular places (E.g. villas, 
vegetable stands) and not in others (E.g. classrooms). They also call attention to 
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what Pred (2000) calls the “metonymical magic of cultural racism,” whereby 
“individual transgression becomes collective guilt” (p. 75).34 Colombians felt 
compelled to challenge these narratives and while some youth attributed 
Argentines’ criminalizing images of certain immigrant populations to potential 
experiences with members of those nationalities, others challenged the 
homogenizing premise of these narratives. Arlanda felt the weight of narratives 
about Colombians in a particularly visceral way:  
  
Stop! No more. We don’t want to continue to be recognized like this, please. 
No more. […] So I’ve always said, yes, I’m Colombian, but not what you are 
thinking, no. That has not happened to me, I don’t know what it is, it was not 
my reality. I am something else […] Hello, I am well prepared, hello, I am 
bilingual, hello, I don’t know. […] The truth is that I see it as my duty, like, 
ok I am Colombian, I know I have to take a handle of the situation so that 
people change their way of thinking. I am not that. No, I am not what you 
think, on the contrary, I do other things and I can do them very well.  
Aliou, a 26-year-old Senegalese youth, constantly challenged these narratives, 
not only about Senegalese migrants but also about Latin Americans. Recalling an 
 
34As defined by Pred (2000) in relation to racism in Sweden, “cultural racism” refers to realities 
“wherein negative ethnic stereotyping leads to racist effects, to discrimination and segregation, to 
marginalization and exclusion; wherein skin-pigment, hair color, and other bodily markers are 
unreflectedly translated into highly charged cultural markers.” This is a type of racism that 
functions “through assuming the historical purity and homogeneity of cultures, through regarding 
cultures as self-contained and impermeable, through openly or roundaboutly claiming that cultural 
antagonism is natural or a matter of instinct, through suggesting that any genuine form of 
accommodation between one singular culture or ethnic group and another is impossible, through 
proposing that the distance separating the Other’s (non-white) culture from Swedish culture is 
unbridgeable...” (p. 66-67). 
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argument with his Argentine brother-in-law who is a police officer in Buenos Aires, 
Aliou stated,  
The disagreement came when he said ‘I can’t stand Peruvians’. [I said] You 
are a son of a bitch for saying I can’t stand Peruvians! [He said] They are 
all the same…. You are kidding me… For me it doesn’t matter that they are 
Peruvian, Bolivian, whatever, a human is a human, each in the way that he 
is. Always! What happens is that people come and say [all] the Peruvians 
are thieves. Stop! All Peruvians are not thieves. […] You can’t say all police 
are thieves, no, there are good police and bad police, there are good 
Senegalese and bad Senegalese, there are bad Argentines and good 
Argentines. 
In his statement, Aliou both evidences and simultaneously challenges the ways in 
which criminalizing images circulate within state institutions and become re-
inscribed by police officers like his brother-in-law. In her research on the Buenos 
Aires city judicial system, González (2017) found that judicial state workers 
subscribe to similar essentializing notions of nationality. For example, much like 
immigrant youth’s critique, state workers associate Peruvians, Paraguayans, and 
Bolivians with theft and Colombians with drug trafficking. Following Balibar, 
González theorizes these criminalizing narratives as forms of “cultural racism” 
given that judicial state workers justify the association of specific nationalities with 
particular crimes on the basis of culture rather than biology. However, as Pred 
(2000) notes, cultural racisms, no matter how contained under notions of customs, 
behaviors, and socialization, “can only hide—but not permanently eradicate—the 
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foundation of biological racism upon which they are (un?)wittingly built” (p. 77).  
While essentializing images tied to nationality are certainly an important factor in 
youth’s experiences, their narratives about everyday mobility reveal how physical 
appearance—through intersecting markers of race and class—plays a significant 
role in how they understand their everyday encounters on Buenos Aires’ streets. 
 
ii. Suspect Bodies: Navigating Everyday Street Encounters 
 
1. A Model of Suspicion  
 
The Jew is not liked as soon as he has been detected. But 
with me things take on a whole new face. I am not given a 
second chance, I am overdetermined from the outside. I am a 
slave not to the “idea” others have of me, but to my 
appearance. 
 
-Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks 
 
 
When I walk around anywhere, I don’t know if it’s because I am a man of 
darker complexion, I don’t know, but I feel that people feel uncomfortable 
when I walk behind someone. Not often, but I’ve perceived that many times. 
[I am] walking and they turn around, and they move to the side, they stay 
behind, or walk faster. But it could be for a matter of security, that everyone 
does it, maybe I do it too, who knows. But I’ve noticed that.  
        Andrés, Guatemala, 24 
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Like today, I went to ‘el chino’ around the corner from my house, and I was 
dressed… Well I had a huge sweater and huge pants, because it was cold. 
And I was in line and a man comes and says—because I didn’t have this 
covered [pointing to his chest]—aren’t you cold? And like, where are you 
from? He started to ask me. [I told him] no, [and] I am from my country, and 
there was a woman behind me that was looking at me, with a facial 
expression… I don’t even know […] she was staring at me with fear, you 
know? […] It’s because they label (etiquetan) a person without knowing 
them, it happens everywhere. […] I don’t know, I think it’s generally because 
of the color of my skin, that’s why.  
                   Jacob, Panama, 21 
 
My Brother-in-law… look, he works as a painter, he’s black and wears a 
cap. Morochito, trigueño, right? Dark skin. And he says that one time the 
police stopped him.  He is always with his cap, he always comes from work, 
he got stopped. Why did they stop him? I don’t know, simply because he 
was wearing cap, that’s why they stopped him. Of course, he’s not… Well 
in that time, he dressed more negrito... now he dresses a bit more formal, 
so that he won’t be stopped. But he still wears a cap.  
                Ian, Peru 26 
 
 
Andrés, Jacob, and Ian all see their and others’ skin color—in conjunction with 
clothing items that mark them as working-class—as determining factors in their 
everyday interactions as they navigate the city. They become aware of how their 
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bodies are misrecognized as suspect, dangerous, and deviant when they walk 
around, shop for groceries, or come home from work. Ian’s statements, however, 
remind us that such misrecognitions don’t just leave youth feeling “uncomfortable, 
exposed, visible, different, when they take up this space” (Ahmed 2007, p. 157), 
but they also can structure encounters with state agents. Ian explains that the 
police have “a model of suspicion” [un modelo de desconfianza], which his brother-
in-law with his darker complexion, work clothing, and cap fits. Ian is so cognizant 
of this “model” that he carefully curates the ways he presents himself to others by 
staying silent and dressing “more cheto”35 as he navigates the city driving his 
family’s taxi four times a week.  He explains: “It’s like you want to go unnoticed, 
like you are not from another country, you know? But sometimes you can’t.”  
Ian understands that being associated with Peru means being associated with 
criminality, and thus he prefers not to speak, as he believes that his “accent” 
immediately gives him away. Furthermore, he realizes that working-class clothing 
can racialize him, deeming him more “negro,” as he mentions in relation to his 
brother-in-law. While Ian does not identify as white, he does believe that unlike his 
other family members, he has generally been able to avoid discrimination and 
police stops due to having a lighter skin tone [no ser tan negro]. His ability to “go 
unnoticed,” however, is shaky at best. Indeed, “blending in” in “White Argentina” 
requires him to dress in clothing associated with the middle class and negate his 
“Peruvian-ness” as much as possible. Ian is thus always at risk of being “outed.” 
 
35 “Cheto” is a slang term used to refer to middle and upper-class (or posh) clothing styles in 
Argentina. 
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“Imagine,” he tells me as we sit in an artsy coffee shop in the neighborhood of 
Palermo, “if I come here dressed in a Boca or River outfit. The patrol would be 
outside waiting for me!” As Ian describes, a wrong move can racialize him and put 
him squarely in the center of the police’s “model of suspicion,” and on the 
constitutive outside of “White Argentina.”  
 
Jacob is 21, from Panama and a cadet at the Escuela de Cadetes de la Policía 
Federal Argentina [School of Cadets of the Argentine Federal Police]. While he 
believes that police forces should treat everyone equally, his experiences in the 
academy suggest a much more contradictory training:  
For me it’s the same, a woman, I don’t know, a blonde [woman] that kills 
and a black man that kills. But for many, no she is different because of this 
and that […] Some [cadets] think like this, that’s why I’m saying that there 
is a lot of labeling (etiquetamiento). I took a class that was called 
communicative practices and covered this labeling of different people. That 
it’s mainly used as a form of discrimination and many cadets do use it. [They 
say] no because this person has a jacket like this, this or that… It’s not 
necessary. That’s why in many cases in which we have to [act out] searches 
or detentions in the school, and they always make us, I don’t know, dress 
differently, with a jacket and everything. And one time I got up and I said, 
officer, I stood up and said, Sir, can’t you give us a case in which the crook, 
or person committing the crime is a man dressed in a suit and nicely dressed 
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with everything else? And he was like, yea but not here, this is Argentina, 
that’s what they say. As if [saying] here it’s always like that. 
Given that future police forces may be trained to see criminality as tied to a type of 
clothing style and socioeconomic status (despite also, apparently, receiving anti-
discrimination training), it is not hard to see why youth continuously point to such 
items (working clothes, caps, baggy jackets), in relation to their skin color as key 
elements that shape their everyday interactions on the street, including those with 
police officers and other state agents.   
Jacob, who identifies himself ethno-racially as black and indigenous, explains 
that he has become “accustomed” to the ways in which Argentines judge people 
on the basis of clothing and skin color. And so in his neighborhood of Lugano, 
where he has safety concerns due to recent high-profile crimes, he strategically 
taps into criminalizing narratives to move more safely through the streets.  
[This] makes me laugh, when I go to “el chino” from around the corner I 
dress, I don’t know, with a giant Adidas jacket, huge pants, and Adidas 
shoes, and I go like this with a cap. And I am relaxed because they are 
going to think that I am… You know? And they tell me, be careful in the 
streets, and I tell them, if you would see how I’m dressed!  
This strategy is exactly the opposite to that of Ian’s, who tries to wear “cheto 
clothes” to “sink into space” and move around more freely. This may be because 
Jacob knows that he will not be able to “blend in” in Argentina. Nonetheless, his 
choice to wear clothing associated with criminality is also tied to his social position 
as a cadet, which provides him with a safety net from police stops. The police 
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academy is in the same neighborhood and he says police forces easily identify 
cadets by their haircuts. 
 
2. Street Vending and Policing 
 
Everyday stops by the police and municipality agents are often commonplace 
for Latin American and African youth who make a living working in Buenos Aires’ 
streets. Jean, a 23-year-old Venezuelan male who works in the neighborhood of 
Flores selling chocolate, describes his experiences:  
Generally, they stop me on the street to see if I have drugs... the other day 
I was just with some friends […] they were selling some chocolates, and 
they had the last ones ... I took out my wallet, I bought him the chocolates. 
He handed me the chocolates and entered the subway. Just then three 
plainclothes policemen were looking at me from the other side of the street. 
As I get out of the subway, the policeman suddenly pulls out his badge... he 
tells me I'm a policeman: I saw you buying drugs up there. Boom, to the 
wall. And believe me, they were not friendly at all. And that’s it, it’s normal, 
nothing happens. And yea, I was buying sweets. It’s normal, they stop you 
like that, they usually stop you on the street. I mean, I can go out here and 
I don’t pay attention because it is something that always happens and can 
happen anywhere. So, it's just a matter of getting used to it. 
Jean describes being “used to being stopped,” he calls it “normal” and uses 
adverbs like regularly, usually, always. This incident in which a police officer 
wrongfully accused him of buying drugs and slammed him into the wall at a subway 
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station, is not an anomaly to him but a naturalized element of his lived experience. 
Jean explains that as a male youth, people always tend to “think the worst” of him. 
Appearance, he says—and his friend Steven adheres—plays a big role too. 
 
It's a matter of appearance. Because more than anything ... like, because 
of the way I dress, how I walk, how I move ...so people tend to judge you ... 
I don’t know ... classify you, stigmatize you as criminal ... suddenly... and 
this always happens, you know ... I mean I can suddenly walk down the 
street and I don’t know, I come out here [Constitución] at 11 o'clock at night, 
a patrol sees me suspiciously and will ... automatically tell me: go there and 
if I were a criminal, they really won’t treat you nicely, the agent first comes 
by force.  
        Jean, Venezuela, 23 
 
One of these days I was around the Obelisco, I was doing paperwork at the 
Colombian Consulate and I was alone. I was walking near the Obelisco and 
a police officer on a bicycle stopped me, asked me for my documents…a 
search ... I really, I don’t know why ... I think because of my appearance ... 
my physical aspect.   
         Steven, Colombia, 23 
 
 
 
Jean and Steven are working-class youth who identify ethno-racially as 
mestizo. They work on the street, Jean selling chocolates in the Flores 
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neighborhood and Steven handing out flyers for a phone repair company in the 
Once neighbourhood. Neither has spent more than six months in Buenos Aires, 
yet they have collected a plethora of stories about being stopped, questioned, 
accused of having drugs, searched, and asked for documents by Buenos Aires 
city police. They have come to expect this routine as part of their everyday lives. 
As they explain, there is no reason for being stopped, other than being judged, 
stigmatized, and deemed “delinquent” or “criminal” due to their physical 
appearance. Unlike Ian, Jean and Steven have no expectation of being able to 
avoid the police: rather, they strategize on how to interact when they are stopped. 
They say they’ve become “cancheros” [skilled] and developed strategies to avoid 
further conflict, like going out of their way to “smile,” saying “good afternoon 
officer,” and speaking “softly” to them.  
Steven considers himself lucky because neither the police or agents of the 
Ministry of Environment and Public Space—in charge of environmental quality, 
public safety, and waste management—have previously confiscated his 
chocolates. Steven explains he has had good luck identifying officers who will let 
him work in “their streets” as long as he stays on the move when required. 
However, he has witnessed these agents targeting black youth—likely Senegalese 
migrants—and confiscating their merchandise. 
I’ve seen it […] In Once.. and so [black youth] are always looking out to see 
if the people from Espacio Público come, and if they come, there are six, 
eight, ten with two police officers and they take everything by force. They 
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take it, and they put it in a white bag, and they let them go. And really I don’t 
know what they do with the things they take. 
This is precisely what happened to Moru, a 24-year-old male from Senegal who 
works in the city-center selling sunglasses and other accessories on the street.  
Moru’s merchandise was taken for good and, as a result, he has learned to 
immediately evacuate his post as soon as he catches a glimpse of a police officer 
or public space agent nearby. After all, he tells me, his relationship with them is 
“very complicated.” 
Moru’s experiences echo a broader reality. In past years, Senegalese youth 
have individually and collectively denounced abusive and violent police practices 
toward them (Espiro, Voscoboinik, and Zubrzycki, 2016; García 2014; Pita, 2017). 
Such efforts, however, have often fallen on the judiciary’s deaf ears, as local 
Buenos Aires courts have argued against notions that these encounters with the 
police are products of racial discrimination and xenophobia and rather are part of 
legitimate policing of “illegal” street vending activities. Although selling brand-items 
and large quantities of products may be subject to intellectual property and 
trademark laws (González and Rotger 2013), whether the sale of products on city 
streets itself constitutes an illegal activity is a problem that is not clear in the city’s 
Code of Contraventions and subject to ongoing debate (Del Águila 2018).  
Yet advocacy groups and researchers have documented the multiple ways in 
which migrants from Senegal regularly become subject to detentions, police 
extortions, fines, and confiscations. According to one Senegalese community 
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leader in Argentina, the relationship with police forces is one of the main 
challenges that Senegalese youth face in the country.  
In the past years, there have been large-scale operations to “search and evict” 
street workers in Buenos Aires’ commercial neighborhoods including in the 
neighborhoods of Once, Flores, and Constitución where most Senegalese youth 
work and live. State officials have described these operations, which have included 
spectacular displays of police force and often ended in confrontations, as an effort 
to “disband criminal organizations” and “return public space” back to the neighbors 
of these barrios. On Twitter, the city of Buenos Aires states “Let’s keep advancing 
together,” pointing to how these evictions make room for the re-designing of 
neighborhoods like Once so that it can become, once again, “a place to enjoy.” 
Such statements tap into “civilizational” narratives that are central to the 
construction and maintenance of “White Argentina.” The claim being that visible 
black and brown bodies on the street must be displaced in order for societal 
advancement to take place. The spaces of the city must be “returned” to white 
bodies for their pleasure and enjoyment.  Such statements tap into global historical 
discourses that relegate blackness to the “uncivilized world.” As Rahier and 
Hintzen (2010) state,  
In this imaginary construction, black bodies are denied the capacities 
(understood as rationality and reason) for full belonging in the spaces of 
civilized modernity […] The state and the nation are markers of civilization, 
and blackness, understood as “uncivilized,” becomes ascribed to their 
constitutive outsides. Under such conditions blackness, however 
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constituted and irrespective of its social and geographic location, becomes 
the object of state regulation, control, and jurisdiction (p. xvii). 
Under these “complicated” circumstances, mobility can become a forced reality of 
black migrant labor. As Moru explained to me when we met, in a matter of hours, 
he may have to vanish from the spot where he was working, adamantly avoiding 
an encounter with the police or municipality agents. In her historical study of black 
girlhood in New Orleans, Simmons (2012) demonstrates that “vanishing” became 
a survival strategy for young black girls as they navigated city streets in the US Jim 
Crow south. Understanding themselves as an unprotected minority who were more 
subject to police abuse than protection, the girls learned the act of “geographic 
disappearance” early on. A news article from February 2018, which details some 
of the daily experiences of Senegalese youth in Argentina, further elucidates this 
forced geographic mobility, 
Becaye is 28 years old, he was born in Dakar and has lived in Buenos Aires 
for three years. He met Mohamed, Mamadú and Ismael - all of them under 
30 - working in street vending at the intersection of Corrientes Avenue and 
Pueyrredón. For some time they shared one of the busiest corners of the 
city until, last summer, the Metropolitan Police moved forward with an 
eviction operation that ended up “running out all the manteros in the 
neighborhood of Once, including them. Becaye now wanders with his 
products through downtown Buenos Aires. He no longer has a fixed point 
for sale.  (Infoabe, February 2018) 
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As the reporter states, after this police operation that “ran out” all the street 
workers, Becaye now “wanders” (deambula) the streets selling his products, no 
longer located in one particular corner like he was before. The verb “to wander,” 
however, perhaps doesn't capture Becaye or Moru’s mobility sufficiently.  To 
wander implies movement that is both aimless and casual.  In their movement 
throughout Buenos Aires’ busiest neighborhoods, Moru and Becaye are neither 
aimless nor casual. In my interviews with other Senegalese youth, they elucidated 
a steadfast commitment to working and supporting their families back home, 
despite finding no feasible labor opportunities outside of street vending in Buenos 
Aires. This is further evidenced by research and reports that highlight the 
determination with which youth migrate to Argentina, often beginning to work on 
the streets just days after their arrival (Kleidermacher 2016; Zubrzycki 2012). 
Senegalese youth are not casual in their movement through the city either. Their 
experiences with the police and municipality puts many—like Moru and Becaye—
on high alert while they work. Pita (2017) has noted modifications in the vending 
displays in accordance with police activities. Such displays have become smaller 
and easier to move, allowing Senegalese street vendors both to “vanish” in a 
moment’s notice and avoid claims that they are obstructing public space.   
This “vanishing” however, is not always successful or safe. On April 14th, 2018, 
when around 300 police agents descended on the neighborhood of Flores in 
motorcycles with the purpose of evicting street workers, a car hit one Senegalese 
youth as he “ran” from the scene. His desire to vanish from this moment was not 
unwarranted, as news and advocacy groups report that the police detained a total 
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of 28 Senegalese men, some of whom were physically injured and threatened with 
further violence. Xango, an advocacy group that works to defend the rights of those 
belonging to the African Diaspora in Argentina, has denounced this police action 
to the UN, claiming they are in violation of the Convention Against Torture. 
Potential violence and detention are not the only consequences of these 
policing actions. Several advocates in the Senegalese community point out that 
such stops can lead to the creation of records that may impact migrants’ ability to 
apply for adjustment of their immigration status in the future. This was a fear shared 
by Latin American youth like Steven and Jean and a reality confirmed by those 
working in the Buenos Aires and National public defender’s offices, particularly 
after a 2017 Emergency Executive Decree (discussed in depth in Chapter Six) 
placed stricter control over migrant admissibility, permanence, and deportation 
(Barbero 2018). 
 
4. Suspect Bodies, Strategic Mobility, and the Limits of Belonging 
 
Bodies that are regularly stopped learn to move about the world differently. As 
Ahmed (2007) states, “having been singled out in the line, at the borders, we 
become defensive; we assume a defensive posture, as we ‘wait’ for the line of 
racism, to take our rights of passage away. If we inherit the failure of things to be 
habitual, then we might also acquire a tendency to look behind us” (p.163). Indeed, 
Latin American and African youth like Ian, Jacob, Arlanda, Moru, Aliou, Jean, and 
Steven move about the city very carefully, each developing a series of strategies 
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for dealing with the ways in which they become etiquetados and subject to 
everyday policing.  
Youths’ diverse strategies also reveal the different options for accommodation 
available to them in “White Argentina” on the basis of their nationality, race, and 
class. Although Ian’s belonging is fragile and always on trial, his ability to blend in 
at times is not possible for black youth or youth who inhabit a more precarious and 
apparent socioeconomic status. Nonetheless, all youth develop strategies. Their 
everyday mobility is not, and perhaps cannot be, habitual.     
Aliou used to work on the street. However, he has since become an Argentine 
citizen and started working for a state agency. These realities provide a safety net 
which he deploys to confront police agents like his brother-in-law and those who 
continue to arbitrarily stop him on the street asking for his documents.  
I almost never take out my credentials from [the state office]. Very rarely do 
I go to a place where I need to take it out. Even sometimes when the police 
stop me on the street: Document? Why!? I fight and I don’t show you my 
documents. When we reach a limit, then I do. [They say] oh I’m sorry, it 
wasn’t like that. Stop lying! 
While Aliou is able to challenge arbitrary stops with the safety nets provided by his 
Argentine citizenship and government employment, his admission that he 
eventually gives in and shows his ID when the “limit” is reached, is perhaps 
evidence that his citizenship sits on shaky ground. This is a reality that Aliou has 
seen first-hand with Senegalese street vendors, whom he advocates for from his 
position as a state worker.  In 2017, he found that public space agents understood 
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the Argentine citizenship of some Senegalese youth as illegitimate. These agents, 
unaware that naturalized citizenship ID numbers begin with a different series than 
those of Argentine-born persons, and perhaps skeptical that these youth could be 
Argentine citizens in the first place, brought these concerns to Aliou himself, stating 
that Senegalese youth had “false documents.” Frustrated and incredulous at the 
lack of information that these state workers had, Aliou pulled out his own 
document, which also started with the same number series. The agent, perhaps 
having what Omi and Winant (2014) called a “crisis of racial meaning,” blushed 
and apologized. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have drawn from scholarship on race and racialization to 
understand the everyday lived experiences of African and Latin American migrant 
youth living in Buenos Aires. The experiences of young people like Arlanda, 
Steven, Jean, Moru, and Aliou reveal that everyday mobility is not as fluid as official 
narratives would suggest. While all of the youth discussed here had some form of 
legal immigration status in Argentina, they were regularly marked as suspect by 
state and non-state actors, etiquetados as “out of place,” or arbitrarily stopped by 
the police. As youth narrate their experiences, they point to markers of class, race, 
and nationality as key factors impacting the fluidity of their movement and 
strategize accordingly. This chapter thus contributes to understanding the ways in 
which notions of security and criminalization become everyday forms of discipline 
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and control experienced by immigrants seen as belonging on the constitutive 
outside of “White Argentina.”   
At the very least, the lived experiences and reflections of young Latin American 
and African migrants living in Buenos Aires reveal a deep awareness of the 
racisms that shape public and state imagination of specific nationalities, as well as 
the very real ways in which their bodies become etiquetados in the racialized 
spatial structures of Buenos Aires.  Further, it becomes clear here how the state 
apparatus—in the form of local police officers, courts, and public space agents— 
remains invested in producing, regulating, and defining the relationship between 
race and national belonging (Hintzen 2004), particularly policing the mobility of 
those racialized as external to “White Argentina.” 
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CHAPTER V: NEIGHBORING COUNTRY MIGRANT YOUTH AND 
“SPECTACLES OF THE BORDER” 
 
As noted by Albarracín, (2004), one of the most notable aspects of Argentina’s 
immigration law since 2004—Ley 25.871—is that it grants special provisions for 
status regularization to migrants from Mercosur member and associated states. As 
stated in the law, for these migrants, nationality itself becomes a sufficient criterion 
for accessing temporary residency status, which then becomes an avenue for 
permanent residency and citizenship. Yet, analysis of discourses and practices 
targeting migrants from neighboring countries like Bolivia and Paraguay shows the 
ways in which the Argentine state continues to produce “Illegality” in relation to 
these migrants, maintaining an exploitable migrant labor force, as well as an 
“illegitimate” and externalizable population onto which all societal ills may be 
projected (upholding narratives of “White Argentina”). Following Nicholas De 
Genova (2013), I argue that this is done through productive “border spectacles,” 
which involve a “scene of exclusion” sustained by discourses of “out of control 
borders” and an “obscene of inclusion” which incorporates bordering country 
migrants—both minors and adults— into precarious economies through what 
some scholars have termed “discipline by neglect.” 
 
1. Background 
While Argentina’s migrant population has become increasingly diverse since 
the 1990s, bordering country migrants from Paraguay and Bolivia continue to make 
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up the largest immigrant communities in Argentina, as well as in the city of Buenos 
Aires. According to the 2010 census, Paraguayans make up 30% of all foreign-
born persons living in Argentina, and Bolivians nearly 20% (IDEC 2010). As is the 
case with other regions in the world, industrialization has led the majority of 
contemporary Bolivian and Paraguayan migrants, who historically settled in 
agricultural border regions, to settle in large metropolitan areas like Buenos Aires 
(Bastia 2005; Cerrutti and Parrado, 2014; De Genova, 2014; Goldberg 2013; 
Pacecca 2001; Portes and Rumbaut, 2014) where they integrate into a segmented 
labor market, often working in informal, labor-intensive jobs in construction, 
manufacturing, agriculture, and domestic work (Pizarro 2015; Cerruti and Gaudio 
2010). Such was the case of Bolivian youth like Belén and Rafael, whom I met and 
interviewed in June of 2017.  Having previously-established networks of family and 
acquaintances in Argentina, Belén and Rafael left Bolivia to enter these industries, 
Belén as a domestic worker at the age of 14 and Rafael as a seamster in a textile 
shop at the age of 15, both in the outskirts of the city of Buenos Aires.  While 
research on young migrants in Argentina is limited, previous scholarship (Bastia 
2005; Pacceca et al. 2014; Punch 2014) suggests that neither Belén’s nor Rafael’s 
experiences are rare. For example, in their research on bordering country 
adolescent minors, Pacecca et al. (2014) note that migrant youth from countries 
like Bolivia and Paraguay insert themselves in the same labor markets as their 
adult counterparts, including in textile shops, grocery and clothing stores, and 
domestic work. Most, like Belén and Rafael, find work opportunities through family 
members and acquaintances in the greater Buenos Aires metropolitan area. And 
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as Pacecca et al. (2014) note, while coercion and deception can be part of many 
adolescents’ migration trajectories, the structural conditions that leave them with 
few educational and work opportunities in their home countries remain the broader 
driving force in their “desires, initiative, and agency” to seek opportunities in 
Argentina (p.15). 
 
2. Globalization, Transnational Mobility, and State Discipline and Control  
Such migratory flows have to be contextualized within the latest phase of 
globalization, characterized by the increased extent, scale, and level of global 
interconnectedness. Beyond technological and communication advances, some 
key characteristics of this moment include 1) economic restructuring and the 
relocation of labor-intensive activities and industrial production outside of rich and 
into developing countries; 2) increased levels of insecure, low-paid, and part-time 
labor; 3) increased power of ‘trans-state” organizations (such as the International 
Monetary Fund, NGOs, and multinational corporations); and 4) the reconfiguration 
and increased dynamism of international banking and investment (Fassin, 2011; 
Harris 1995, Ong, 1999; Trouillot, 2001; Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002). Under 
these conditions, migration scholars have pointed particularly to a “disjuncture” 
between the demand for flexible and internationally mobile labor, on the one hand, 
and the increasing restriction and control of human mobility, on the other. As 
markets liberalize and global migrants abound, some have called our times “an 
unrelenting age of immigration control,” and 50 million people around the world are 
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characterized by states as “illegal” or “irregular” migrants (Wong and Hollifield 
2015).  
 
Migration scholars have worked to document and understand the multiple ways 
in which states seek to control transnational human mobility (De Genova 2002; 
Wong and Hollifield, 2015; Hollifield, Martin, and Orrenius 2014; Kanstroom and 
Menjívar 2014; Mezzandra 2004; Nevins 2011). Notably, in the edited volume 
Disciplining the Transnational Mobility of People (2013), scholars from across 
disciplines analyze the ways in which state and non-state actors not only control 
the movement of people across international borders but also seek to discipline 
migrant populations into particular ways of being and belonging. Their insights are 
important for understanding migration control in contexts like Argentina, where 
borders are much more permeable and less militarized than in wealthier global 
north contexts (Cerruti and Gaudio 2015; Pacecca et al. 2014).  In Disciplining the 
Transnational Mobility French sociologist Antoine Pécoud argues for the 
reconceptualization of “migration control,” as a term not only about inspection at 
the border but also 
about creating the conditions for human mobility to take place without what 
Nikos Papastergiadis calls “turbulence” (Papastergiadis, 1999) – that is, 
without disturbing the “national order of things” (Malkki, 1995), without 
challenging state sovereignty, without hurting the socio-economic interests of 
dominant groups, and so on. Disciplining is about introducing a specific 
rationality to what may otherwise turn out to be a disruptive process. This 
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rationality implies the transformation of a complex, multifaceted, sometimes 
unlawful and always challenging process into “predictable,” “sound,” 
“manageable,” “orderly” and rule-obeying dynamics. (Pécoud,2013, p. 17). 
Shifting the focus of analysis to everyday forms of discipline that seek to maintain 
the “national order of things,” and incorporate migrant presences without 
“turbulence” or “disruptions” to national and economic interests, sheds new light 
on segmented processes of incorporation that many neighboring-country 
migrants experience in Argentina. In what follows, I analyze the ways in which 
Bolivian and Paraguayan migrants navigate labyrinths of inclusion/exclusion that 
are productive for both economic interests and notions of “White Argentina.” 
 
i. The Scene of Exclusion  
In De Genova’s (2013) theorization, the scene of exclusion refers to practices 
of immigration enforcement that perform and enact state borders. From grand 
militarized displays of power at physical borders, to more mundane practices of 
inspection, the scene of exclusion is enacted by the state, in which migrants are 
marked as having violated “the Law” (immutable and unquestionable) and migrant 
illegality becomes fetishized as a condition belonging to migrants themselves, 
rather than a product of state policies and practices. While De Genova points to 
the US/Mexico border and the Mediterranean as spaces where grandiose scenes 
of exclusion may be encountered, in Argentina one may locate such scenes of 
exclusion in statist discourses, DNM twitter posts, and everyday policing practices 
described in previous chapters. 
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As it relates to bordering country migrants in Argentina, the scene of inclusion 
is enacted through narratives of an “out of control” border. Indeed, Bolivians and 
Paraguayans—along with Peruvians and Colombians—are often targeted in statist 
narratives about a dangerously permeable and uncontrollable Argentine border. 
While these narratives are not new, they circulate more widely in Argentina since 
2016, under the current administration of Mauricio Macri. Such narratives, 
however, have extended well beyond the Argentine president’s political party 
(Barbero 2016). For example, an Argentine senator from the province of Rio Negro 
and strong critic of Macri’s administration, Miguel Ángel Pichetto, has been a 
mouthpiece for these narratives. In October 2016, Pichetto went on national 
television to ask a question raised in the 1980s by former French Prime Minister 
Michel Rocard: “How much misery can France sustain by taking in poor migrants?” 
Pichetto stated, “This is a question that I too reflect on and ask myself in Argentina” 
(Canal 26 2016). He argued that migrants were “occupying” Buenos Aires’ 
hospitals and receiving unfair and unreciprocated access to public higher 
education in Argentina. His most incendiary statements were about Bolivian and 
Peruvian migrants, claiming that Argentina had “always” functioned as “a social 
valve for Bolivia […] and a criminal valve for Peru” (Canal 26 2016). He alleged 
that Peru had largely resolved its problems with drug trafficking for the betterment 
of the country, and concluded that Argentina had been incorporating “this ‘residue’ 
(resaca) where we don’t have migratory controls, where we haven’t had them.” 
(Canal 26 2016). The depiction of Peruvians and Colombians as prone to 
criminality and Paraguayans and Bolivians as a drain on public resources by state 
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actors has been a constant in recent years.36 Such images are also projected by 
the DNM’S public speech. For example, between February 2016 and October 
2018, the DNM’s official Twitter feed always referred to Bolivian, Paraguayan and 
Peruvian migrants in relation to irregularity, criminality, and issues of migration 
control.  
 
ii. The Obscene of Inclusion 
 
As De Genova (2013) notes, the scene of exclusion is 
Always accompanied by its shadowy, publicly unacknowledged or 
disavowed, obscene supplement: the large-scale recruitment of illegalized 
migrants as legally vulnerable, precarious, and thus tractable labour 
(p.1181).  
The underbelly of the scene of exclusion involves the “public secret” of migrants’ 
“abject inclusion of migrants into ‘illegal’ labor” (De Genova 2013, p.1189).  I’d 
like to argue here that the creation of migrant illegality through the “scene of 
exclusion” also allows state actors to maintain a “shadowy” externalizable 
population onto whom all societal ills may be projected, allowing for the 
maintenance of a narrative of “White Argentina” with all its implications of 
prosperity, progress, and civilization that purportedly differentiate the country 
from the rest of Latin America. 
 
36 Note, for example, statements made by legislators calling for a wall at the Argentine border with 
Bolivia in 2017, or statements made by Minister of Security, Patricia Bullrich discussed in Chapter 
Six.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 127 
Given the progressive nature of Ley 25.871, particularly as it relates to 
migrants from MERCOSUR, the maintenance of a “scene of exclusion” and its 
underbelly of abject inclusion, requires what Basok, Piper and Simmons (2013) 
have termed “discipline by neglect.”  In their work on the migration trajectories of 
Bolivian women to Argentina, the authors argue that despite the human rights 
emphasis in Argentina’s immigration law and a robust “anti-trafficking” set of 
policies and discourses, the Argentine state and international actors fail to 
adequately address the violation of Bolivian women’s labor and social rights. 
Rather, anti-trafficking efforts center on migration control, pushing Bolivian 
women further into the shadows through state neglect. That is, while the state 
appears greatly concerned with anti-trafficking initiatives, trafficking is largely 
framed as an issue of irregular migration, leaving unexamined the structural 
conditions, social discrimination, and root causes of emigration that place 
Bolivian women in vulnerable labor conditions in Argentina. This, they argue,   
turns migrants into subservient, docile workers charged with carrying out 
the most precarious types of work without having a political voice and 
without the chance to avail themselves of state-provided welfare services” 
(p. 195). 
In research on minors and trafficking policies and discourses in Argentina, Bastia 
(2005) also found that the Argentine state addressed human trafficking in ways 
that elided the root causes of labor exploitation faced by both minors and adults 
from bordering countries in Argentina and further pushed young migrants to the 
margins by equating anti-trafficking initiatives with more restrictive border 
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controls. As Pacceca et al. (2014) note, given structural factors pushing young 
people to cross the international border in search for work, stricter controls at 
ports of entry do not protect young people from labor and sexual exploitation. 
Rather, they push them to evade border inspections. Inability to accredit 
“authorized entry” becomes a critical obstacle to access legal residency later on. 
This type of “discipline by neglect” also emerged in my research on youth 
experiences.  
 
3. Minors from Neighboring Countries and Discipline by Neglect 
i. Notes from the Field 
Throughout my fieldwork, as I explored the various state agencies focused on 
immigration, seeking to understand the state’s approaches to the topic of youth 
migration, a question continued to emerge: what about bordering country youth? 
Toward the end of my time in Buenos Aires, in July 2017, the gap between the 
state’s concern for African youth versus Bolivian and Paraguayan youth became 
apparent, leading me to ask a number of explicit questions about bordering 
country youth to different state workers in agencies in charge of protecting 
migrant rights. As I wrote fieldnotes after a visit with state workers at the Ministry 
of Public Defense’s Commission for Immigrants, I documented my frustrations in 
in-text memos.   
Excerpt from fieldnotes – July 2017 
 
I am speaking with a state worker from the MPD’s Commission on 
Immigration. We are “off the record” at her request due to some sensitive 
information she was sharing about DNM official’s attempts to open up an 
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immigrant detention center in Buenos Aires. This leads to a discussion 
about detention in the United States. She’s so appalled by some statistics 
I share about the detention of minors that she calls out for a colleague to 
join us in her office and asks me to repeat the information. The 
colleague—also in disbelief—says that things are different in Argentina, 
where there are not as many unaccompanied minors. She says that they 
are largely from Africa. I bring up Bolivian and Paraguayan youth I’ve 
recently met at the DNM. These youth had migrated to Argentina alone at 
the ages of 14 and 15 years-old. The original interviewee agrees, she 
says it happens a lot with Bolivians, that their parents send their children 
and they come here and work. Recently she says, a girl came, now she is 
over 18, but she came at 14 in that same situation. The thing is she says, 
that “we don’t see them.”  
 
Memo: This is true. But aren’t any of them stopped at the border, 
does the protocol apply to them? Has it ever? Who works with the 
minors who come to the border and are not refugees? I haven’t 
gotten anyone to answer this question! 
 
The other colleague adds that these youth tend to come with someone, 
usually an uncle or someone related and there is a planned network. I 
mention that the youth I recently interviewed both came with an 
acquaintance. 
 
Memo: Many of the unaccompanied youth currently under state 
guardianship also came with a family member or acquaintance. State 
actors, however, insist on “accrediting the relationship” to the point 
that sometimes a state guardian is assigned despite the presence of 
a family member. What makes the situation of Bolivian and 
Paraguayan youth so different? 
 
As my fieldnotes suggest, I found that across state agencies, there seemed to be 
different standards for thinking of bordering country migrant minors versus those 
from Africa, the Middle East, or non-contiguous Latin American countries. Across 
state agencies, I was told things like 1) bordering country youth “don’t knock on 
the state’s door;” 2) Bolivian youth don’t really come alone; and 3) these youth 
are different because they form part of pre-established labor networks. Except for 
the fact of not “knocking on the state’s door”—which I explore below—there were 
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many similarities in the experiences of African, Latin American, Caribbean and 
bordering country youth I met throughout my research. Except for those who 
migrated for the purposes of studying or in familial contexts, most young people 
arrived with knowledge of specific work opportunities, tapping into pre-
established networks composed of kin, fictive kin, or co-nationals to insert 
themselves in the Buenos Aires labor market.  
Not all, however, as state actors suggested, “knocked on the state’s door.” 
For example, while many Senegalese youth like Aliou—both minors and adults—
seemed to go immediately upon arrival to CONARE to apply for refugee status, 
or Colombian young adults to the DNM to start their documentation process, 
some Bolivian youth had specifically steered clear of the state’s immigration 
bureaucracy for years, remaining in the country without legal status, except for 
the fact that— in theory—their Bolivian nationality is sufficient basis for accessing 
temporary legal residency status in Argentina. Such was the case of Belén and 
Rafael, both of whom had arrived in Argentina as minors and quickly started to 
work in the textile and domestic work industries. When we met, they had recently 
turned 18 and 19, both explaining to me that they had explicitly waited until 
turning 18 to start the documentation process because they did not have a parent 
or guardian in Argentina. Pacecca et al. (2014) note that this is a prevalent 
problem for neighboring country youth, for whom entry into Argentina does not 
require parental authorization after the age of 13 (as stated by 2015 disposition 
3328/2015), and yet applying for a residency requires the authorization of a 
parent or guardian for all those under the age of 18. 
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Beyond this hurdle specific to minors, Bolivian youth like Belén expressed 
broader challenges in getting their immigration documents straightened out. Such 
challenges included lack of information (both on the documentation process and 
on navigating the city to do so), lack of funds to pay fees, and difficulty taking 
multiple workdays off to make trips to different government offices in disparate 
areas of the city to gather the documents required to initiate the process. 
Previous research with Bolivian migrant populations also suggests the 
prevalence of such “time, money, and know-how” hurdles in neighboring country 
migrant’s ability to regularize their status (Goldberg 2013; Pizarro 2015). In his 
seminal text Labyrinths of Exclusion, sociologist Diego Casaravilla documented 
such hurdles in the 1990s, arguing that juridical realities “rely on the social 
imaginary, in the repertoire of fantasies, prejudices and images, that constitute 
the mirrors in which a society looks at itself and its others” (1999, p.42).  Prior to 
the passage of Ley 25.871 in 2004, Casaravilla was already raising questions 
about the differential effects of Argentina’s immigration policies on poor 
neighboring country migrants who became excluded from “legality” through 
complicated procedures, fees, and indifferent when not discriminatory treatment 
in state agencies. Such hurdles, he argued then, constituted a labyrinth that 
made migrants vulnerable to labor exploitation, one “created to lose the migrant. 
To invite him to escape, although it’s an open secret that all exits have been 
blocked” (Casaravilla 1999, p.144). The experiences of youth like Belén and 
Rafael become evidence of the continued labyrinths that many migrants face 
despite Ley 25.871. Such obstacles are perhaps even more dizzying for minors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 132 
who become trapped between incongruent policies that see them as old enough 
to enter the country without a parent or guardian’s authorization and too young to 
access legal residency by themselves. Despite these vulnerabilities and a 
constant flow of minors across the Paraguayan and Bolivian borders (Pacecca et 
al. 2014), I found during research centered on the 2011 protocol for 
unaccompanied minors, was that bordering country youth were explicitly 
excluded from these discussions centered around protection. 
 
ii. An Exclusionary Protocol for Protection 
The inclusion of non-asylum-seeking youth in protection mechanisms 
developed for unaccompanied asylum-seeking minors would offer these youth an 
avenue for regularization, inviting them to “knock on the state’s door” rather than 
pushing them further into the shadows of abject inclusion. Yet, the protocol 
excludes these youth, specifying its target audience as “unaccompanied or 
separated children in search of asylum” in its very title. This exclusion is also 
clear in the protocol’s three stated objectives: 
 
1) To design a coordinated intervention and response mechanism to meet 
the protection and care needs of unaccompanied or separated children 
seeking international protection in the country, which clearly defines the 
roles and responsibilities of the different actors involved in their care, from 
the moment of their identification until they find a durable solution to their 
situation. 
 
2) To reach a better understanding of the protection and assistance needs of 
these children, as well as contribute to a better understanding of the roles 
and responsibilities of the different actors involved in their care. 
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3) Finally, it is expected that the principles, criteria and measures of action 
agreed in the Protocol can contribute to the regulation process of Law 
26.165 [Argentine National Refugee Law] 
 
 
Each of these objectives points to matters impacting minors seeking asylum in 
Argentina. I found during interviews with those involved in the creation of the 
protocol and surrounding practices, was that this exclusionary nature of the 
protocol was not an accident but, rather, a matter of debate and negotiation 
among agencies with diverging interests. When speaking about non-asylum-
seeking minors, one state actor involved in the process of developing the 
protocol explained,  
 
The protocol does have a component of early [trafficking] detection. 
Because the idea was to make a determination of children’s need of 
protection, for any unaccompanied child. Which this, of course, 
Immigration [DNM] would fight with us and say, ‘we came here to discuss 
a protocol for refugee children, and you are talking of determining the 
needs of protection of any unaccompanied child at the border!’ And we 
would say yes, because one of the possibilities is that [the child] ends up 
being an asylum applicant, a refugee. But they may also have other needs 
for protection. Other needs for protection could be a need for protection 
against being a potential victim of trafficking or, simply, they may be trying 
to reunify with their family. Really, what [state] actors should do, is 
guarantee that family reunification. You have to learn the story of the child, 
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what are their needs for protection, and depending on those needs for 
protection, make the corresponding referrals. So the protocol—as it was 
approved—had components for the prevention of trafficking, which was 
very much resisted by immigration.  
Adding language of human trafficking prevention was perhaps a way for some 
actors concerned with a broader population of migrant minors to expand the 
scope of the document despite the DNM’s insistence on creating a document that 
would only be applicable to asylum-seeking minors. This language is particularly 
evident in section 1.4 of the protocol, which refers to “entry into the national 
territory” (see Table 3). This section divides minors into three categories, each 
signaling a different course of action for immigration officers. 
 
Table 3: Categories of Minors According to the 2011 Protocol 
Category of minor Migration Authorities Procedures 
Children with “protection 
needs as refugees” 
Immigration bureaucrat shall grant transitory entry, with a 
period of authorized permanence of 48 hours. Migration 
authorities shall inform DGN, relevant local protection 
authorities, CONARE. 
Children with other 
international protection 
needs (E.g. likely victims or 
potential victims of 
trafficking or other 
international protection 
needs) 
Immigration grants transitory entry according to applicable 
regulations. Migration authorities notify DGN and relevant 
local protection authorities 
Children without protection 
needs 
Immigration authority will proceed according to the current 
immigration legislation. DNM will “focus” on children 
without or with deficient documentation. When referring 
the case to DGN and protection authorities, it will request 
the adoption of measures for the integral protection of 
rights—as outlined in local legislation or the National law 
for the Integral Protection of Children and Adolescents 
(Ley 26.061), according to the needs detected in the case. 
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Presumably, youth like Belén and Rafael, who neither sought asylum in 
Argentina nor found themselves victims of human trafficking, fall into the table’s 
third category of children “without need of protection.” Although the protocol 
points here to local and national laws for the protection of the rights of minors, 
researchers have pointed to the “double invisibility” of migrant minors not only in 
these laws but also in Argentina’s immigration legislation (Ceriani Cernadas, 
García and Salas 2014). Above all, what is outlined here is that minors are either 
1) asylum seekers, 2) trafficking victims, or 3) regular migrants for whom the 
current immigration policy shall be applied without special consideration.  
Across agencies, state actors in Buenos Aires expressed doubts about the 
actual application of this protocol for the first category of minors, those claiming 
asylum. Such doubts were perhaps exacerbated by the lack of knowledge that 
DNM officials I interviewed had about the very existence of this protocol. Two 
final issues can be raised here. First, the extent to which any of the protocol’s 
protection mechanisms are being applied not only to the first, but also to the 
second and third categories of minors outlined above is a significant source of 
concern that requires further research both at the border and across state 
agencies. Second, as previous research on the Argentine state’s anti-trafficking 
efforts suggests, the extent to which practices that seek to identify minors who 
are victims of trafficking are productive for protecting their rights requires further 
analysis. Such efforts may also serve to discipline young people into 
understanding that “knocking on the state’s door” is not an option for them, 
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whether that is to denounce exploitative situations or to regularize their status 
and claim labor and social rights as guaranteed by Ley 25.871. 
 
4. Conclusion 
As discussed in Chapter Three, for some youth—particularly African youth— 
some of the practices outlined in this 2011 protocol can become deeply 
embodied and racialized forms of migration control. However, my research also 
suggests that for other youth—explicitly excluded from conversations about the 
vulnerabilities and required protections for unaccompanied minors—migration 
control may be experienced as a form of neglect. For youth like Belén and 
Rafael, “knocking on the state’s door” is simply not an option, at least until they 
turn 18. These conditions sustain that state’s “border spectacles,” producing not 
only an abject labor force that sustains powerful economic interests, but also an 
illegitimate population onto which social and economic ills may be projected. 
Such becomes the backdrop for moral panics about migrant presences 
discussed in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER VI: “A MORE PROFOUND PROBLEM:” IMMIGRATION POLICY 
AND BELONGING IN THE ARGENTINE RACIAL STATE 
 
In January 2017, after months of escalating anti-immigrant rhetoric in Argentine 
media, the current administration of President Mauricio Macri modified parts of Ley 
25.871 via an emergency decree (Decreto Nacional de Urgencia 70 or DNU 
70/2017). The decree significantly expedited deportations, limited possibilities for 
deportation exemptions, and expanded legal impediments for entry or permanence 
in Argentina, among other changes. These modifications drew criticisms from 
actors in civil society, certain sectors of the state dedicated to protecting migrants’ 
rights, as well as intergovernmental agencies such as the United Nations 
Committee Against Torture (CAT 2017). The decree has since been challenged by 
multiple actors and deemed unconstitutional by Argentine courts. The Macri 
administration has appealed this decision, which will be taken up next by 
Argentina’s Supreme Court. While the ultimate impact of DNU 70/2017 on 
Argentina’s immigration law remains to be seen, the decree nonetheless brought 
the first significant challenge to Ley 25.871.  
As I conducted research in Buenos Aires in early 2017, it became clear that 
amidst rising anti-immigrant sentiment, state and non-state actors alike viewed one 
crime as the “tipping point” or the “final straw” that led to DNU 70/2017. This crime 
took place on Christmas Eve of 2016. Two male suspects robbed two women at 
gunpoint in Flores, a southern barrio located in the city of Buenos Aires. The 
victims said it took about two minutes before the thieves drove away with one of 
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their purses. This was not an extraordinary event. Motorcycle thefts are relatively 
common in Buenos Aires, and the capital city’s Flores neighborhood is often 
associated with such crimes. A Minuto Uno headline in December 2016 deemed 
Flores “one of the most dangerous barrios” of the city, and news reporting of crimes 
usually starts with the pre-emptive Otro [another] crime in Flores. This particular 
crime was different, however, because just when the motorcyclists were fleeing 
the scene, a car turned in their direction. It is unclear whether or not the car sought 
to corner the robbers, but, at this point, the passenger of the motorcycle shot at 
the car, leading to the death of a 14-year-old boy named Brian Aguinaco (Brian A. 
hereafter).  
This crime became popularly known in Argentina as El Crimen de Brian [Brian’s 
Crime] and it quickly turned into a metonym for migrant criminality plaguing the 
capital city of Buenos Aires. Within less than a month, Macri had signed DNU 
70/2017, citing recent acts of “notorious knowledge.” As with the passage of Ley 
25.871, it is likely that multiple factors influenced this policy change and more 
research is needed to understand the extent to which broader regional and global 
trends influenced the signing of DNU 70. In this chapter, I am interested in 
exploring the following question: Why and how El Crimen de Brian could be seen 
by so many as a catalyst for DNU 70/2017?  
In what follows, I first discuss the context of El Crimen de Brian, attending to 
the ways in which the current administration had already laid the groundwork for 
linking issues of drugs and criminality to migration. I then analyze state and media 
narratives regarding El Crimen de Brian, focusing on the key events that captured 
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the public imagination. I conclude by discussing the consequences of the reaction 
to El Crimen de Brian for Argentine immigration policy and beyond.  
 
1. Background 
i. The State of Insecurity: Discourses About Drug Trafficking and 
the Border 
In January 2016, just months after he was elected president, Macri signed a 
decree (Decree #228/2016), which declared Argentina to be in a state of “national 
emergency.” The justification provided was that the country faced a situation of 
“collective threat” to public safety created by “complex” and “organized crime” 
(Presidencia de la Nación 2016). One of the central concerns of the decree was 
drug trafficking, understood to affect not merely the “health and security” of 
Argentine citizens, but also—due to its “transnational nature”—Argentina’s 
national sovereignty. The measures outlined in the decree, which included the 
allocation of additional resources to “strengthen control” over the country’s aerial, 
fluvial, and territorial borders, were declared to be part of the effort “to combat drug 
trafficking with the utmost rigor, with the end of giving a final response to the 
profound preoccupation of the citizenry over this issue.”  
Insecurity, defined broadly as fear of becoming a victim of a crime, has been 
polling as the central concern for adult Argentines living in urban areas since 
2010.37 With this emergency decree focusing on strengthening border control as a 
 
37 See for example, Muratori and Espínola (2016).   
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means to ensure public safety, the administration began to lay the groundwork for 
re-packaging this generalized anxiety over insecurity into a problem that could be 
solved through a crackdown on immigration. Macri, for example, argued that 
Argentina has turned into a place with “indefensible borders” where drug traffickers 
could become prosperous and felt “free to expand” (Casa Rosada 2016b). In 2016, 
senators and other government officials contributed to this discourse, blaming the 
previous administration of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, for giving “total” and 
“absolute” access to criminals and allowing people to enter “without any type of 
minimal conditions” (América TV, 2016). Further, they have made statements with 
the intent of linking migrants from countries like Bolivia and Peru to crime and 
poverty in Argentina (Barbero, 2016). In her research on the Buenos Aires city 
judiciary, González (2017) found similar notions of migration as out of control, as 
well as essentializing stereotypes about migrant criminality and dangerousness 
that permeate the judicial branch of the state.   
The notion of the “Argentine family” has been a recurring trope within this 
context, with Macri, framing his administration’s fight against drug trafficking as a 
fight against a “scourge that sickens and kills our children” (Casa Rosada 2016b). 
In his words,  
Drugs attack the most important nucleus that we have in this country, which 
is the family, because it captivates our children who end up murdering 
without realizing what they are doing, and in the majority of cases that 
violence starts with their own homes. (Casa Rosada 2016 b) 
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Not all, however, are equal members of the “Argentine family.” This is evidenced 
by state and media responses to El Crimen de Brian, which culminated in DNU 
70/2017, through which the Macri administration asserted in no uncertain terms 
that Argentina’s problem of insecurity was a problem of migration. In state and 
media responses to El Crimen de Brian, an Argentine-born suspect was presented 
as a foreign threat from which (presumably “real”) Argentine children and families 
needed to be protected. The conditions for the very possibility of this response 
were set by the ongoing racial project of White Argentina.  
 
ii. Reaction to El Crimen de Brian and Moral Panic in Buenos 
Aires 
Just one day after El Crimen de Brian took place—before any suspects were 
named—Flores neighbors took to the streets, calling their barrio a “neighborhood 
at war” (La Nación, December 27, 2016). On December 26, a protest took place 
outside of police station #38, less than a mile from where Brian A. was shot. At this 
protest, neighbors held signs that read “We are all Brian.” They chanted for justice, 
and screamed indignant insults aimed at government officials like Buenos Aires 
mayor Horacio Larreta and the National Minister of Security, Patricia Bullrich. 
Some chants reported in the news contained phrases like “murderers!” “They are 
all thieves” and “corrupt bastards” (La Nación, December 26, 2016). At one point, 
a large section of the crowd barged into the police station, continuing the protest 
inside. The public outrage over insecurity and corruption in Flores was directed 
against a much larger issue than El Crimen de Brian. Persons interviewed by the 
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media said they felt that their neighborhood was “abandoned” by the police (Diario 
Popular, December 25, 2016) and functioned as a “liberated zone” (La Nación, 
December 25, 2016).  
Facing public outrage, Argentine officials swiftly moved to action. By December 
28th, the leadership of the police station had been replaced. And by the 29th, two 
young men were named the leading suspects in this crime, a 26-year-old named 
Yun, and a 15-year-old also named Brian (hereafter Brian G.). If the initial reaction 
to the death of Brian A. could be described as a “moral outrage” over insecurity 
directed toward the state, what happened next could perhaps best be described 
as a moral panic. Sociologist Stanley Cohen has defined a moral panic as a 
moment when "a condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to 
become defined as a threat to societal values and interests" (2002, p.1). Cohen 
has argued that such panics are often followed by stereotypical media attention 
and expert diagnoses. And perhaps more importantly, they tend to reflect a 
society’s deepest anxieties, targeting its most vulnerable populations. 
The focus of the moral panic was Brian G., one of the two suspects named by 
the state. He was a resident of the Villa 1-11-14, a Buenos Aires slum located just 
south of Flores, often referenced in state speech as one of the central locations of 
the fight against drug trafficking. Brian G. also happened to be the son of Peruvian 
immigrants with previous drug-related offenses. Further, he was 15 years old and–
–due to this age—could not be charged criminally under the Argentine penal code 
(Guemureman, 2012). His arrest, family dynamics, detention, and release drove 
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the news cycle on the issue for the next two months. The young suspect came to 
symbolize all issues of insecurity plaguing Buenos Aires.  
State and media actors are central elements of the social processes by which 
events that feed moral panics are “produced, perceived, classified, explained and 
responded to” (Hall et al. 1978, p.18). In the following section, I analyze the state 
and media narratives regarding El Crimen de Brian. These narratives are deeply 
imbricated with assumptions about Argentine nationhood that place those marked 
as nonwhite on the margins of national belonging, readily expendable for the sake 
of the national project.   
 
2. Media and State Narratives Regarding El Crimen de Brian 
I draw here on in-depth analysis of 69 Spanish-language media articles 
published in major Argentine media outlets between December 25, 2016 and 
February 23, 2017.  Below I discuss major themes that emerged out of two coding 
phases,38 including the ways in which Brian G. was constructed as a priori guilty 
by the media, the framing of the crime within a context of “migrant criminality” and 
issues of drug trafficking, and the externalization of Brian G. as a “deported 
immigrant” despite his birthright Argentine citizenship. I then discuss the ways in 
which the crime was used to justify immigration policy changes through DNU 70.  
 
 
38 See introduction for further discussion of data collection and analysis for this chapter. 
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i. Guilty from the Start 
The media first wrote about Brian G. on December 29, just as Argentine officials 
worked to extradite him from Chile, where he had traveled to reunite with his father 
two days after Brian A. was shot and killed. Mass-circulation news sources, 
including Crónica and Clarín, first introduced Brian G. as a 15-year-old youth who  
“escaped,” “fled,” “ran away,” and “hid” in that country (Crónica, December 25, 30 
2016; Clarín, December 30, 2016). Some simply deemed him a murderer on that 
very first day of reporting. Clarín published the following headline: “Cayó el asesino 
de Brian: tiene 15 años y sus padres lo habían ayudado a escapar,” [Brian’s 
murderer was caught: he is 15 years old and his parents had helped him escape] 
(Clarín, December 30, 2016).  
 
ii. An Issue of Complex Crime: Moving Heaven and Earth  
High-ranking government officials, including the Minister of Security Patricia 
Bullrich, became personally invested in this case. During a radio interview for 
Radio Mitre on December 30, Bullrich slipped into language that deemed Brian G. 
guilty a priori, explaining that she would soon meet with Brian A.’s parents to 
explain how these “two murderers had been detained. She stated, “Justice is 
healthy. Even though it doesn’t heal the loss of a son, it heals” ("Interview with 
Patricia Bullrich," 2016). During this interview, Bullrich and the radio host, Marcelo 
Longobardi, began setting the foundations for what would later become an 
impenetrable link between Brian G. and issues of drug trafficking and criminality 
that required further migration control. While drug trafficking was not part of the 
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crime that led to the death of Brian A., Bullrich explained that this particular crime 
required collaboration between local Buenos Aires security forces, and her national 
ministry, which was in charge of such “complex crimes.” 39 By using the term 
“complex crime,” Bullrich was coding the national conversation with the language 
of Macri’s emergency decree, specifically formulated to combat “complex” and 
“organized” crime associated with transnational drug trafficking.  The radio host, 
perhaps understanding the implications of this language, went on to provide the 
following assessment: 
these guys with backgrounds, with criminal records, with links to drug 
trafficking act with impunity […] And that doesn't work because clearly the 
guys manage to kill a 14-year-old boy on a street of Buenos Aires. 
Deemed an issue of “complex crime,” the state went to extraordinary efforts to 
repatriate and detain Brian G. The operation took place between December 29 th 
and 30th, when Bullrich collaborated with Chilean authorities to carry out the 
deportation of Brian G.’s father (who had failed to disclose prior criminal records 
when he first entered Chile) in order to bring his son back to Argentina. In an 
interview with me, Brian’s lawyer doubted the legality of these actions, given that 
neither Brian G. nor his father was initially told that they were returning to Argentina 
because of Brian’s potential involvement in El Crimen de Brian. Bullrich later 
described this operation as “moving heaven and earth” to bring the minor back to 
Argentina. Brian G. arrived at Aeroparque Jorge Newbery International Airport on 
 
39 “Complex crime” and “organized crime” were defined in the decree (DNU 228/2016) as 
including a wide range of crimes, ranging from those related to drugs, arms, and human 
trafficking to crimes of fraud, child prostitution, and extortion. 
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December 30, 2016. There, what were reported to be nearly 100 police officers 
awaited him. Live TV footage showed Brian G. exiting the airport doors, handcuffed 
and face covered, surrounded by five federal police officers. These officers then 
escorted Brian G. into an unmarked police car. Once he was inside, the car left the 
airport as part of a caravan of at least nine police vehicles.  A columnist at an 
alternative news source, La Izquierda Diario, described the scene in the following 
way:  
The rest of the chapter was broadcast on TV as a telenovela: Brian was 
arrested with his father in Santiago de Chile and handed over to the 
Argentine authorities at the Cristo Redentor pass. His arrival at Aeroparque 
Jorge Newbery was apotheotic for the captors. There, the cameras 
registered his hooded silhouette in the middle of a spectacular operation 
that even included GEOF assault cars. As if that adolescent robber was the 
very "Chapo" Guzmán.40 
Brian G. was subsequently detained and held at General San Martín Institute for 
minors until January 10.  By this time, media narratives and state actions had 
turned him into a concrete symbol of the transnational drug problem that so 
concerned the Macri administration. This was abetted by the reality that Brian G.’s 
parents had previous drug-related criminal records, records mentioned by the state 
and media at every turn.  
 
 
40 GEOF stands for Special Group of Federal Operations in Spanish. This is a special police force 
trained to handle anti-narcotics and counter-terrorism operations.   
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iii. A Problem of Migrant Criminality 
Drawing from a pre-established discursive triad among migration, drugs, and 
criminality, the state and media now began to turn El Crimen de Brian into an 
immigration problem, although neither Brian G. nor the second suspect was 
foreign-born. Although this link would later influence the rollout of immigration 
policy change, it first required the steady work of symbolic and material 
externalization that tapped onto exclusionary discourses of Argentine nationhood 
under which Brian G. was never meant to belong.  
While Brian G. was born in Argentina, his family history is emblematic of long-
standing migration patterns between Peru and Argentina, and as a result, includes 
members born in both countries. Some, including Brian, possess dual citizenship, 
which was often treated as an aggravating factor in media coverage. The sheer 
mention of Brian G. as a dual national yielded a plethora of racist, xenophobic, and 
discriminatory remarks in the comments sections of online newspapers. Readers 
made statements such as: “Had to be Peruvian, they are all thieves, narcos, and 
delinquents” and “we have to deport all the illegals.” Others called for “massive 
deportation” or for the return of military dictator Rafael Videla (Infobae, December 
30, 2016). 
While Brian G.’s dual citizenship was not pertinent to the facts of the crime, it 
became a focal point of media attention. During these first days of media coverage, 
Brian’s Peruvian nationality was mentioned in more than half of the articles 
analyzed. While some sources like Clarín (December 30, 2016) and Diario Popular 
(December 30, 2016) reported on his Peruvian citizenship as a factor that 
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diminished his Argentine citizenship through the conjunction “but” (E.g. “The young 
man is Argentinean but has Peruvian citizenship”), others simply chose to 
emphasize Brian G.’s Peruvian citizenship, calling him a “Peruvian adolescent” 
(Crónica, December 30, 2016), or a “Peruvian with Argentine citizenship” (Data, 
December 29, 2016).  
The conjunction “but” evidences an ongoing illegitimacy afforded to those 
who—despite birthright citizenship—do not fit within the purview of “White 
Argentina.” While the principle of Jus Soli—whereby citizenship is granted to all 
those born within the state’s sovereign territory—is applied in Argentina, social 
scientists have long documented gradations of citizenship that emerge in 
Argentine border-towns (Caggiano, 2007; Karasik, 1999). For example, sociologist 
Gabriela Karasik (1999) coined the term “imperfect nationality” to describe the 
interrogated belonging that those who, due to national origin, ethnic phenotypes, 
or cultural attributes, are placed on the constitutive outside of Argentine 
nationhood.  
iv. Brian’s Release and the State of Outrage  
By January 10, Brian G. had been placed squarely within the discursive triad 
that linked drugs, crime, and migration. This link was further supported by an 
escalating construction of Argentine-born Brian G. as a foreign-born criminal.  On 
January 10, Brian G. was released from detention after the presiding judge ruled 
that he could not be tried for El Crimen de Brian due to his age, clearing his “good 
name and honor.” However, through the participation of multiple state actors at the 
local level, the judge decided that it was in Brian G.’s best interest to move to Peru, 
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where he would live with his grandparents. Through a discrete operation, he was 
taken to Ezeiza International Airport, where he boarded a plane to Lima.  
Immediately following this operation, the media covered the outrage of multiple 
actors over the fact that Brian G. would not be imprisoned and could leave the 
country. Brian A.’s parents, their lawyer, the minister of security, and even 
immigration officers expressed disbelief over his release, although this was the 
expected outcome under the Argentine penal code. In interviews with Clarín and 
Infobae, Bullrich described feelings of “impotence” over Brian G.’s release, 
especially, she said, since federal security forces had intervened, moving “heaven 
and earth” to bring him back from Chile (Clarín, January 10, 2017).  “It infuriates 
me that killing has no consequences,” she said in an interview with Infobae 
(January 10, 2017). She and countless other politicians, including president Macri, 
promised to push forth reforms to the penal code. The national immigration office 
(DNM) seemed to take Brian’s punishment into its own hands, announcing on 
January 11 that it would be canceling the permanent residency of Brian G.’s 
mother, and prohibiting his father’s entry back to the country.  While it is quite clear 
from media coverage and my own interviews with DNM officials suggest that the 
DNM chose to announce these actions on January 11 as a retaliatory response to 
the “impotence” felt over Brian’s release, Brian’s parents’ prior criminal record 
provided the office with sufficient legal basis to move forward with these measures.  
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v. Becoming a Deported Immigrant 
By January 12, Brian had become a “minor deported to Peru,” his birthright 
citizenship effectively erased from Argentine public imagination. Not a single media 
source or state actor voiced concerns over the logic—or much less, the legality—
of sending an Argentine-born minor to live in a foreign country. Rather, media 
coverage often matter-of-factly referred to Brian as a deported foreigner. For 
example, three of the top mass-circulated media sources referred to him as: 
Table 4: Brian G. as Deported Minor in the Media 
A minor “who was deported to Peru” Clarín January 15th, 2017 
A minor of “Peruvian citizenship who returned to his 
country” and could potentially return to Argentina 
“illegally” 
Infobae January 22nd, 2017 
“A minor deported to Peru after el crimen de Brian” La Nación February 23, 2017 
 
Perhaps the most emblematic example of the erasure of Brian’s birthright 
citizenship in public imagination is provided by the evolution of coverage in Clarín. 
On December 30, the newspaper reported that Brian was Argentine-born. 
Subsequently, on January 11, a Clarín article explained that DNM officials had 
clarified that Brian G. could not be deported as an Argentine national. Yet by 
January 15 the newspaper was labeling Brian G. a minor “deported to Peru” 
(Clarín, January 15, 2017).   
During my fieldwork in Argentina in late 2016 and the first half of 2017, I found 
that while most were familiar with the crime, few knew that Brian G. was born in 
Argentina. Even state workers familiar with the case remained doubtful about 
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Brian’s country of birth. The very possibility that Brian G., an Argentine-born minor, 
could become constructed as a foreign-born criminal is inscribed into the racial 
project of Argentine whiteness. A the brown-skinned son of Peruvian immigrants 
and a resident of the Villa 1-11-14, Brian G. was already located on the constitutive 
outside of Argentine nationhood. News articles regularly juxtaposed images of a 
white, skinny, smiling Brian A. (“the good one”) with those of a much sturdier, 
brown-skinned, face-covered, handcuffed Brian G. (“the bad one”). Negro de 
mierda [fucking negro], negro villero [slum-dwelling negro], negro asesino 
[murderer negro], negro salvaje [savage negro], negro importado [imported 
negro]—these are just some of the myriad ways in commenters in online news 
sites derogatorily attribute blackness to Brian G. The readership of Clarín called 
for the extermination of Brian, his entire family, all Peruvians, Bolivians, 
Paraguayans, and entire villas. Others blamed the previous president, Cristina 
Kirchner, for El Crimen de Brian, claiming that she was responsible for “filling the 
country with negros.” Brian G. represented the “popular blackness” against which 
White Argentina is constantly defined and redefined: the mestizo, the poor, the 
uncivilized, and, in the latest iteration, the foreign drug trafficker, who—according 
to Macri—most threatens the “Argentine family.” As a result, little fuss was made 
when Brian G. was first symbolically, and then materially excluded from his country 
of birth for a crime he was never proven guilty of committing. The state and media 
had successfully placed the problem of insecurity on the backs of non-white 
Argentines, deemed outsiders by definition, once again redrawing the exclusionary 
boundaries of Argentine national belonging.  
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In Policing the Crisis, Hall et al. (1978) explain that the pressure of the ongoing 
news cycle and the demand for objectivity “produce a systematically structured 
over-accessing to the media of those in powerful and privileged institutional 
positions” (p. 58). In coverage of El Crimen de Brian, media sources frequently 
take on the narratives offered by state actors, who regularly interject through 
discourse and practice to set the terms of the conversation. However, the readers’ 
comments discussed above suggest that, to some extent, media coverage also 
represented popular understandings of Argentine nationhood under which Brian 
G. could be easily externalized. These findings resonate with Bonikowski’s (2016) 
understanding of media representations as an “intermediary mechanism” between 
nationalist beliefs emerging from institutional politics and those coming from social 
movements and ordinary persons.    
 
3. Immigration Policy Change and a More Profound Problem 
i. Brian as the Final Straw  
On January 20, 2017, the Macri administration renewed the state of 
emergency, citing the need to continue “the fight against drug trafficking.” 
Subsequently, on January 30, the administration signed DNU 70/2017, which 
made numerous changes to Ley 25.871, all of which “criminalize migration, and at 
the same time equate migrant irregularity (administrative offence) with a 
crime”(González and Tavernelli 2018). As part of the justification for this 
emergency executive action, the DNU cites “recent acts of organized crime that 
were of public and notorious knowledge” and an extensive appeals process that 
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has created “severe difficulties to finalize the orders of expulsion dictated against 
persons of foreign nationality.” Nowhere in the decree does the state refer directly 
to Brian G. However, in interviews with multiple state officials and civil society 
leaders there was general consensus that El Crimen de Brian functioned as a 
catalyst for DNU 70/2017. At the very least, state and media narratives about this 
crime served to legitimate the policy change. The passage of DNU 70/2017 was 
precisely framed as the solution to a broader problem of migrant criminality (which 
Brian G. had come to represent) and received very little public scrutiny (González 
and Tavernelli 2018). 
An exchange I had with Patricia, a female DNM inspector in her forties, is quite 
telling. She called the case the lo que faltaba [the missing element] for policy 
change.  “The final straw?” I asked. “Right,” she said, “many cases of insecurity 
had been happening… and every time something happened there was… [pause] 
…well…” she asked herself, “so what’s happening?” The inspector omits part of 
her claim, the subtext being that migrants always seemed to be involved in recent 
crimes, and therefore, this one was just the final straw. While unable to fully commit 
to the claim, the inspector is repeating the premise of the emergency decree, which 
justifies immigration control measures with a recent “increase of persons of foreign 
nationality” in the federal penitentiary service. State actors such as the foreign 
affairs minister Susana Malcorra also spouted this premise a few days prior to the 
announcement of the decree.  In an interview with the newspaper Clarín, Malcorra 
argued that Argentina is  
receiving immigrants who come with personal baggage. That has to be 
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checked […] we cannot become a closed country, but at the same time we 
have to be a reasonable country that welcomes those who come to 
Argentina to be part of a project with goodwill. (Clarín, January 15, 2017). 
During a press conference on January 17, Macri also weighed in on the issue of 
immigration. First, he argued for the need to debate and reform the juvenile penal 
code, specifically mentioning Brian’s case, and stating that this was necessary to 
“take care of the Argentine family,” to “take care of Argentineans, take care of 
ourselves.” Such statements continue to make evident that Brian G. was 
considered an outsider, not only by the media, but also by government officials. In 
these statements, Brian G. becomes that which the nation, the Argentine family, 
“our children,” need to be protected from. Macri then went on to discuss 
immigration,  
…we cannot allow criminals to continue to choose Argentina as a place to 
come and commit offenses… the first thing we need to achieve is to act 
preventatively… to be able to say to them “sir, I am being informed that you 
have this criminal record, that you committed this number of crimes in your 
country, you are not welcome here.” Argentina did not have this, and we 
have just begun to implement it in this year that we have been governing, 
this is the course of action. And then, if someone who came was sentenced 
by us and after half of the sentence we want to return them to their country 
[…] we have to have tools for that to be done in weeks, because it prevents 
things so traumatic from happening to us, and the tragedies that are 
happening every day in Argentina. (Casa Rosada 2017) 
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Such statements publicize the previously established link among criminality, drugs, 
and migration; a link which both allowed El Crimen de Brian to be rendered legible 
as an issue of drug trafficking and migration control and, in turn, became further 
solidified by the state and media narration and response to this crime. Although 
this narrative does little to address the problems of insecurity highlighted during 
protests in Flores on December 26th, it creates the conditions whereby “insecurity” 
can be easily solved through further migration control. 
 
ii. Brian G. as the Perfect Scapegoat and Vulnerable Citizen 
Multiple state and civil society organizations have critiqued Macri’s immigration 
decree, arguing that neither the arguments of rising migrant criminality, nor the 
bureaucratic delays in the deportation process cited in the document, warrant the 
emergency decree.41 In a federal court ruling, judges found DNU 70 
unconstitutional, in part because the statistics provided by the administration to 
justify the “urgency” and “necessity” of the executive action were deemed to be 
“unaccredited,” “biased,” and “contradictory.” The court further pointed out that 
rather than an increase in the representation of migrants in the criminal justice 
system, official statistics showed long-term stability and a recent decline.   
While the justifications for DNU 70/2017 were problematic at best and have 
thus far failed to withstand judicial scrutiny, the state, with the complicity of 
mainstream media, used El Crimen de Brian as an opportunity to securitize 
 
41 See the annual report on Human Rights in Argentina (CELS, 2017) and the Technical Report 
made by the Buenos Aires Public Defender’s office (Carril, 2017).   
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migration. A young migrant who worked for the National Public Defender’s office 
similarly understood El Crimen de Brian to be simply a convenient incident for the 
Macri administration. He reflected on August 15, 2017, 
For me, it’s something that they linked, but they had already been 
preparing… If this happened, or didn’t happen, it would have happened. In 
one way or another they would have rolled it out. They were waiting for the 
moment. They took advantage of what happened to do what they wanted 
to do.  
This case seems to have provided the state with the necessary elements to move 
forward with policy change. The incident and broader parallelism between 
criminality and migration become a way for the Argentine state to mask its failures, 
projecting issues of insecurity onto migrant populations (Bigo 2002). This is not a 
unique move and a similar sequence of events could be imaginable outside of the 
Argentine context. What makes this case important for further consideration is that 
a youth who was neither foreign-born nor convicted of the crime he was accused 
of committing could become the scapegoat onto which all issues of ”migrant 
criminality” were projected. This reality can only make sense under a persistent 
racial project of “White Argentina,” whereby brown, working-class inhabitants of 
Buenos Aires’ villas (particularly the descendants of Latin American migrants) are 
deemed foreigners by definition.  
 
4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I’ve sought to unpack “El Crimen de Brian” in relation to the 
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racial project of “White Argentina.” Through an analysis of how this crime was 
sensationalized and framed as an issue of “migrant criminality,” I’ve looked at the 
ways in which nonwhite migrants, as well as Argentine-born youth can become 
externalized by the state and media for the sake of the national project. We see 
here how notions of “out of control” migration are deployed to (re)locate any issues 
of “security” on nonwhite bodies and working-class bodies. The unfolding and 
narration of the moral panic over “El Crimen de Brian” reveal the remaining 
vulnerability of migrant rights and protections mechanisms when they are 
undergirded by exclusionary constructions of national belonging, giving credence 
to Carlos’ claims in the introduction of a more “profound problem” structuring 
migrant reception in the country. This case, however, also points to the 
vulnerabilities of native-born citizens who do not fit dominant constructions of 
Argentine nationhood. While Brian G, was not officially deported and has 
reportedly returned to Argentina, the broad acceptance of his supposed 
deportation perhaps evidences his “deportability.”42 In the 21st century, countries 
like Canada and Germany have passed legislation that permits the revocation of 
citizenship and subsequent deportation of native-born persons who possess dual 
nationality and are deemed a “danger” to the nation.43  Examining the mechanisms 
 
42 I am drawing from the term “deportability” as theorized by De Genova (2002).  
 
43 See bill C-24 in Canada, which amended the Citizenship Act in 2014. Although revoked in 
2017, this legislation provided grounds for the revocation of Canadian citizenship of subjects 
convicted of specific crimes regardless of birthright citizenship. In Germany, see the 2017 
deportation of two German-born youth of Algerian and Nigerian parents. Their deportation was 
justified through section 58(a) of the German Residency Law, amended in 2005. 
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through which native-born persons can become caught within the apparatus and 
narratives of immigration control becomes increasingly relevant as states across 
the global north and south retreat to “virulent nationalisms” and exclusionary 
politics (Van Ramshorst 2018).44 Migration studies thus need not only attend to the 
erosion of migrants’ rights under an anti-immigrant global climate, but also to the 
ways in which immigration enforcement and anti-immigrant discourse create 
increasingly vulnerable naturalized and native-born citizens. As Huysmans (2000) 
suggests, debates about immigration policy can be understood as “part of a 
political spectacle in which the criteria of belonging are contested” (p.762). This 
case though, serves as a reminder that dominant criteria for belonging also form 
part of the stage on which such spectacles play out. Further research is needed to 
understand the extent to which exclusionary conceptions of national belonging can 
become convenient tools, if not strong foundations for the securitization of 
migration, and in turn, securitizing narratives serve to further solidify profoundly 
exclusionary nationalisms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44 For example, the 2018 creation of a “denaturalization task force” in the United States adds to 
these concerns. 
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CHAPTER VII: “WE ARE THE UNCONTROLLED MIGRATION:” DISRUPTING 
THE MULTICULTURAL STATE 
 
1. Multicultural Buenos Aires 
Buenos Aires is multicultural. Buenos Aires is cosmopolitan. Buenos Aires is 
welcoming and inclusive. Buenos Aires is a city of migrants. These were messages  
         
I often heard from state officials while conducting research in Buenos Aires during 
2016 and 2017. Such narratives also circulated through the city government’s 
monthly cultural programming—programming that attracts thousands to iconic 
Figure 4: Promotional material for “Buenos Aires Celebra India.” 
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parks and streets to eat ethnic food and to celebrate immigrant communities: 
Buenos Aires Celebra Colombia, Buenos Aires Celebra Italia, Buenos Aires 
Celebra Paraguay, and so on and so forth. Advertisement for these events is 
exemplified by colorful images such as those seen in Figures 5 and 5. 
 
 
 
This robust programming resembles what Lugones (2014) calls “ornamental 
multiculturalism,” or multiculturalism that “reduces non-Western cultures to 
ornaments to be enjoyed touristically,” while ignoring and obscuring structures of 
power. These events generate colorful flyers, professional photographs, short 
Figure 5: Promotional material for “Buenos Aires Celebra Bolivia.” 
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video clips and hashtags through which the message of an inclusive, multicultural 
state is circulated via Facebook, Twitter, and government websites.   
One event put together by Buenos Aires’s Office of Collectivities of the Under-
Secretary of Human Rights and Cultural Pluralism (La Dirección General de 
Colectividades de la Subsecretaría de Derechos Humanos y Pluralismo Cultural) 
targets young migrants, some of whom I also interviewed as part of this study. This 
was a Mundialito, or “Mini World Cup” for young migrants between ages 18-35. 
Through advertisement such as that displayed in Figure 6, the Office of 
Collectivities recruited 24 teams for the 2017 tournament, including teams 
representing Portugal, Chile, Haiti, Spain, Paraguay, Ireland, Turkey, El Salvador, 
Peru, Austria, Brazil, Italy, Armenia, Colombia, Syria, China, Bolivia, Guatemala, 
USA, Panama, Senegal, Lebanon, and Russia. While the tournament was co-ed, 
most (if not all) participants were male, and further, not all participants were 
immigrants themselves, some, especially in teams like Italy and Spain, were 
children or grandchildren of immigrants who choose to represent that team. The 
Figure 6: Promotional Material for El Mundialito.  
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event took place on weekends throughout the months of June and July at a sports 
complex in the neighborhood of Colegiales (pictured in Figure 7), concluding on 
July 22 with the crowning of team Peru as the 2017 champion. According to one 
actor in the Office of Collectivities, the event exemplifies two central concerns of 
this office: integration and coexistence. The event itself, as advertised in the 
office’s website, aims to “promote and foment values associated with [sports] like 
coexistence, dialogue, teamwork, respect, cooperation and compromise.”    
 
i. Possibilities  
The youth I interviewed who participated in this event, had positive experiences 
during the Mundialito, explaining that they had particularly enjoyed the healthy 
competition among migrant communities.  In reference to the 2016 Mundialito, one 
leader in the Senegalese community summarized what he saw as the objectives 
and positive outcomes of the event, 
Well, the objective was, let’s say, first to generate relationships, friendships 
between different communities. We see each other a lot in the Argentine 
federation of collectivities. But the delegates of each community, not the 
youth. So, it was a moment for the youth of each community, could come 
together, share things, laugh, etcetera, have fun and it’s also, sports. It’s 
like, culture, it’s health, it’s happiness, it’s brotherhood… [it was] an 
opportunity for the members of each community to meet… For me it was 
marvelous. We were eliminated from the first round, but we loved the idea. 
The guys were really excited to get up on a Sunday at seven in the morning 
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to play at nine for example. Look, that’s incredible, it’s something that only 
sports can do. (Pepe, Senegal) 
For Pepe, the city government’s organizing of immigrant communities around 
soccer was a huge success. Not only did it allow immigrants from different 
countries to meet each other, but it also promoted healthy habits, happiness, and 
even brotherhood. It’s not that he formed long-term friendships with youth from 
other countries, Pepe admitted, but he did meet people and he viewed the state’s 
hosting of the event as a positive gesture in itself. 
In addition to the outcomes mentioned by Pepe, the event allowed migrant 
youth to engage with state actors on a different, much less bureaucratic field.  This 
was the case for the Panamanian team, composed mainly of cadets who were at 
the time enrolled at the Juan Angel Pirke School of Cadets in the neighborhood of 
Villa Lugano. During an interview, Jacob, one of the cadets, shared that much to 
his delight, he realized after a match that he was playing alongside one of the 
Panamanian Consuls to Argentina. Jacob shared his surprise: “I didn’t know it was 
the consul […] I didn’t know, really. He’s the Consul. Young, he’s 27!” 
In an interview weeks later, the Consul also delighted in his experiences during 
the 2017 Mundialito. He explained that he didn’t see any of his collogues there, but 
admittedly this probably had to do with the fact that, unlike him, diplomats tended 
to be over the age of 35 (the event’s cutoff age). He found great value in playing 
alongside Panamanian migrant youth living in Argentina. After the game, he said  
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he had to do some work, as many of the youth had questions about visas, 
passports, and other documents. This was a good way to build trust with young 
people, who he said, don’t always “dare to” [no se atreven] ask questions to official 
figures like himself, or for that matter know the role of their country’s consulates 
and sometimes even fear approaching such authorities due to their documentation 
status. 
ii. Limits 
While Pepe and the Panamanian Consul offered insights into some of the most 
interesting aspects of events like the Mundialito, during a conversation with 
Figure 7: Migrant Youth Playing Soccer, 2017 Mundialito  
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Andrés, a Guatemalan male in his early 20s who had also participated in the 2017 
Mundialito, some of the limits of the event also came up.  
It’s all to show. How do I explain it, like so that they [people] see, they eat, 
they try. Take pictures.  To show that Buenos Aires has all these 
collectivities that participate, and this and that, but it’s all for show. […] 
Maybe, thinking from an objective of rights, well one of the objectives that 
people have when they arrive to a country is to integrate. And so through 
these events, well you supposedly meet people, and you can stabilize 
yourself when you arrive, from that perspective we could say that it’s good. 
But it falls short, I think, for the number of events they do and resources 
they allocate.  
Andrés’ evaluation of city events like Buenos Aires Celebra and the Mundialito is 
mixed. On the one hand, he sees such events as an opportunity to meet people 
and soften the initial challenges of arrival that migrants might face by expanding 
their networks. On the other hand, he evaluates such events as “falling short” and 
being “all for show.”  While the events generate a lot of photo-ops and show the 
diversity of Buenos Aires, they don’t necessarily address the structural needs of 
the very migrants who are invited to participate and “be seen.” 
Jacob’s experiences are demonstrative of this contradiction, whereby an 
otherwise interesting event “falls short” in addressing some of the most important 
challenges that immigrants face in Argentina, including knowing their rights.  
J: Last year, I didn’t go [to the Mundialito]  because of school. And yesterday 
I went and I played. But, I don’t call myself a player because I play volleyball 
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more than anything. But I was careful to not insure myself because I don’t 
have insurance. I was a little scared. So I didn’t risk it all.  
 
M: Really? You had that in mind? 
 
J: Yea, because I don’t have insurance. Because one [classmate] who 
didn’t go was telling me: ‘no, I’m not going because if something happens 
to me in the game’… ‘no [I said] nothing will happen.’ And I went, but with 
caution… I mean, the other guy, he got injured last time, he didn’t go out of 
fear of having to go to the hospital.  
[…] 
 
M: Ok, but do you know that you have the right to go to a hospital for free, 
no matter what country you are from? 
 
J: Really?  
 
M: […] They may ask for a DNI [identity documents], but if you don’t have 
it, the law says that even if you don’t have it, they have to see you, no matter 
what […] 
 
J: Yea? If I have a traumatological problem, I can go?  
 
M: Yes, for anything […] 
 
J: But, which hospital? Any? 
 
M: a public hospital.  
 
While Jacob met the consul of Panama during the Mundialito, he also participated 
in the event with what he described as fear. Some of his classmates choose not to 
participate due to the same fear; the fear of getting hurt in a country where [they 
think that] they don’t have access to healthcare. Despite having lived in Argentina 
for over a year and having come to the country under a special visa program for 
cadets, Jacob and his friends did not know that under Argentina’s immigration law 
they have the right to public healthcare services just like any Argentine citizen. And 
so an event that some described as a fun opportunity for networking and 
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“integration” was for others a tremendous risk to take in a country where they did 
not fully understand their rights.  
 
2. Challenges from Below  
While producing some opportunities for migrant youth to network, the state’s 
“multicultural programming” can be generally described as having a more 
“ornamental” objective. Events like Buenos Aires Celebra, offer migrant diversity 
as a sight to be consumed, with little attention to the actual needs of migrant 
populations. As described above, migrant youth both enjoy these events and offer 
critiques of their limits. During fieldwork in Buenos Aires, I found that events such 
as the Mundialito and Buenos Aires Celebra were paralleled by a scene of cultural 
production offered by migrant youth organizations themselves. These involved 
theater performances, books published with cardboard and cloth, and radio 
programming. As the examples discussed below suggest, this scene was 
multicultural, multilingual, and transnational, and it provided an alternative to the 
state’s ornamental multiculturalism, offering both a critique of structural conditions 
and of the racialized securitizing narratives of the state. Further, rather than simply 
creating photo-ops and inviting others to “to see, to eat, to try” migrants’ culture, 
this scene often deliberately levied culture as a vehicle for resistance.  
 
i. Disrupting the Silence: A Typical Thursday 
 
The book No Olvidamos [We Won’t Forget], pictured in Figure 8, begins with 
the phrase, “It was a typical Thursday…” and it chronicles a tragic fire in a Buenos 
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Aires textile sweatshop in the barrio of Caballito that took place on March 30, 2006. 
The fire led to the death of five Bolivian children and one 25-year-old pregnant 
woman, who were resting upstairs in the crumbling facility where they lived and 
worked in conditions of “servitude.” Written and published by Simbiosis Cultural, a 
Bolivian youth collective based in Buenos Aires, No Olvidamos is but one in a 
series of books published through “Editorial Retazos," characterized by binding 
made out of cardboard and cloth scraps thrown out by local textile shops. 
Simbiosis Cultural also holds events every March 30th to “remember,” “denounce,” 
and “make visible” the precarious working conditions of so many Bolivian migrants 
living in Buenos Aires. Their actions, which also included calling attention to the 
trial subsequent to the fire, are meant to counter what No Olvidamos describes as 
a push for silence and inaction from all those—including the Argentine and Bolivian 
states—who depend on avoiding “overexposing” a system structured around 
exploitation.   
 
This book struck a chord given the silences about bordering country youth 
experiences (discussed in Chapter Five) that I encountered across state agencies. 
As I’ve argued following De Genova (2013), the Argentine state relies on a dual 
“scene of exclusion” (which sensationalizes the “out control” nature of migrations 
from bordering countries), and an “obscene of inclusion” (which silently 
incorporates these migrations into precarious labor markets). This silent inclusion 
is sustained through a sort of “discipline by neglect” that fails to address obstacles 
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that immigrants from countries like Paraguay and Bolivia encounter as they seek 
to regularize their status. 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Cover of No Olvidamos, written and published by Simbiosis 
Cultural, a Bolivian youth organization in Buenos Aires 
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During an interview, Juana, a youth leader in Simbiosis Cultural, shared 
some of the challenges of denouncing the textile shops where many Bolivian youth 
work and live. 
We thought it was right that those textile shops shouldn’t exist, but 
something was missing. So, these analysis… we would do them over time, 
and we also realized that the fact of reporting the textile shops first of all 
leaves many people without work. Like, it’s a problem that they don’t look 
at, the problem of denouncing. The other issue is how do they report it? 
Because they report it from a place of victimization of the worker. Right? 
Like a poor seamster, he’s a slave, we have to take him out, to liberate 
him..[…] And that, we thought that didn’t seem right.  There were just a few 
of us though, right? We didn’t have resources from anybody. Not from the 
state, not from anybody to take care of the situation. But at least we could 
make visible that which wasn’t fitting for us, right? And for us that was the 
first step, coming out of [the place of] victimization.  
In the context of a resounding silence from state agencies about the experiences 
of bordering country migrant youth, in No Olvidamos and other cultural 
programming, youth from Simbiosis Cultural call attention to the complex dynamics 
of young migrants who travel to Argentina to work in places like the Luis Viale 
sweatshop. In doing so, they also seek to move beyond simplistic narratives of 
victimization/criminality at the root of the limits of state responses to youth 
migration described in Chapter Three, while also offering a powerful and resolute 
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critique of the deadly structural conditions of exploitation that Bolivian migrant 
youth often face in Buenos Aires. 
  
ii. Disrupting the Streets: "We Are the Uncontrolled Migration" 
 
It is 4:00 pm on Saturday, November 26, 2016 and Mandioca Radioactiva airs 
in Buenos Aires through Radio Sur. This is a weekly radio program produced by 
Movimiento 138, a Paraguayan youth organization founded in 2012 after a land 
conflict resulted in the death of eleven peasants and six security officers in 
Curuguaty, Paraguay, and President Fernando Lugo was ousted by a right-wing 
Paraguayan parliament. The group has since been active in the sociopolitical 
scene of both Argentina and Paraguay. As Carmen, one of the group’s members, 
explained to me in an interview, the aim of Movimiento 138 has always been to 
"organize the anger, from a place that is honest, and creative above all."  Since 
2012, the group has held events to demand justice for Curuguaty and to promote 
the rights of migrants in Argentina. Toward the end of the two-hour-long radio 
program, the members of Movimiento 138 discuss a protest that took place just 
days prior in Buenos Aires. Hundreds of migrants marched to Congress to 
denounce the government’s expressed desire to change Argentina’s immigration 
policy and to open the country’s first immigrant detention center (Barbero 2016). 
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One program invitee and active member of Movimiento 138 explains, "We made 
noise, it was great to bother all the people there, to shut down the streets, it was 
really beautiful." In light of this, the radio hosts discuss also "making noise" at an 
event held by the immigration office on the Day of the Immigrant. The event felt 
staged, they explain. "It was a festival for blonde immigrants." It wasn't for 
"bordering country immigrants. We are the uncontrolled migration."  Here, 
members of Movimiento 138 seem to be both calling out the state’s construction 
of white and European migrants as more desirable than mestizo and indigenous 
bordering country migrants and delighting in the fact that their very presence poses 
Figure 9: Migrants March During Demonstration, November 2016.  
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a challenge to the state’s current discourses and securitizing policies. By stating, 
“we are the uncontrolled migration,” they are both referring to derogatory 
statements made in 2016 by high-ranking government officials regarding bordering 
country migrants which demonstrate the state’s unfavorable view of migrants like 
themselves, as well as their ability to “shut down the streets” like they did during 
the 2016 march pictured in Figure 9.  
Youth movements like Movimiento 138 develop a culture of resistance that is 
disruptive to the state's ornamental cultural programming. After attending several 
of the group’s events, I came to understand that for them, culture and social justice 
cannot be disentangled. During an interview, a Buenos Aires government worker 
in charge of the monthly Buenos Aires Celebra activities explained to me that the 
aim of the cultural programming was to  
establish the possibility for each collectivity that lives in the city of Buenos 
Aires, to have its own space on the street, in the public space once a year 
to celebrate their customs, traditions, and culture. 
In May of 2017, I ran into members of Movimiento 138 at Buenos Aires Celebra 
Paraguay. The group was selling traditional Paraguayan dishes. They were also, 
however, walking the streets handing out flyers which read, "Migrant rights are in 
danger."   
 
3. Conclusion: Culture as Resistance 
As I’ve discussed here, the cultural programming organized by state agencies 
to celebrate immigrants resembles an “ornamental” type of multiculturalism that, 
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while offering opportunities for networking among immigrant communities, does 
not necessarily address the structural inequities and social justice issues impacting 
immigrants in Argentina. On the other hand, a parallel scene of cultural production 
developed by migrant youth organizations like Movimiento 138 and Simbiosis 
Cultural is explicitly designed with the aim of addressing issues of inequity and 
social justice impacting migrant populations. The examples provided here pose a 
fundamental challenge to the state’s “border spectacles” over neighboring country 
migration discussed in Chapter Five, both reclaiming notions of “uncontrolled 
migration” to assert economic and political power and refusing to let exploitative 
labor conditions go “unseen” by the state.  
Juana, from Simbiosis Cultural, offered the following critique of Buenos Aires 
Celebra events, 
[During these events] the migrant is this […] And come everyone and watch, 
right? This is the migrant: the one who dances, the one who eats something 
different and nothing else. And the migrant has to do with a lot of things, 
with rights that are being violated, with respect… 
 
Culture, for members of Simbiosis Cultural and Movimiento 138, cannot be 
disentangled from questions of power and inequality.  Culture, becomes not only 
a source of belonging and enjoyment but likewise a vehicle for promoting 
democracy, rights, and justice. Culture for these migrant youth living in Argentina, 
is anything but ornamental.   
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CHAPTER VIII: CONCLUSION: THE RACIAL STATE AND THE 
SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION 
The moral panic over El Crimen de Brian discussed in Chapter Six exposes the 
centrality of “security” in the Argentine state’s immigration narratives. It reveals the 
ways in which—despite progressive immigration policy—countries like Argentina 
are by no means immune to the predictable framing of migration as a security 
threat. Further, it evidences the ways in which securitization efforts can hinge on 
“very Argentine” (Frigerio 2006) forms of racism, whereby immigrants and native-
born Argentines can be quickly externalized for the sake of the national project 
(because of skin color, class position, place of residence). Although a robust 
literature has explored the migration-security nexus (Bigo 2002; Bourbeau 2014; 
Domenech 2017; Donelly 2018; Doty 1998; Huysmans  2000; Magliano and Clavijo 
2011; Mountz and Hiemstra 2014; Squire and Huysmans 2014; Treviño Rangel 
2016), less attention has been paid to the ways in which this nexus—despite its 
multitude of contradictions—serves to maintain the racial state (Ibrahim 2005; De 
Genova 2017).  
Through this dissertation, I sought to analyze south-south “youth migration”— 
as a phenomenon that emerges as a “problem” for state and non-state actors 
involved in the governmentalization of migration.  Toward these ends, Chapter 
Three looked at the ways in which African youth migration is understood as a 
problem by state and non-state actors in a context of changing migratory flows to 
Argentina. The chapter points to 1) the racial and gendered underpinnings of 
narratives about “good” vs. “bad” refugees and relatedly, “real” vs. “pseudo” 
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children; 2) the deployment of age and related constructions of “childhood” vs. 
“adulthood” and “innocence” vs. “criminality” in practices of migration control; and 
3) the limits of such simplistic and simplifying narratives for addressing the needs 
and desires of young migrant populations. Chapter Four provides a broader look 
at the experiences of mostly male Latin American and African youth as they 
navigate the streets of Buenos Aires. I draw from Sara Ahmed’s work to theorize 
their careful navigation of the racialized landscapes of the city. I particularly look 
at 1) how youth understand how they are seen by state and non-state actors, and 
the ways in which they become marked as “suspect” based on their skin color, 
nationality or class position; and 2) how youth strategize to move about the city 
more safely and fluidly. The chapter seeks to move beyond simplistic dyads 
between migration control/immobility and freedom/mobility (Domenech 2017). 
Rather than the more apparent forms of migration control such as a detention or 
deportation, temporary stops and displacements emerge as consequential forms 
of migration control in Buenos Aires. Such practices, locating “insecurity” on the 
bodies of young migrants, serve to discipline youths’ mobility, teaching them what 
is their “place” in the city—a lesson they both challenged and strategically took 
note of.  
Chapter Five centers on neighboring country migrants and the continued 
significance of their presence in Argentina, and Buenos Aires specifically in the 
21st century. In this chapter, I draw from Nicholas De Genova’s notion of “border 
spectacles” to highlight the contradictions between the inclusion of such migrants 
in Argentina’s immigration law, and the narratives and practices that seek to (re) 
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produce their socio-legal illegitimacy in the nation. Through the example of 
bordering country “unaccompanied minors,” I argue that the state engages in a 
“willful neglect” to see such populations, producing “docile bodies,” whose 
precarious inclusion into a segmented labor market is desirable, and whose social 
exclusion is essential for the maintenance of “White Argentina.”  
Chapter Six offers an analysis of the context within which a significant 
challenge to Argentina’s 2004 immigration law took place in early 2017. Through 
analysis of media and state narratives regarding a crime in which one of the 
suspects emerged as a 16-year-old who happened to be the son of Peruvian 
immigrants, this chapter shows 1) the fragility of human-rights-based immigration 
policies when they co-exist with a narrative of nationhood that continues to hinge 
on notions of “White Argentina;” and  2) the fragility of belonging not only for 
global south immigrants, but also for Argentine-born citizens racialized as 
nonwhite. Chapter Seven looks at the “multicultural programming” put together 
by Buenos Aires state agencies, pointing to how a parallel scene of cultural 
production enacted by migrant youth themselves offers important critiques and 
challenges to the official narratives of the state.     
 
1. Externalization Through Security: Exception and Routine  
By bringing the historically-specific racial project of “White Argentina” to the 
forefront, this research sought to explore how racialization shapes state responses 
to youth migration as well as how young migrants understand their experiences in 
a country sometimes chosen for its progressive immigration policies. The objective 
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of this research is to bring to the fore new questions in migration studies, 
particularly about how “security” becomes constructed and deployed, who 
becomes understood as a “threat” to the state and on what account. The key 
arguments of my research project are organized through critical engagement with 
literature on the migration-security nexus. 
Critical security studies scholars have explored both the logics of “exception” 
and “routine” through which states seek to manage international migration 
(Bourbeau 2014). Such logics are also relevant for understanding the production 
of “state effects” in the face of ethno-racial, economic, and social contradictions 
that challenge the state’s legitimacy and, in the case of Argentina, the racial 
configuration of the nation. Both logics serve to externalize populations marked as 
“Other,” projecting any “unease” onto their bodies, and sustaining exclusionary 
boundaries of national belonging.    
 
i. The Logics of Exception and Routine 
I use El Crimen de Brian, for example, to illustrate what critical security studies 
scholars have identified as a “logic of exception” (Bourbeau 2014). Under this logic, 
“labeling something as a security issue imbues that issue with a sense of 
importance that legitimizes the use of emergency measures extending beyond the 
usual political processes” (Bourbeau 2014, p. 3). Notions of chaos, crisis, and 
disorder “become gateways to exceptionalism and opportunities for states to 
legitimate enforcement activities in ways that result in the expansion of sovereign 
reach” (Mountz and Hiemstra 2014, p.386). The signing of DNU 70, an emergency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 179 
decree supposedly addressing a crisis of insecurity perpetuated by “out of control” 
migration, becomes a textbook example of the “logic of exception” as 
conceptualized in critical security studies.  Such practices, however, not only allow 
states to pursue otherwise “exceptional measures,” they also allow states to re-
define problems, and, as a result, reaffirm their role as “providers of protection and 
security and to mask some of their failures” (Bigo 2002, p. 65). Exceptional 
measures taken in moments of “crisis” or “moral panic” legitimize state power in 
the face of challenges posed by the cultural and economic “blurring” of national 
borders under globalization (Duany 2011). As states like Argentina struggle to 
provide social, economic, and political “security” for its citizens, “exceptional 
practices” simultaneously provide a semblance of control and externalize “the 
problem” they define.  
Drawing from Foucault’s lessons on biopower, critical security studies scholars 
also note the routinization of security narratives and practices, arguing that the 
“logic of exception” functions in tandem with and is reinforced by a “logic of routine” 
(Bourbeau 2014). The routinization of (in) security involves the regularity with 
which states tap onto notions of crisis, emergency, chaos, and disorder for the 
purposes of negotiating contradictions posed by globalization, as well as the 
everyday (re) creation of insecurity and unease (Bigo 2002).  Bourbeau (2014) 
summarizes the “logic of routine” of securitization narratives as follows:  
…the logic of routine sees securitization as a process of establishing and 
inscribing meaning through governmentality and practices. It sees the 
securitization process as consisting of a series of routinized and patterned 
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practices, carried out by bureaucrats and security professionals, in which 
technology holds a prominent place. (p.3)  
Such routine (re) production of insecurity can be located in narratives about “bad” 
and “abusive” refugees that circulate across Argentine state agencies, in the 
routine stops that mark young global south migrants as suspect as they navigate 
the streets of Buenos Aires, and even in the normalization of discourses about the 
border as “out of control” in relation to South American migrants. 
 
ii. Producing State Effects  
Both the logics of routine and exception are tremendously productive for the 
racial state. Specifically, they help create what Trouillot (2001) has called the 
state’s spatialization, identification, and legibility effects. The “spatialization effect,” 
refers to the state’s ability to (re) assert power over its sovereignty and jurisdiction 
within its territorial borders (Trouillot 2001). Moral panics such as that over El 
Crimen de Brian as well as routine discourses of “border crises” allow the state to 
reassert power over its territorial borders, despite the permeability of Argentina’s 
borders and strategic acceptance of migrant presences. Similarly, as I have argued 
in Chapter Six, externalizing “insecurity” as originating from outside of the state’s 
territory, allows the state to reassert jurisdiction over its territory despite the 
citizenry’s disaffection with its ability to provide material and economic security. 
Routine and exceptional security measures also serve as “identification” and 
“legibility” effects for the state (Trouillot 2001), allowing state and nonstate actors 
to (re) produce notions of a collective, homogenous population, and at the same 
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time create a language that classifies and regulates said population, reproducing 
the material conditions for the undesirability and externalization of those marked 
as “Other.”  As Favell (2015) contends,    
We can actually observe the self-constitution of the (nation-) state in the 
very act of bringing itself into being in the way—albeit sometimes with 
difficulty—that it identifies, conceptualizes, classifies, enumerates and then 
controls the persons whose crossing made its own borders visible, and 
whose faces enable its own population to become a “people” (Favell in 
Brettell and Hollified, 2015, P. 322).  
As discussed in Chapters Three and Four, as young migrants become stopped on 
the street, their bodies marked as suspect, at times even examined through 
pseudo-scientific and invasive practices of age determination, everyday state 
actors contribute to narratives of national belonging that have been historically 
centered around “Whiteness” and structured in relation to categories of difference 
and othering. In Sara Ahmed’s terms, they reinscribe the skin of the social as white, 
forcing those racialized as non-white to navigate a mine-field of racialized 
suspicion—yes, moving throughout the city—but doing so ever so carefully and 
strategically.  
 
iii. Youth Responses  
This research has pointed to less apparent but perhaps no less insidious 
practices of migration control. In doing so, I’ve sought to attend to the ways in 
which young people—regularly constructed as potentially unruly, violent, and 
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delinquent (Chaves 2009; Reguillo 2000)—experience the state’s everyday 
deployment of the migration-security nexus. From protection mechanisms for 
asylum seekers, to everyday police interactions and media narratives, I’ve sought 
to understand how this nexus becomes relevant in the lives of global south migrant 
youth. I’ve argued that—precisely due to ongoing constructions of youth as 
potentially rebellious, unruly and even ungovernable, and the specific association 
youth/poverty/criminality, solidified since the late 20th century in Latin America— 
examining youth experiences with the state is fertile ground for understanding 
broader realities in Argentina.  Drawing from Youth Studies, I’ve also sought to 
explore how youth who participated in this research negotiated, challenged, and 
responded to the narratives and practice of the state, which often positioned them 
as the very embodiment of (in)security. In her work on “biopolitics,” as a form of 
social control and classification aimed at disciplining young bodies, Reguillo (2000) 
argues that “attending to the dimensions of biopolitics is not only unveiling 
mechanisms of control, exclusion, and domination, but also making visible the 
devices through which youth bodies subvert the programmed order.” (p.94) 
As I’ve shown, the routine, everyday securitization of migrants’ movement is 
deeply felt at the most intimate and embodied levels by youth like Ian, who 
strategically remains silent and wears “middle class” clothing in certain 
neighborhoods, or Steven and Jean who have carefully developed a specific 
habitus for their frequent encounters with city police.  I’ve documented experiences 
like those of Moru, a 24-year-old Senegalese street vendor who also strategically 
navigates the city in ways that reveal his knowledge of both the “routine” and 
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“exceptional” logic of state security narratives. Moru works the city streets 
constantly looking over his shoulders, carrying a highly-portable display of 
sunglasses. He is ready to “disappear” at the slightest sight of the city’s 
“professionals of security.” Moru’s ongoing “geographic disappearance” (Simmons 
2012) is a survival strategy. Much like what can be witnessed in other migrant 
cities, even if he is driven away by the presence of municipality or police agents, 
Moru might return to work at the same corner a few moments or hours later. And 
yet, he understands that not disappearing can have extreme and exceptional 
consequences for him. His merchandise has been taken without explanation 
before, and Moru is likely to be aware of lawsuits that other Senegalese migrants 
have filed against Buenos Aires police. Even more so, he is likely to be aware of a 
handful of YouTube videos that evidence the type of violence that can ensue from 
failing to disappear on cue. 
My experiences with Paraguayan and Bolivian migrant youth organizations 
also revealed youths’ creative responses to the exceptional and routine ways in 
which “insecurity” is located on the bodies of global south migrants. As discussed 
in Chapter Seven, youth collectives like Movimiento 138 and Simbiosis Cultural 
challenge state discourses and practices. For example, they reclaim narratives of 
“uncontrolled migration” to assert the sheer economic and political power of South 
American migrant presences in Buenos Aires, and—through constant efforts to 
“remember” a fire in a textile sweatshop where several Bolivian children and youth 
died in 2006—they seek to make the labor exploitation of Bolivian migrants visible 
in ways that cannot go “willfully unseen” by state actors.  
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2. Conclusion: Centering the Racial State in Studies of Migration and 
Security in Latin America 
This work aims to contribute to the literatures on migration studies and youth 
studies, both of which have largely side-stepped analyses of race and racialization 
in Argentina. As Alberto and Elena (2016) note, this gap is part of a broader trend 
in the literature on Argentina, which can perhaps be explained by the complex 
ways in which race has been historically subsumed under categories of class in 
Argentine society. This project centered the “racial state,” putting migration and 
youth studies in conversation to understand the experiences of young people as 
they encounter the everyday, contradictory, subjective, and embodied state. In 
doing so, it raised questions about the ways in which the 
youth/poverty/delinquency association so prevalent in Latin America (Reguillo 
2000) is also deeply racialized.  Further, it provided analysis of insidious forms of 
migration control that often exist outside of the more apparent practices (E.g. 
detentions, deportations) and can become consequential for young people. 
Exploring the state’s construction of “youth”—both foreign-born and native-born—
as either subjects in need of state protection, or threats to the security of the state 
and its population, provides an instructive window for understanding the ways in 
which migration control, or even its more subtle forms of “migration management,” 
can function in the service of the racial state.  
It is true, as Domenech (2017) writes, that—with a few exceptions (see for 
example, Magliano and Clavijo 2011)—Latin America is often overlooked in 
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academic debates regarding the migration-security nexus. As Domenech notes, 
the rise of “new right” governments across the region makes it imperative that 
scholars address this gap. This work, however, argues that analyses of the 
migration-security nexus must also attend to the racial state. Indeed, as De 
Genova (2017) has argued in relation to “migrant crises” in Europe, migration 
studies in the region may benefit from sustained questioning of the extent to which 
“migrant crises” may be productively explored as “racial crises.”
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